Violent Youth Gangs in Portland: a Study of the City\u27s Response by Lindberg, Debra Lynn
Portland State University 
PDXScholar 
Dissertations and Theses Dissertations and Theses 
1996 
Violent Youth Gangs in Portland: a Study of the City's 
Response 
Debra Lynn Lindberg 
Portland State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds 
 Part of the Social Policy Commons, Social Welfare Commons, Urban Studies Commons, and the 
Urban Studies and Planning Commons 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Lindberg, Debra Lynn, "Violent Youth Gangs in Portland: a Study of the City's Response" (1996). 
Dissertations and Theses. Paper 1188. 
https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.1187 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations 
and Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more 
accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Violent youth gangs in Portland: A study of the city's response
Lindberg, Debra Lynn
ProQuest Dissertations and Theses; 1996; ProQuest
pg. n/a
INFORMATION TO USERS 
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI 
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some 
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be 
from any type of computer printer. 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the 
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality 
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, 
and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. 
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete 
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if 
unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate 
the deletion. 
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by 
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and 
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each 
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced 
form at the back of the book. 
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced 
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white 
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations 
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to 
order. 
UMI 
A Bell & Howell Information Company 
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA 
. 313n61-4700 8oot521-06oo 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VIOLENT YOUTH GANGS IN PORTLAND: 
A STUDY OF THE CITY'S RESPONSE 
by 
DEBRA LYNN LINDBERG 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
in 
URBAN STUDIES 
Portland State University 
@1996 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number: 9628860 
Copyright 1996 by 
Lindberg, Debra Lynn 
All rights reserved. 
UMI Microform 9628860 
Copyright 1996, by UMI Company. All rights reserved. 
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized 
copying under Title 17, United States Code. 
UMI 
300 North Zeeb Road 
Ann Arbor, MI 48103 
•···---·--------------------------------
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
DISSERTATION APPROVAL 
The abstract and dissertation of Debra Lynn Lindberg for the Doctor of Philosophy 
in Urban Studies were presented May 7, 1996 and accepted by the dissertation 
committee and the doctoral program. 
APPROVALS: 
Sy Adler, Chair 
Annette Jolin 
Gary Perlstein 
:;;=;r Charles Tracy 
Kathryn Farr 
Representative of the Office of Graduate Studies 
rban and Public Affairs 
**************************************************** 
ACCEPTED FOR PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
by~~~ on '7-"u ,/9£'-:;, 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ABSTRACT. 
An abstract of the dissertation of Debra Lynn Lindberg for the Doctor of 
Philosophy in Urban Studies presented May 7, 1996. 
Title: Violent Youth Gangs in Portland: A Study ofthe City's Response 
Youth gangs infiltrated Portland's illegal drug trade in the early 1980s. By the 
mid-I980s, entire neighborhoods in some parts of the city were affected. Residents 
expressed fear that their children would be drawn into gangs. Violence between 
rival gangs was frightening. Citizens, law enforcement and social services 
personnel organized to defend themselves and adjust programs to manage the 
problem. City officials denied a problem existed until a gang style shooting death 
forced recognition. The shooting death was catalytic in that it launched an effort to 
respond with a continuum of services. The House ofUmoja was one of the 
services. 
The research was a case study of the response by citizens, street level service 
providers, and government officials to craft a meaningful gang control policy. Two 
themes were followed: The first addressed forces influencing decision-making and 
how those decisions shaped the process. The second examined considerations 
involved in selection of a community-based, residential, culturally-specific 
program. 
Data were collected through media accounts of events, organizational 
documents. and personal interviews utilizing a questionnaire format. The 
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information was used to reconstruct the "story" as it was shaped by events and 
policy decisions which affected it. 
2 
It was determined that affected citizens and street level service provid~rs 
recognized, early on, they were dealing with a more dysfunctional juvenile 
delinquent. Efforts to respond were valiant, but hampered by lack of support from 
the levels of government able to allocate funds to build appropriate methods of 
control. The House ofUmoja, part of the continuum of sanctions for gang involved 
youth, was implemented only after a painful, but rewarding, process involving 
citizens, strong community leadership, and the support of high ranking officials and 
influential business persons. 
Program selection was determined by arguments for establishing stronger 
tics between youth and their community in order to intervene with a holistic, rather 
than piecemeal approach. It was also influenced by the reputation of the 
Philadelphia House ofUmoja which had been providing services to·African 
American youth for 25 years. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Managing the activities of outlaw youth gangs is not a new problem in the 
United States. Adolescent involvement in smuggling and thuggery can be traced 
back to the Revolutionary War. Over time, techniques to control the illegal 
behavior of juveniles have often been reflective of cyclic variations in the general 
public's feelings of complacency or uncertainty. Depending on the tenor of the 
country, youth have been ignored, educated, banished, beaten, incarcerated and 
"rehabilitated" in efforts to prevent, incapacitate, or deter their criminal behavior 
(Haskins, 1974; Gilbert, 1986; Dryfoos, 1990). 
Aside from recent legislation requiring incarceration for specific offenses, 
contemporary prevention and intervention techniques have employed a social 
services model in an attempt to meet social and environmental needs believed 
unmet in the lives of gangsters. Programs have been implemented to supply 
nutrition and health care, substance abuse treatment, education, employment, 
sensitivity, and accountability training. Some programs attempt to provide loving, 
stable homes. 
In the last decade, citizen concerns regarding safety and economic issues have 
risen in association with drug trafficking youth gangs and their violent behavior. 
Gangsters have been responsible for overflowing caseloads in courts, hospitals and 
child welfare systems. Their illegal behavior has taken a ghastly toll in terms of 
property damage, and drainage on law enforcement and other public resources 
(Rohe and Burby, 1988; Currie, 1993). 
Drug trafficking and violent youth gangs operate in Portland, as in many U;S. 
cities. As early as the mid-1980s, drugs were openly dealt on street comers; graffiti 
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adorned homes and buildings; "colors" were flaunted; and mmed youth fought on 
the streets, killing each other and sometimes those caught in the middle. 
2 
City officials in Portland were reluctant, initially, to concede an issue existed, 
as few were willing to attach the label, "gang activity" to this behavior. Providers 
of direct services to youth and affected residents found they were encountering 
youth with serious problems which would require drastic responses. They 
approached the issue by increasing the number and intensity of programs for youth 
and by organizing within the community to manage problems and prevent them . 
from growing. Without political and fiscal support of lawmakers, though, effective 
control of gang activity was difficult to implement. Gang-involved youth 
continued to sell drugs, engage in other illegal acts, and intimidate residents of 
some neighborhoods. When a drive-by shooting resulted in the death of a teenager, 
city officials and unaffected residents were shocked. Those in daily contact with 
the gangsters were not surprised, at all. 
The purpose of the research is to examine the response of residents, 
community leaders, government officials, and professionals in social services and 
law enforcement to the problem of escalating gang activity in Portland. 
Two themes will be addressed. The first theme follows the forces driving the 
various responses to gang activity and how choices made by individuals helped to 
shape the process. The second theme addresses considerations involved in 
selecting a specific program for gang-affected youth. 
By the mid-1980s, many street level service providers were asking the City of 
Portland for assistance and scrambling to prevent the situation from eroding further. 
With seemingly irrefutable evidence of gang activity, one questions how city 
officials could have successfully avoided direct confrontation with the issue for as 
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long as they did. Theme one follows events leading to the opening of the House of 
Umoja, including denial by city officials; organization by street level workers and 
citizens; placement of the issue on the agenda of law makers; and efforts to 
implement a residential program as part of an overall continuum of interventions. 
Theme two examines the basis for selecting the House ofUmoja as a model 
for a community-based, residential, and culturally-specific program for youth in 
Portland. It describes the theoretical and practical perspectives of program 
designers who chose the House ofUmoja, despite the fact that it was not the least 
difficult to implement, the least costly to operate, or the least controversial to 
support. 
Though program designers knew about the Philadelphia House ofUmoja, 
they did not specifically think of seeking the help of its founders, David and Falaka 
Fattah, until the plans were well under way. When chosen, it was determined that 
the Fattahs, as consultants, would be enormously ~elpful and credible. An added 
reward was that, once in Portland, an air of mystique surrounded Sister Falaka 
Fattah, with her exotic name, traditional African dress, and fearless, grandmotherly 
approach to even the toughest gangster. She did, indeed, have the an unusual gift 
when dealing with youth who were gang-involved. 
Methodology 
The study relies on newspaper articles, organizational documents, and 
interviews with persons invo"Ived in the effort to institute measures to control gangs 
(see APPENDIX A for a detailed description of the methodology). An open-ended 
interview (see APPENDIX B for the interview guide) was devised to gather 
recollections and insights from individuals playing a role in gang management and 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4 
in bringing the House ofUmoja to Portland. The interview was accompanied by an 
informed consent form (see APPENDIX C for informed consent form). Both were 
approved by Portland State University's Human Subjects Research Review 
Committee. 
Interviewees were asked to describe how gang activity affected agencies with 
which they were associated and what measures were utilized to deal with the 
problem. Data relative to the process of consensus building with community 
groups and on the emergence and roles of community leaders were collected via the 
interviews. Interviewees were asked for their opinions on Umoja's impact and on 
its future. 
Summary of Chapters 
Chapter I is a short overview of the gang problem in Portland, the period of 
official denial that gangs existed, and the efforts to stave off deeper entrenchment 
of gangs. It describes the purpose· of the research and th~ themes it carries. 
Chapter II provides a history of the evolution of societal responses to juvenile 
delinquency. It then describes the theoretical framework underlying the response. 
It ends with a description of programs designed for prevention, intervet ·'ion 
suppression, and deterrence. 
Chapter III provides background material for the reader. The history and 
evolution of Philadelphia's House ofUmoja is chronicled. It is essential to 
understand how and why that program exists in order to comprehend the 
significance of the Portland facility. Regarding this program, Sister Fattah, of the 
Philadelphia House ofUmoja, states, "It is not only a philosophy, but also a 
strategy." Central to the program is the application of Afrocentric principles in 
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daily life. Included in the background material is an explanation of why the Houses 
ofUmoja have opted to use this value system as part of their teaching process. 
Chapter IV recounts the effort to control gang activity in Portland and to 
implement the residential program, the Portland House ofUmoja. It describes the 
early official denial of the gang problem and community efforts to manage it, in 
spite of lack of support from the city government. It narrates the events of the 
incident which shocked the rest ofthe city out of its complacency and the 
subsequent urgency to bring government agencies into a position to respond to the 
crisis. It relates how one response, the House ofUmoja, began with discussions 
about a residential facility and progressed to raising funds, siting locations, 
developing programs, hiring staff and actually serving youth. 
Chapter V discusses the ways in which different factions of the Portland 
community responded to a serious and complicated problem. It discusses the 
unofficial organizing by professionals and citizens groups. Reasons for city 
officials' lengthy period of denial are analyzed. Also discussed is how community 
leaders, community groups, business leaders and city officials interacted and 
influenced one another. The way in which that process was instrumental in shaping 
the way Portland manages its gang members is examined. 
Working Definitions 
I) Gang - A group with exclusive, predominantly adole~cent membership, often 
territorial, who engage in illegal and/or violent activities (Cummings and Monti, 
1993). 
2) Gangster- One who claims affiliation with the gang or engages in the above 
activities. 
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3) Juvenile Delinquency -All juvenile law-breaking, whether officially known or 
not. 
4) Juvenile Delinquent- A juvenile whose illegal behavior brings him or her into 
frequent contact with authority figures. 
6 
5) Street level service provider- worker from a public service agency, such as 
schools, police and welfare departments, lower courts, legal services offices, who 
interacts with and has wide discretion over the dispensation of benefits or the 
allocation of public sanctions (Lipsky, 1980). 
6) Community-based program - operation with a public welfare mission, located in, 
and with emphasis on a locale defined by a common interest. 
Interchangeable Terms 
1) Community-based, in-community, community action 
2) Juvenile delinquent, delinquent youth, at-risk youth, youth who are gang-
involved 
3) Street level service providers, human services personnel, social services 
personnel 
Delimitations 
The research is confined to an examination of the process of creating a 
functional human services program. It does not describe gang members, what they 
do, how they are inclined toward gang affiliation, how they are organized, or where 
they live. It addresses crimes which appear to be originating out of conditions of 
poverty, not out of mental illness or privileged thrill seeking. 
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CHAPTER II 
EVOLUTION OF RESPONSES TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 
This chapter provides a history of the evolution of societal responses to 
juvenile delinquency and a description of the theories reflected in the responses. It 
is divided into three segments relative to the juvenile court system: responses to 
juvenile delinquency before the establishment of the juvenile court system; 
responses during the period of the installation of the juvenile court; and responses 
since the juvenile court system became established practice in the United States. 
Chapter II also summarizes major theories of delinquency causation with 
emphases on sociological explanations. Before discussing major theories of 
delinquency causation among youth of lower social and economic class, it is 
important to cite Gibbons and Krohn's (1991) caveat: "Juvenile delinquency exists 
in varying degrees and takes a variety of forms" (p.6). It covers a wide spectrum of 
youthful infractions and varies in frequency, duration, and seriousness, and 
sometimes involves different forms of specialization. Many youth flirt with 
lawbreaking, but are not deeply entangled in crime. Most offenses are episodic acts 
of law breaking, interspersed with longer periods of legal conduct. Juvenile 
delinquency is often transitory behavior and most youth grow out of the activity 
whether anything is done to them or not. Most youthful offenders are 
psychologically normal and reasonably well-adjusted and their behavior cannot be 
attributed to psychological maladjustment. 
They further state that, "delinquency, like all other social behavior, has 
complex roots ... simple explanations of human behavior are usually inadequate" 
(p.7). Juvenile delinquency is usually rooted in basic features of social 
organization and is no less normal or basic as a behavior than is conforming 
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conduct. In addition, given the many forms of delinquent conduct, it is unlikely 
that a single theoretical formulation can be developed to provide answers to causal 
or etiological questions. 
I 
Major Theories of Crime Causation 
Theories explaining criminal behavior fall into three major categories: 
biological, psychological, and sociological. This study emphasizes sociological 
explanations for juvenile delinquency and focuses primarily on them. It briefly 
outlines the other approaches so that distinctions between the three categories may 
be drawn. 
8 
Biological theories, according to Void and Bernard (1986), contend that an 
individual's physical and biological abnormalities cause criminal behavior. Those 
who engage in criminal activity are considered abnormal, defective, and 
substandard, biologically. Biological inferiority is thought to generate in criminals, 
specific physical attributes making their appearance different from noncriminals. 
The criticism of biological theories is that research has failed to provide convincing 
evidence that criminality is related to body type or physical characteristics. 
Biological theories include the work ofLombroso, Kretschmer, and Hooton but, 
will not be detailed in this study. 
Psychological theories of crime causation argue that criminal behavior stems 
from personality problems rather than an individual's physical make-up or situation. 
According to Gibbons (1992), the theories primarily associate psychological factors 
with unlawful conduct, but biological and sociological factors are also taken into 
account. Freud's psychoanalytic theory was extended to criminology by Aichhom. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Others have proffered general arguments regarding links between emotional 
problems, sociopathic disorders, and unlawful conduct. 
9 
Sociological theories claim that criminal behavior is related to environmental 
factors: poverty and economic inequality; alienation; strain; social disorganization. 
Social disorganization and social control theories relate closely to literature on 
gangs. These theories emphasize dramatic changes experienced by residents in 
some areas of a city as its expansion forces competition over land use. The 
pressure caused by these changes can render social institutions ineffective in 
controlling the behavior of its residents. Inadequacies in the social environment 
(instability, immigrant or minority status, poverty, lack of upward mobility, under-
and unemployment, discrimination) are said to induce unlawful behavior in youth. 
Proponent" of these views contend that one's connectedness with, or 
integration into one's community influences control exercised by society. 
Increasing the amount of connectedness one feels toward society increases the 
likelihood of willingly adhering to its rules. Major contributors to this category of 
theories are Durkheim, Merton, Sutherland, Shaw and McKay, Cohen, Cloward and 
Ohlin, and Hirschi. These theories form the framework of the present study and 
will be described below. 
Durkheim (1858-1917) was one ofthe first to maintain that the normal and· 
pathological are not different forms of behavior, but are labels for social 
distinctions imposed on behavior. He expressed that the social needs and desires of 
people are potentially insatiable, and that social organization is needed to define 
and control the goal-seeking of individuals. He states that criminality is an 
inevitable feature of society and appears closely connected with conditions of all 
collective life. Members of a society condemn behavioral deviations and single 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
them out as crimes. The criminal serves as a means of determining the limits of 
permissible behavior (Durkheim, 1893/1988). 
10 
Merton ( 193 8) elaborated on Durkheim' s beliefs regarding the breakdown of 
regulatory norms and deviant behavior. He asserted that a substantial proportion of 
deviant behavior does not represent impulses of individuals breaking through social 
controls, but rather represents socially induced deviations which the social 
organization itself produces. The American cultural system encourages everyone to 
strive for success goals by means of regulated and socially approved behavior. 
Opportunities to reach goals through these means are unequally distributed. 
Society extols certain common success goals for the community at large. It then, 
severely restricts a significant part of the same population from achieving these 
goals, thus creating deviant behavior on a large scale. 
Shaw and McKay (1942/1988) viewed the concept of "differential systems of 
values" as referring to a situation where residents are not integrated into the social 
institutions of their communities, (e.g., church, school, and neighborhood groups) 
thereby rendering the institutions ineffective in controlling the residents' behavior. 
Most of the time, values which support the conventional order predominate, but in 
some communities delinquency can be a strong competitor as delinquent acts may 
bring prestige for the perpetrator. Youths' attitudes and habits are formed in 
accordance with the extent of participation and identification with peers, groups and 
gangs .. Social traditions are inseparable from the life of the local community and in 
some neighborhoods, the criminal tradition can be passed from one generation to 
the next. 
Shaw and McKay identified the "zone of transition," an urban area with high 
crime rates just outside the central business district. The area attracts immigrants 
- -·--- ·----
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11 
because it offers inexpensive housing and increased opportunities for employment. 
High delinquency (as measured by juvenile court referrals) persists even in areas of 
stable growth rates, and is attributed to lack of opportunities for people living in an 
area. It is not due to rapid turnover in population, lack of economic resources, or 
heterogeneity of local groups, as was previously assumed. High crime rates, they 
say, are clearly not due to any ethnic group's characteristics, but more to social 
dynamics within the zone of transition. 
Gibbons and Krohn (1991) state that the social disorganization approach fell 
out of favor in criminology in the 1960s and 1970s, but has recently experienced a 
resurgence of interest. The renewed interest in an ecological approach has resulted 
in a refocusing on some of the dynamics of social relationships, especially 
residential mobility which has been found to produce increased difficulty for 
persons living in an area to become acquainted. Not knowing and interacting with 
neighbors increases the difficulty in exerting informal social control over them; 
hence, the possibility of higher rates of crime and delinquency is increased. Policy 
implications of social disorganization theory include the development of 
community institutions, which serve to regulate behavior. In order for the approach 
to generate effective results, it would be necessary for residents to become involved 
in the lives of their neighbors. 
Sutherland ( 194 711988) offers the theory of "differential social organization" 
in which he argues that criminal behavior is rooted in the situation as defined by the 
individual who is involved. A criminal act will occur "when a situation 
appropriate for it as defined by a person, is present" (p. 169). 
He contends that some people learn criminal conduct behavior patterns and 
values through the same socializing influences as noncriminal roles are acquired. 
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Social influences are often inharmonious and inconsistent. This condition is a part 
of differential social organization, and it is in certain societies or communities that 
opportunities and pressures leading to the learning of criminal norms are 
widespread. The cultural system is one in which upward mobility is supposedly 
open to all. It exists with a social structure that deprives many of economic 
opportunities because of social barriers. 
Cohen and Cloward and Ohlin are most often associated with strain theories 
which attempted to explain the attraction of gangs and unlawful behavior among 
youth. Cohen (1955/1988) characterized the behavior of gang-involved youth as 
malicious, non-utilitarian, and negativistic. He focused on the origins of gang 
involvement in working class youths for whom the most important goal was social 
status. He argued that social-structural inequality creates social disadvantages. 
Working class youth are at a disadvantage, relative to middle class youth, in 
attaining high social status in middle class institutions, such as school. They are 
inadequately socialized in middle class standards of proper behavior and cannot 
compete for the approval of adults (such as teachers) when measuring "good" traits 
such as ambition, talent, asceticism, rationality, individual responsibility, courtesy, 
or control of physical aggression. 
Working class youth adapt to strain and frustration in three ways. Some 
choose to delay gratification of social status and strive for success, in spite of the 
low probability of achieving it. Others disengage from middle class values, retreat 
into the working class community and depend on intimate relations for satisfaction. 
The third choice is to become a part of the delinquent subculture. The subculture of 
the gang provides protection from assaults on an individual's self esteem inflicted 
by the middle class culture. The delinquent gang, frustrated by ·not being able to 
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achieve middle class status, encourages behavior opposite to middle class 
expectations. 
Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) opportunity theory posits an alternative view. 
13 
They argue that lower class youth share a common American value commitment to 
success which is measured, mainly, in middle class terms. Lower class youth, 
however, are at a disadvantage, relative to middle class youth, in access to 
legitimate means to reach the success goals. Pressure to engage in delinquent 
behavior is generated by the discrepancy between goals and the means to attain 
them. 
They further state that just as specific youth have differing access to 
legitimate opportunity structures, they also have differing access to illegitimate 
opportunities. That access is limited by both social and psychological factors. The 
individual must have access to the occasion to learn the values and skills associated 
with the performance of particular roles and must be supported in the role once it is 
mastered. 
The type of response to the difference between a youth's aspirations and 
expectations is heavily influenced by the opportunity to engage in delinquent 
behavior. Some lower class neighborhoods are characterized by an integration of 
conformist and criminalistic patterns of social organization. Others do not support 
stable criminalistic networks. Gang subcultures can develop in neighborhoods 
where organized criminal networks thrive. Unlike Cohen, Cloward and Ohlin 
assert that much gang activity has utilitarian value. In areas lacking organization, 
gang activity may still occur, but in a more superficial and chaotic form (Cloward 
and Ohlin, 1960). 
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Hirschi ( 1969) developed social control theory to explain why juveniles 
conform most of the time, since many youth are attracted to prohibited, risk-taking 
behavior. Social bond pertains to an individual's ties to the conventional social 
order (i.e., parents, friends). It is a theory of juvenile delinquency which takes a 
micro-level approach and which parallels social disorganization theory, a macro-
level approach. 
Four interrelated elements constitute social bond: attachment (strength of ties 
to others), commitment (devotion to conformist lines of conduct), involvement 
(degree of involvement in other activities), and belief(strength of attitudes toward 
conformity). Strong bonds indicate increased constraint on an individual to behave 
in ways which will not jeopardize a relative position in the social order. Weakened 
or severed ties allow an individual freedom to deviate. According the Hirschi's 
theory, to a juvenile, nonconforming behavior is inherently attractive and/or the 
most direct means to goal attainment. It is, therefore, a viable option. Weakening 
of ties does not guarantee delinquent behavior but places a person in a position 
where it is possible. 
Thrasher ( 1927) studied 1313 youth gangs in Chicago. His views are 
characterized as consistent with control theory, though he includes the concept of 
social disorganization. He contended children of all neighborhoods form play 
groups. In areas of social disorganization, social institutions are not capable of 
controlling the behavior of the play groups. In the absence of social controls, 
Thrasher argued, delinquent behavior offers a more exciting alternative to 
conventional behavior. Some areas of the city have weak social institutions. When 
institutions are weak, play groups are free to behave in a manner which is more 
attractive. 
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II 
The following section describes societal responses to juvenile delinquency 
before the establishment of juvenile courts. It is followed by a discussion of the 
theoretical base underlying the responses. 
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In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the American colonies offered 
attractive opportunities (but not guarantees) to European peasants. For the first 
time, they had the chance to start anew and to become land owners. By the second 
half of the eighteenth century, however, strong class distinctions came into 
existence. As had been the case in Europe, those not fortunate enough to be born 
into wealthy families could do little to change their fortune. 
Among those with least hope of material or status gain were orphans. Some 
were taken in by families, but by the ages of 12 to 14, boys were apprenticed to 
craftsmen while girls became household helpers. Orphans were not allowed to join 
the community as equals for years and became a separate class unto themselves. In 
an apprenticeship situation, the master was interested only in extracting work, not 
in the needs of the child. As a result, many alienated boys and young men 
expressed their frustration by sabotaging their master's materials. 
Hanlin and Hanlin (in Haskins, 1971, p.32) write, 
The lads and wenches met when they wished, they drank rum at the 
taverns and they danced together till late in the night. Reproved, they 
threatened to burn the town down over the ears of the Burghers. From 
time to time, disorderly gatherings and even open riots showed the limits 
of control. Apprentices were often among the active elements in eighteenth 
century mobs. 
As the population of cities increased, so did a class of servants, orphans, and 
derelicts for whom no responsibility was felt. The behavior of the youth was 
unwelcome, but due to fear, little was done to suppress them. The youth had no 
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power, nothing of value, and nothing to lose as a result of their actions. "Yet youth 
'gangs' were not so much a problem as an annoyance ... before the birth of 
America as a nation" (Haskins, 1974, p. 16). 
Much rioting and disorder existed prior to the Revolutionary War and youth 
who were disenfranchised were the primary participants in the disturbance. It was 
due to mob emotionalism, excitement, and the adventure of being against authority, 
as well as ordinary resentment of the poor toward the wealthy. The disorder was 
only remotely related to a clear dream of a new and independent country. After the 
war, driving out the British also meant driving out the British government, police 
forces, and other institutions of authority necessary to maintain an orderly society. 
More violence and mob activity resulted. Much of it was perpetrated by 
apprentices and orphans who had left country villages for the excitement of cities. 
By 1790, the unattached child was truly unwanted. The supply of slave and 
wage labor had reached the point where apprentices were no longer needed. The 
government built orphanages, C?Stensibly to provide the love and care of mothers 
and fathers. In reality, the institutions were more like prisons. No one in the 
orphanages was happy, and the bold were quick to escape (Ibid.). 
Those who did escape were once again relegated to the streets. Haskins 
( 1974) states, "Despite these bands of homeless youths, America did not have a 
'gang problem' as we know it. Philadelphia might fret about its delinquent youth 
and worry about its image in the eyes of sophisticated New York, but all this would 
seem trivial in comparison with things to come" (p.22). It was dangerous for the 
police to deter gang members' illegal and threatening behaviors. Policemen caught 
by the youth faced beating, torture, maiming, or death. Assistance in law 
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enforcement was often required from the National Guard and the regular army, the 
latter of which generally had no trouble dispersing the gangs. 
Many big city politicians, on the other hand, utilized the thuggery talents of 
gang members. They assured protection to gang meeting places and financial 
rewards for loyalty. They paid for blackjacking political opponents and voting 
many times over at the polls. Gangs, with the approval of politicians, came to play 
a significant role in political struggles in the nineteenth century (Ibid.). 
By the late eighteenth century and first half of the nineteenth century, the 
prevailing Puritan attitude toward the destitute, orphans and derelicts was outrage at 
their "moral" failings, including the "choice" to be a burden to society. Distinctions 
were drawn between the "worthy" and "unworthy" poor, but not between adults and 
juveniles. The sick, the insane, the destitute, and those whose crime was that of . 
"unworthiness", adults and children alike, were warehoused in prisons under brutal 
conditions. Penitentiary sentences, reflecting frustration with the impotence of an 
overloaded system, were meted out to adolescents for such offenses as being turned 
out of the house, vagrant thieving, begging, no means of support, and sleeping in a 
boat at night (Sanders, 1970; Schmalleger, 1993). 
Schmalleger (1993) states that by the end of the eighteenth century, social 
conditions were changing in Europe and America. The Enlightenment focused on 
human potential rather than on mysticism. The growth of an industrialized 
economy led to movement away from agrarianism, a lowering of infant mortality, 
and the implementation of poor laws. Children began to be appreciated as a source 
of cheap labor and as successors to the future. Society became concerned with 
treating them well. 
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This concern led to the creation of houses of refuge and schools of reform, 
which were created in the early nineteenth century to "save" the hordes of orphans, 
runaways, and children of the destitute who wandered the countryside making their 
livelihood through crime. Problems caused by imprisoning youth with mature 
criminals were also beginning to be recognized as harmful to children. The newly 
created institutions were designed to care for and educate children toward the 
positive values of work. In order to accomplish this, when possible, youths were 
put to work in factories tending machines for long hours. Other juveniles were 
shipped to the frontier to help farmers clear land and seed crops (Ibid.). 
Partly altruistic, the gesture to house and feed the unattached youth was 
mainly related to concern for the protection of persons and property from the young 
offenders. Institutional conditions were seldom preferable to homelessness 
(Haskins, 1974; Sanders, 1970; Trattner, 1994). The youth were being controlled 
to some degree; charity organizations were not overburdened and public patience 
was not yet inexorably strained. Problems related to poverty and crime could still 
be contained - or hidden. The great wave of immigration in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, however, would strain traditional methods of managing the 
poor. 
Between 1860 and 1900, fourteen million immigrants entered the United 
States; another nine million came between 1900 and 1910 (Trattner, 1994). They 
were a "backward helpless mass," according to Epstein (1953, p. 2). The shear 
number of mostly unskilled laborers, concentrated in industrial centers, living in 
squalor, hunger, and misery was too stark to contain, hide or ignore. Laziness was 
no longer assumed to cause poverty. Inadequate wages, crowded and filthy living 
conditions, oppression, and the utter hopelessness of ever finding a way out of the 
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ghettos became recognized as factors contributing to the continuance of the tragic 
lifestyle (Haskins, 1974; Sanders, 1970; Trattner, 1994). 
Fierce competition for scarce food, housing, and jobs fueled graft and 
corruption. Urban ethnic gangs were driven to the streets partly by crowded living 
conditions, partly for numerical safety, but also for the excitement and material 
gain afforded by criminal activity. Sometimes loosely on the payroll of politicians, 
young gangsters were employed to handle odd and unsavory assignments. Though 
not steady work, lack of police interference offered the opportunity to ease some of 
the misery of ghetto life and to join in the excitement of criminal activity (Haskins, 
1974; Karger and Stoesz, 1994). Haskins (1974, p. 21) states, "Society had lost 
both the desire and the ability to police every corner of the community. As long as 
the armies of boys stayed within certain areas of the city, they had little fear of 
apprehension and little hope of help." 
The following section describes the theoretical frameworks reflected in 
society's response to juvenile delinquency prior to the establishment of juvenile 
courts. The general theories discussed are those of Cloward and Ohlin, Shaw and 
McKay, and Sutherland. 
As Trattner (1994) states, the first institutions for juveniles were, in reality, 
juvenile prisons with prison cells, prison labor, prison punishment and prison 
discipline. The method of managing youthful offenders was based on the 
"prevailing nineteenth century belief that the roots of delinquency were in the 
individual, who freely chose to act in a deviant manner and thus needed to be 
'reformed', severe punishment was considered not only a legitimate part of such 
institutions but also their very function" (p. 124). 
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In the early years ofthe United States, the Puritan influence emphasizing 
obedience and discipline strongly governed much of society. Criminal behavior, 
including that committed by juveniles, was viewed as freely chosen by an 
individual. The free will perspective held that decisions were made by individuals 
who were capable of making rational choices based on potential benefits of 
committing a crime versus its costs (Void and Bernard, 1986). Children, 
considered no less capable of free will than adults, were punished no less harshly 
for their sins. Society believed its severe discipline was justified because it had a 
duty to save souls. 
Once juveniles were recognized as requiring treatment different from adults, 
responses reflected theories of social disorganization and strain. Houses of refuge 
and schools of reform were a reaction to rapid social change brought on by 
industrialization and the move away from an agrarian economy. Institutionalization 
served two basic purposes. It removed the immediate threat to person and property 
posed by the youth, and it was an attempt to integrate the youth into socializing 
organizations of church, school, and the institution, itself. It was believed that 
association with peers who were not involved in criminal activity would influence 
similar lawful behavior in the delinquent youth. 
Sutherland's theory of differential social organization is related to thought 
regarding the influence of peers and learned criminal behavior. Reform schools 
and houses of refuge were expected to remove youth fror:n the ability to learn 
unlawful behavior and allow them to acquire only socially approved habits and 
tastes (e.g., religiosity and appreciation for hard work). Placement in institutions 
was also an attempt to remove situations perceived to be appropriate for 
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commission of an illegal act. Lengthy, supervised work periods resulted in 
exhausted youth with little free time for criminal activity. 
Cloward and Ohlin's theory of opportunities to engage in illegal behavior is 
connected to situations appropriate for committing a crime. Removal to an 
institution designed to house society's unwanted youth also removed the youths 
from opportunities to engage in illegal behavior. It was believed that hard work, 
direct supervision, and exposure to a community of individuals supportive of 
conforming patterns of behavior, would influence prosocial attitudes in the youth 
remanded to the institutions. 
III 
This section details responses to juvenile delinquency during the time of the 
establishment of the juvenile court system. It is followed. by a description of the 
general theoretical frameworks reflected in the responses. 
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Toward the end ofthe nineteenth century, established avenues of assistance to 
the poor were no longer able to cope with the demands of the masses of destitute 
immigrants. Calls for reform in traditional relief practices were made. Settlement 
houses, located in lower class urban neighborhoods, arose as criticism grew over 
the ineffectiveness of organized aid in controlling youth-gang criminal activity. 
They offered meals, recreation activities, employment training and respite from the 
harshness ofthe streets (Platt, 1977; Trattner, 1994). 
Many of the early settlement workers ("child savers", as they called 
themselves) were upper class, politically connected women (Jane Addams and Julia 
Lathrop being most notable). Their energy was focused on the social and economic 
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conditions responsible for poverty and crime and they sought to remedy them in the 
political arena. Platt (1977) states that the child savers were a, 
group of 'disinterested' reformers who regarded their cause as a matter 
of conscience and morality, serving no particular class or political interests. 
The child savers viewed themselves as altruists and humanitarians dedicated 
to rescuing those who were less fortunately placed in the social order. Their 
concern for 'purity', 'salvation', 'innocence', 'corruption'; and 'protect.ion' 
reflected a resolute belief in the righteousness of their mission (p.3). 
The settlement house activists' most lasting contribution to juvenile crime was 
not its elimination (or even amelioration). The child savers' contribution was their 
success in pushing into the political field a new category of youthful misbehavior: 
juvenile delinquency. Through their efforts, juvenile crime was recognized as a 
social problem requiring improved legal and correctional methods. Settlement 
house activists helped define juvenile delinquency and set the stage for modem 
methods of managing it: a separate category of human being (adolescent), 
requiring separate courts, laws, and punishments, and new thoughts about 
protection and responsibility. The first juvenile court was opened in Illinois in 
1899, and many states followed Illinois' lead (Platt, 1977, Trattner, 1994). 
Juvenile court was intended to avoid the stigma of crime by creating new 
procedures for handling youthful offenders. It was based on the old English notion 
of parens patriae where a child who committed an illegal act was considered 
someone whose social development was so faulty that the state was justified in 
intervening as an authority to bring in corrective influences to compensate for 
previously inadequate rearing. Informal hearings were held in the judge's private 
chamber without lawyers, oaths, or robes. The judge was supposed to act as the 
parental guide, seeking to reeducate, enlighten, and "save" youths, rather than 
punish them (Schmalleger, 1993, Trattner, 1994). 
---------· 
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Platt ( 1977) contends that the juvenile court system was developed as a 
vehicle through which unemployed and troublesome immigrant youth could be 
controlled and made into malleable members of the working class. In addition, he 
argues, middle class women who worked to create the juvenile court were 
concerned less with the welfare of childr~n than their desire to control those of the 
"dangerous classes" and to carve out more meaningful lives for themselves (i.e. 
professional careers). 
Whether well-intentioned or not, the programs the child savers supported 
diminished the civil liberties and privacy of youth. For example, an adolescent 
could be placed in schools of reform at the whim of the child saver or the parent, 
even if no crime had been committed, if it was believed the youth were incorrigible 
or living in an impure environment. Child activists were successful in reforming 
some aspects of life for the poor (such as introducing child labor laws), but houses 
of reform, settlement houses, and the juvenile court system were only marginally 
effective in reducing crime (Helfgot, 1981; Haskins, 1974; Platt, 1977; Trattner, 
1994). 
This section describes how the theories of Merton and Dirrkheim, Hirschi, and 
Shaw and McKay are reflected in the establislunent of a juvenile court system. 
Merton and Durkheim's beliefs regarding the breakdown of regulatory 
norms is reflected in the desire of settlement house activists to ease the burden of 
immigrants who were fighting a battle for survival under the competitive urban 
conditions in the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
Settlement houses reflected a response to the social disorganization caused by 
the crowded and chaotic living conditions experienced by many immigrants. The 
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reformists sought to assist youth in connecting with the social institutions of their 
communities. They believed that through educational programs, meals, and access 
to leisure activities, they could increase the controlling influence the community 
had over the behavior of its wayward youth. 
Social bond and social disorganization theories were reflected in the 
establishment of the juvenile court system. This response to juvenile delinquency 
represented a societal belief that an authoritative figure needed to be a controlling 
influence in the life of a child. Informal community controls often did not prevent 
youth from committing crimes. Often a child's natural parents were absent, unable 
or unwilling to provide guidance and protection. Official government entities, then 
had an obligation to intervene in the life of the child and instill values and ethics 
believed to be absent. It was an attempt to link a youth with the conventional order 
in place of, or in addition to, parents and an involved community. The notion of 
guidance rather than punishment more closely mirrored a biological parent's 
handling of a child. The more lenient treatment was believed to strengtllen bonds 
and increase the constraint on an individual to behave in a socially acceptable 
manner. 
IV 
Section IV presents societal responses to juvenile crime since the 
establishment of the juvenile court system. It is followed by a description of the 
theoretical frameworks reflected in the responses. 
After the turn of the century, reformist practices became established and the 
public believed that humane and "scientific" treatment was being administered to 
wayward teenagers. Though the next four decades were uneventful relative to the 
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progressive era, cycles of concern regarding youths' deportment rose and 
diminished. Gilbert (1986) reports that any juvenile delinquency during World 
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War I was attributed to the international conflict. "Flaming youth" ofthe 1920s 
were believed to be influenced by silent movies and dime novels. "Indeed," he 
states, "novels, dime novels, and other sorts of artifacts of popular culture had at 
one time or another borne the blame for seducing the innocent child from the 
bosom of his or her family into the destructive and dangerous culture ofthe streets" 
(p. 3 ). In the 1930s, the criminality of the highly publicized, sometimes 
romanticized, "gangs" was believed to incite similar behavior in adolescents. 
Though intense attention was occasionally diverted to the cause, skirmishes 
between youth and parents, teachers, and law enforcement officials were short-lived 
and episodic during this period. 
Spergel ( 1995) states that in response to juvenile delinquency of the 1930s, 
local groups took on more responsibility for the neighborhood conditions presumed 
to beinfluencing the creation of the gangs. Local community organizations, 
citizens, welfare councils, youth agencies, and the criminal justice system 
coilaborated at the neighborhood level, to manage the youth gang problem. Citizen 
involvement, support and control was intended to help restore a sense of 
community and lead youths to more acceptable behavior. 
Rapid social disorganization brought on by World War II raised concerns 
about its impact on children. Gilbert (1986) states that delinquency was a 
phenomenon whose interpretations involved complex fears about the impact ~f war 
and social change on children, and it became an important public issue in 1942 and 
1943. Journalists sensationalized the issue by offering lurid headlines and 
predicting crime waves. Films and journal articles exaggerated the seriousness of 
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delinquency and offered nothing more than easy, vague solutions. Law 
enforcement officials reduced the cause of juvenile delinquency to women 
neglecting their duties at home by going off to wartime jobs. While working 
women were especially blamed for youthful crime, excessive and early 
employment of children, geographic mobility, and the windfall of high wages 
suddenly available to previously poor or economically marginal populations were 
listed, as well. 
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Concrete evidence of an increase in juvenile crime was difficult to find, partly 
because crime reporting was imprecise. FBI figures showed that arrest rates for 
youth under eighteen years rose by over 40 percent in 1943. The Children's Bureau 
collected statistics from Children's Court cases and arrived at markedly different 
figures. Though wishing to impress the seriousness of delinquency upon the 
public, the Children's Bureau was also interested in avoiding the projection of an 
exaggerated sense of the problem. 
By the time issues were brought before the senate subcommittee on juvenile 
delinquency, interagency competition (squabbling, territoriality,jockeying for 
position and funds) redirected the focus of the committee. Findings and 
recommendations had little substance. Each side blamed the other for its lack of 
efficacy. "Senators concluded that delinquency could not be reduced to a single 
cause, and certainly not to a 'general laxity in morals' or to 'neglect by working 
mothers,' ... a dangerous fallacy" (Gilbert, 1986, p. 36). 
The character of delinquency seemed to change after World War II. The spirit 
of civil rights, class mobility and more relaxed traditional thinking punctuated the 
post war climate. An intense interest phase of the concern-cycle was activated by 
fears that a whole generation had turned sour. By the mid-1950s, frenzied dance, 
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music and family rebellion were cited as indicative of vicious and bored youth who 
would next turn to murder and mayhem for amusement. Worry gradually 
dissipated despite the fact that juvenile delinquency increased statistically. Societal 
acceptance set in, the post war adolescents grew up, and American culture more 
positively focused on the creativity of youth, reducing the overtones of criminality 
and suspicion (Ibid.). 
During this period, many of the urban poor were unemployed migrants, 
displaced by the agricultural revolution (especially modernization and 
mechanization which lessened the need for farm labor) which began in the 1940s. 
Ghettos of the 1950s were populated by the least articulate and by those least able 
to make their plight known or their power felt: the young, the old, the unskilled, 
and the members of minority and culturally distinct groups. They were people for 
whom no one felt any real responsibility. It was difficult to raise money or to 
maintain interest in programs designed to assist them. Once again, there was 
inadequate housing, wretched, crowded ghettos, a swelling of relief rolls, and 
violence, hopelessness, and discontent (Trattner, 1994). 
Marris and Rein (1982) write that the Eisenhower years were not responsive 
to the inequality in economics. The standard of living for all seemed to be rising 
and the position of unskilled workers was improving more rapidly than for others. 
A progressive tax structure, expanded welfare services, mass public education and 
the G.l. Bill all served the aims of economic growth and income redistribution. It 
was believed that marginal economic groups would in time "gracefully succumb" to 
the diffusion of good living, and in the end, only a small residual group of 
incorrigibles and incompetents would remain. 
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There continued to be a widespread belief in mass prosperity. There remained 
" ... an era of complacency: Contain the Communists, balance the budget, cut 
taxes, and don't rock the boat..." (Trattner, 1994, p. 31 0). By the late 1950s and 
into the 1960s, however, the myth of overall prosperity could no longer be 
believed. Omnipresent poverty and other indications of inequality could not be 
hidden or ignored. 
Growing concern over the plight of the poor in urban ghettos, the sharp rise in 
both welfare expenditures and citywide rates of juvenile delinquency brought about 
the first of the professional reform organizations. Sponsored by several agencies 
and institutions (President's Committee of Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime, 
the City ofNew York, the Ford Foundation and National Institute for Mental 
Health in the forefront), the community action programs were designed to address 
problems associated with gangs, crime, poverty, unemployment, and 
discrimination. 
The most notable program was Mobilization for Youth (MFY), concentrating 
on New York's Lower East Side and offering employment bureaus, manpower 
training programs, remedial educational work, anti-discrimination activities, and 
neighborhood service centers. MFY was designed to provide greater opportunities 
for education and employment in slum neighborhoods. MFY's innovative 
approach was to introduce a neighborhood program of community organization and 
participation. Worker-s were sent out to make contact with members of street 
gangs, to establish relationships, become accepted and, once accepted, try to 
redirect antisocial behavior into socially acceptable paths.(Helfgot, 1981 ). 
MFY eventually recognized the limits of its cooperative approaches to deliver 
programs to the poor. Traditional service-providing agencies strongly resisted 
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MFY's objective of increasing their responsiveness and accountability to low-
income people. According to Marris and Rein (1982), MFY used its recognition of 
the limitations of the cooperative approaches to justify a more aggressive approach, 
claiming, "exercise of power would help poor to overcome their apathy" (p. 67), 
and began to rely on overt tactics to pressure for reforms. 
The organization grew more militant throughout the 1960s and encouraged 
the poor, also, to speak out for more meaningful services. MFY became outwardly 
critical of the very city agencies which either controlled or could influence its 
funding base. Over time, the program was divested of its influence and its most 
militant staff fired. By the early 1970s, it had ceased to exist. Though MFY had 
problems with unclear direction, public relations and territorial problems, it did 
become the prototype for community based programs for the next thirty years 
(Helfgot, 1981; Marris and Rein, 1982; Trattner, 1994 ). 
In 1960, John Kennedy had made juvenile delinquency, mental health, 
poverty, unemployment, and hunger part of his campaign theme and it was highly 
critical of the general neglect of these issues during the 1950s. 'Jhe Civil Rights 
movement had made it no longer possible to ignore Blacks and other minority 
groups. Social conditions were ripe for reform programs aimed at these issues. 
The community action model ofMFY was adopted by subsequent programs ofthe 
Kennedy and Johnson era's War on Poverty. 
Though well-intentioned, War on Poverty efforts were fraught with 
difficulties, many revolving around unrealistic promises made at the beginning of 
Kennedy's campaign. Rhetoric bore little resemblance to the tools available to 
carry them out. Rather than deal with real poverty-reducing factors, such as racial 
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discrimination and structural unemployment, the administration chose to give 
money to the poor in an effort to pacify them (Helfgot, 1981, Trattner, 1994). 
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What was to be accomplished was articulated in only grandiose and 
ambiguous terms, and almost any interest could be enticed to support the effort. 
After Kennedy, Johnson was concerned with getting laws on the books, but allowed 
implementation to be someone else's problem. In the tradition ofMFY, community 
action programs, the Job Corps, training programs for high school drop outs and 
unemployed teenagers, legal services for the poor, Head Start, Volunteers in 
Service to America (VISTA), and urban renewal programs, all quickly came into 
being. Soon each program was plagued with unexpected, difficult problems due to 
lack of leadership, training, or other real support from the federal government 
(Brewer and deL eon, 1983 ). 
Another program based on the MFY model was the Grey Areas Projects 
designed to address the problems of people living in the zones of deteriorating real 
estate between metropolitan downtowns and the suburbs. That area became the 
place where those new to the city settled, mostly migrating southern Blacks and 
other minorities. Oakland, New Haven, Boston, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C. 
and North Carolina were selected as project sites. 
Central to the approach of the Grey Areas Projects was the belief that poverty 
is self-perpetuating; that children of the poor and ill-educated start at a disadvantage 
and soon fall behind. Youths with no skills will become dropouts, in frustration 
tum to crime, and will always be poor. Since the causes of poverty are circular; 
intervention at any point could be helpful. Most efforts concentrated on the young 
and offered educational, employment training, and life skills programs. 
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Like MFY, the Grey Areas Projects were rife with problems. Cooperation 
broke down because the projects were preoccupied with the design of the programs 
and with a sophisticated method of evaluating the outcomes. They neglected the 
practical details of implementation. Existing agencies were, in many cases, 
defensive about public criticism of their lack of success in ending poverty and 
controlling crime. They, therefore, resisted experiments thrust on them by the 
outside agency. They were inadequately informed of the background and planning 
that needed to take place, the purposes and scope of the programs, and the roles 
which they were to assume. 
Frustrations arose when institutions would not, in practice, commit to the 
autonomy of the project's structure or to its innovative spirit. Reformers supposed 
that an institution, such as a school district, took part in the planning of changes in 
the curriculum because of genuine interest. Often, this was not the case. The 
institution did not want to reject grant money, and did not want to refuse to 
participate in a progressive community venture, in order to avoid public criticism. 
To some institutions, participating in the projects was a fund-raising resource, 
whose independent views on their practice were a tiresome impertinence, directing 
money to peripheral experiments. 
Schools and other institutions were not interested in innovation. They only 
desired to conduct "business as usual" or receive funding for pet projects. They 
viewed the federal government as being intrusive despite the fact they were a 
funding source. They were overwhelmed by the many jurisdictional rivalries, and 
there was much unclearness about hierarchy. The programs were officially in one 
local department, but informally run by another. Some agencies maintained 
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authority but played a passive or uninvolved role. Others felt their jurisdiction was 
usurped by an invading department. 
Marris and Rein (1982) add that no one agency or service looked at people in 
their totality or looked for new approaches to the dilemma of the poor. The 
etiology of poverty is convoluted and many individuals can assume some 
responsibility for alleviating their own condition. Yet the Grey Areas projects 
insisted that "institutions, not their users, were to be the target of reform" (p. 40). 
The projects were cramped by their inability to supersede the limits of local action 
and tackle the national problems which underlay their frustration. 
Marris and Rein (1982) found apathy not as crucial to the poverty cycle as 
previously thought. When offered an opportunity which was perceived as genuine, 
the projects received a greater community response than they could handle. It was 
not apathy amongst the poor, but amongst the staff of institutions serving them that 
most frustrated progress. "Disillusionment is not apathy, and to confuse them only 
complacently displaces the responsibility for failure" (p. 90). The weaknesses were 
not the programs, themselves, but rather society, the continuing poverty and 
discrimination, the ghettos, inequality of opportunity, and all the problems that give 
rise to gangs (Haskins, 1974, Marris and Rein, 1982). 
Spergel ( 1995) states that in recent decades, four basic (and one modifying) 
types of responses to juvenile delinquents and gangs have emerged. He states that 
each strategy has been dominant in a particular historical period and each is related 
to different suppositions about causes of, and solutions for the gang problem. The 
strategies, in chronological order, are: local community organizing and 
mobilization; social intervention; social economic opportunities provision; 
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suppression (including formal and informal social control and incarceration); and 
organization or institutional change and development. 
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In the 1970s and 1980s, community organization strategies became more 
closely aligned with suppression methods to control juvenile delinquency and youth 
gangs. The focus changed from the individual's unmet needs, and was directed 
toward the crime event. ·School grounds became the center of attention as school 
staffs, parents, and students were mobilized to maintain the safety of children as 
they traveled across gang territories to and from school and home (Ibid.). 
Spergel states that in the 1990s, the community organization approach utilizes 
coalitions of justice agencies, schools, community groups, and former gang 
members with local, state and federal agencies to deal effectively with gangs. 
Focusing in drug trafficking and violence, the coalitions also engage various human 
service agencies to employ drug use prevention strategies. 
~ocial intervention strategies of the 1950s were based on the assumption that 
youth could be redirected to fit the expectations and needs oflarger society. It was 
believed that appropriate behavior could be generated through peer counseling, 
group development activities, and crisis intervention or mediation. The gang 
structure was manipulated through group meetings, coun~eling, referrals of 
individual members to services, and the involvement of parent and community 
groups. These methods were phased out in the late 1960s as the gang problem 
seemed to become more complex and the youth less amenable to street work 
counseling and recreational strategies (Ibid.). 
In response to community concerns and with the inducement of federal and 
state initiatives and resources, youth agencies became involved again with the 
· youth gang problem in the late 1980s. Younger youths were targeted in efforts to 
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prevent serious gang or criminal behavior. Mediation of disputes between gangs 
was emphasized and attempts were made to increase cooperation and coordination 
between street workers and law enforcement personnel. Local citizens, former 
gang members and schools were included in control efforts. Recent programs 
include crisis intervention, outreach, diversion, counseling, role modeling, 
mentoring, group work, drug prevention and treatment, presentence and 
postsentence services, tattoo removal, conflict resolution, leadership development, 
referral for services, job training and development, and temporary shelter (Ibid.). 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the rising rates of delinquency, unemployment, and 
school failure of inner-city youths were attributed to lack of opportunities to middle 
class standards of success. Concern over these conditions produced efforts by 
foundations and federal agencies to change social institutions and to establish new 
types of schools and training programs directed toward youth. Programs 
emphasized new social opportunities for disadvantaged youth and demonstrated 
greater involvement of the federal government at the local neighborhood level. The 
new approach was thought to solve both delinquency and overall poverty (Ibid.). 
In recent years, states Spergel, the social services approach is no longer 
viewed as a simple or direct method of furnishing access to opportunities since 
counseling and personal development activities are not considered tantamount to 
basic social and economic opportunities. Activities associated with acquisition of 
jobs (e.g., job preparation, job placement and development, vocational training, 
remedial tutoring, apprenticeship, and competence-building) are con~idered 
opportunities. 
Suppression methods to control youth gang activity grew out of 
conservative attitudes of the 1970s and 1980s. Community youth outreach efforts 
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diminished, community alarm over crime increased, and a police suppression 
approach developed. Intense law enforcement became an important method in 
protecting communities. Gang members were arrested, prosecuted, and 
incarcerated for long prison sentences. Information gathering systems and 
specialized police units were developed. Legislation was proposed or passed to 
increase prison sentences for serious gang-related violent or drug-related offenses. 
Community groups and social service agencies were asked to assist police with 
intelligence gathering and support for arrests. In spite of the increased suppression 
strategy, gang activity continues to grow in prisons and in neighborhoods 
(Cummings and Monti, 1993; Spergel, 1995). 
The following section describes theoretical frameworks mirrored in responses 
to juvenile crime since the establishment of juvenile court. The cycles of responses 
to the behavior of youth reflect theories associated with Cloward and Ohlin, Cohen, 
Hirschi, Shaw and McKay, and Sutherland. 
The social change and stresses of the two world wars and the Great 
Depression caused concern over what was perceived as a change in the behavior of 
youth. The response reflects social bond and social disorganization theories. The 
problem was handled through pressure on local community organizations to take 
additional responsibility for including young adults in church, school, and 
community organizations and to increase interpersonal controls. 
After World War II the social disorganization of mass migrations to the cities, 
accompanied by a lack of social integration by ethnic groups. The response was 
similar to that of the settlement houses, but with the added dimension of the 
professional reformer encouraging clients to become outwardly political (even 
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militant) in demanding meaningful services and equal treatment. It reflected 
Cloward and Ohlin's opportunities theory as well as the general civil rights fervor 
of the times. 
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The Grey Areas Projects and MFY had the similar philosophies and emerged 
from same opinion climate: Delinquency was set in the context of social frustration 
and alienation; the conventions·ofinstitutional practice were the principal target of 
reform; they were innovative, intellectual, and anti-bureaucratic (Marris and Rein, 
1982). The projects utilized the research and theory of Cloward and Ohlin: strain 
and frustration, opportunity theory. Both programs assumed poverty, not juvenile 
delinquency, to be the crucial issue, related to the breakdown in the distribution of 
opportunities. It was viewed as a failure of the institutional structure. 
The suppressive tactics of the 1970s and 1980s made use ofthe technology of 
the times. Those responses reflected, to some degree, Cohen's theory of inequality 
in legitimate access to standards of success to the degree, in that it considered gang 
activity as malicious, negativistic, and nonutilitarian .. Otherwise, suppression 
methods do not fit well with sociological theories of juvenile delinquency. 
Aside from suppression tactics which continue, strategies to control gang 
activity in the late 1980s and into 1990s reflect social bond, strain, social 
disorganization, and differential social organization theories. Emphasis is on 
prevention and intervention and demonstrates a more sophisticated understanding 
of the complexities of the social phenomenon of gang involvement. 
Recent thinking on the gang phenomenon reflects sociological theories and 
includes the work of Currie (1993), who asserts that the lure of a gang life style is 
more than an individual psychological or medical issue. It involves the complex 
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social deprivational milieu of the adolescent: Economic "squalor", cultural and 
familial disruption, the effects poverty has on values and beliefs, and a culture 
mandating competition for material accumulation. Aware of standards of success 
in the larger society not available to them (realistically) to achieve, and faced with 
diminishing opportunities to feel capable, strong, and respected, gang inclusion 
satisfies basic needs for challenge, esteem, and sense of purpose. Affiliation with a 
gangster elite is still a way to achieve a certain amount of status and build an 
identity. It is because of the risks of death, imprisonment, and addiction that a 
youngster is drawn to gangs not in spite of them. Material gains through 
manipulating, outwitting, persuading and ingratiating behavior are viewed as 
superior to gains from toiling for wages and taking orders from superiors. 
Public and professional opinion rages over how best to effect preventative 
measures. At issue are concerns for the property and personal safety of law-abiding 
citizens, as well as those for the future of youth engaging in addictive and violent 
life styles. Theories to preclude the possibility of violence occurring, or at least, 
occurring twice at the hands of the same adolescent, range from incarceration to 
social intervention techniques. Some would advocate shipping youth out of 
communities. Others support imposition of severe incarceration penalties. 
English (1993) states that when the government systematically shifted 
authority and resources from communities to bureaucracies, greater problems arose: 
crowded juvenile facilities; bloated caseloads; revocation of 40 to 60 per cent of 
training school residents. Though it is easier to remove a child from the 
community than to expend the effort and resources to reintegrate, removal is 
counter to research findings in successful youth programs. Key features in 
successful programs include location in the community and the ability to involve 
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local leaders in the day to day operations. In addition, gains from relocation and 
incarceration are minimal when compared to difficulties encountered by both the 
community and the youth upon return. He or she will not be a more law-abiding 
citizen for the ~xperience. 
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At the other end of the prevention continuum, parents, the community, law 
enforcement personnel, schools, and social workers are enjoined collaboratively to 
develop strategies which preclude a child's engaging in gang-related acts at all. 
Communities create the environments that produce healthy or delinquent 
adolescents. Family, school and peer groups are critical units of socialization. 
They provide the opportunity to develop skills to be successful adults and the 
rewards for gaining the skills to do so. If opportunity and ·rewards are not present, 
children will have behavior problems, become school dropouts, delinquents, adult 
offenders, and career criminals. State and federal government responsibility for 
human services has cost local communities, agencies and organizations the ability 
to develop programs and approaches which meet the needs of communities in 
which they operate and the individuals with whom they work. It is important to 
provide a continuum of effective community-level services (Ibid.). 
The ability to intelligently fashion rational and effective crime control 
strategies is limited, according to Sultan (1994). While the calls for more research 
are sincere, criminal justice practitioners and government officials seldom 
acknowledge that there is insufficient information to support currently fashionable 
crime control strategies. Benefits of more law enforcement are difficult to identify. 
Intensified law enforcement has both greatly increased the amount of dollars used 
to operate criminal justice agencies and increased the number of people who have 
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contact with the agencies. It has proven expensive and it has not reduced the 
number of crimes committed. 
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The concept of "prevention science" is one which seeks to prevent major 
human dysfunctions and to eliminate the causes of disorder in communities. 
Increasing protective factors may become the strategy of choice, particularly where 
risk factors such as dysfunctional parenting or extreme poverty are difficult to 
identify or eliminate. Sultan notes that the Philadelphia House ofUmoja has for 25 
years approached prevention of crime from the assumption that it is easier to start 
by providing protection from harmful influences than to start by eliminating those 
influences. 
Programs should be designed and controlled by community residents who 
know better what strategies and techniques will work. They should involve 
community residents, businesses, schools, social service and law enforcement 
agencies, and the gangsters, themselves. Program components should include 
outreach, cultural diversity training, communication skills building, the 
procurement of outside resources and evaluation. 
Community involvement will communicate to gang members that gang and 
substance abuse problems are a concern to residents. Involvement will also s~ow a 
dedication to amelioration of problems associated with gang violence and substance 
abuse. Crime control efforts require long-term, multi-year commitment of human 
and financial resources. Year to year funding encourages year to year planning. It 
does not allow for the formation of clearly stated program goals or time to evaluate 
usefulness of the strategy (Sultan, 1994; Porche'-Burke and Fulton 1992) . 
Currie (1989) proposes a "social-environmental " or "human-ecological" 
approach to reduce crime. The approach includes interventions at the level of 
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individuals and families at-risk, but also moves to exert social control over larger 
forces which are increasingly undermining communities and placing families at-
risk in the first place. The forces are aggravating an already fundamental imbalance 
in society and have enormous consequences for crime and for much else. He states 
that the model should seek to discover forces in need of control, as well as who 
may decide, and who is held responsible for the consequence of the decisions. He 
suggests strategies that address individuals, families, community stability, and 
political economy. They should include: 
I) A high quality early education model. 
2) Expanded health and mental health services- evidence suggests that early 
childhood traumas of the central nervous system, early severe problems and low 
birth weight may be implicated in some kinds of delinquency, including the most 
troubling and destructive. Evidence also indicates that those who most need help 
are not receiving it. 
3) Greater commitment to family support systems - Crucial as a shaping force and 
one shaped, in turn, by forces larger than itself. Needed is a genuinely pro-family 
economic policy at the national level, and attention to interventions at the family 
level. Violence in the home should become a major issue (abused children often 
become abusive parents). 
4) Reassert the importance of doing something constructive with people after they 
have broken the law. Deliver the basic services young offenders need. Use time 
constructively to ensure they leave a little smarter, healthier, and more sober. 
Establish a higher floor of expectations about what institutions for the young should 
accomplish. Increase basic skills in youth as there are links between low skills, 
poor verbal abilities and serious delinquency. 
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5) Commitment to accessible, non-punitive drug abuse treatment. Reform, then 
support the reforms. Do not throw money into the old system because it does not 
work. Ensure the delivery of intensive, high quality treatment programs, outreach 
to hard-to-reach abusers, aftercare, and advocacy in the community for broader 
needs such as housing, health care, and employment. 
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English (1993) advocates Balance Approach/Restorative Justice (BAIRJ) as a 
systematic approach to management of youth who have been adjudicated. BAIRJ 
has three objectives: competency development, accountability, and community 
protection. It attempts to strike a balance between the needs of offenders and the 
victims and community. BA/RJ operates on the principle that community support 
is essential to success. It implies that the roles of a community's socializing 
institutions (schools, employers, and advocacy and youth development groups) are 
vital and ultimately responsible for helping youth make the transition to productive 
citizenship. Institutions also provide essential support in helping young offenders 
and the justice system address the needs of victims and in providing the informal 
control necessary to achieve real community protection. 
Successful programs utilizing the BAIRJ approach are characterized by: 
1) Front-line workers who are given discretion to determine appropriate sanctions. 
2) Provision of a broad spectrum of responsive, convenient, and timely services 
provided. 
3) An encouragement of collaboration across traditional and professional 
boundaries. 
4) A view of children in the context of family, neighborhoods, and communities. 
5) Deep roots in the community and customization to meet cultural needs. 
6) Parental cooperation and participation. 
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7) Relationships of trust with youth and their extended families as a priority. 
8) Long term preventive orientation. 
9) An organizational milieu based primarily on outcomes rather than on 
regulation. 
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Dryfoos (1989) states that the problem of youth at-risk is receiving attention. 
Thousands of prevention and intervention programs, hundreds of conferences, and 
the media attend to the difficulties of youth: school achievement, drugs, criminal 
behavior, pregnancy, suicide, and mental health. Many forces are brought to bear 
on separate problems, but the status of high-risk youth is still deteriorating. 
Victories are evasive, few and fleeting, partly because intervention programs are 
too partitioned and weak to have much impact. They do not create change in either 
individuals or institutions, sometimes miss children most needing them, and only 
address individual symptoms of disadvantage, not the quality of life of the child. 
Many programs do not deal with the antecedents or the predisposing factors that 
lead to the behavior, only with the outcome. 
Some programs are successful. Commonalities of successful models include 
that children are identified early, that they receive intensive individualized 
attention, and that families and multiple community agencies are involved. In 
addition, most successful programs are located in schools, and intertwine their 
services with acquisition of basic skills, coping skills, and career awareness. They 
are usually administered by university, foundation, government, or local health 
agencies, and use specially trained staff assisted by older peers. Some programs are 
located outside of schools (community and church centers, businesses and youth 
service agencies) offering alternative-type programs and overnight shelter to youth 
who are homeless or runaway. It is necessary to utilize !he common concepts and 
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interventions from all disciplines, to design more integrated and stronger programs 
to address high-risk children's needs (Ibid.). 
Dryfoos ( 1990) states that programs in high-delinquency areas offer 
alternatives to delinquent behavior, such as recreation, culture, and academic 
enrichment activities. Past efforts to connect gang-involved and other delinquent 
youth with social workers who organized meetings, dances, and sports events, or 
referring youth for treatment or counseling have not been successful in reducing 
delinquent behavior. Recent programs offering primarily employment-related 
activities to older youth have demonstrated some success. Employment efforts are 
successful because they reduce cohesiveness and contacts among delinquent peers. 
Dryfoos reviewed several community-based multi-component intervention 
programs which experienced varying degrees of success. 
Targeted outreach - Boys Clubs of America created Targeted Outreach which 
recruits and "mainstreams" high-risk youth (ages 12-18). It incorporates a case 
management approach and formal linkages with an array of community agencies. 
Programs are encouraged to tailor to the needs of the youth. Some give high 
priority to individual counseling and behavioral contracting; others emphasize 
group counseling and heightening decision-making skills. 
Juvenile court volunteers - Trained volunteers are paired with adjudicated 
youth to seek individualized solutions to the youth's problems. Tutoring, youth 
advocacy, crisis intervention, and various group recreational activities are offered. 
Success is attributed to the introduction of a caring, stable adult into the lives of 
disadvantaged youth, who acts as a role model and advocate. 
Runaway and homeless youth shelters - Provide crisis intervention, individual 
counseling, drug and alcohol counseling, long term foster care, transportation, 
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recreation, and work readiness training. Success in stabilizing lives is attributed to 
the comprehensive mix of services. 
Youth service corps - The Conservation Corps provides work experience, 
educational remediation, and the opportunity to live away from home with other 
youth and adults in a structured environment. It has been shown to improve self 
concept. Employment skills have not been improved so much as the completion of 
many public works projects. 
Neighborhood based organizations- The Violent Juvenile Offender Research 
and Development Program was created to strengthen bonding between family, 
school, peers, and the community. Neighborhood organizations act as coordinators, 
mobilize residents to increase supervision of youth and to liaison with community 
institutions, and develop specific projects for families and youth. They develop 
neighborhood councils and conduct assessment of needs and action plans. Projects 
included mediation with schools and law enforcement agencies to change policies, 
youth activities such as jobs, youth councils, and community services opportunities. 
The major focus is on intervention with gangs. 
These neighborhood programs have experienced moderate success, but with 
many obstacles. It has been difficult to implement family support programs 
because families were too involved with their own survival to spare the time for 
community activities. Community leadership existed, but demands on the 
participants' time were excessive and they were not willing to get involved in 
another project. It has been difficult to sustain the participation of volunteers. In 
addition, school officials have been unresponsive to community demands and 
denied neighborhood groups access to the schools. 
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Adolesce~t Diversion Project- Focuses on youth who have committed 
delinquent acts but have not yet been formally adjudicated. Its rationale is to 
provide empowerment skills to high-risk youth and their families so that they can 
change the behaviors that are creating problems for them. It builds on their 
strengths rather than their shortcomings. The instrument for change is a family 
worker who spends three hours per week with an assigned youth for 16-18 weeks. 
Success is attributed to extensive cooperation with the juvenile justice system in 
referring youth, long term commitment rather than a short demonstration project, 
placement of the intervention in the youth's natural environment (home, streets, 
school) rather than in an office or a center, close adherence by the staff to a defined 
and carefully researched model, and availability of close supervision for the staff. 
Another approach is to limit adjudicatory interference in the lives of 
adolescents. Schur (1973) advocates "radical non-intervention" as a tool for 
managing the behavior of delinquent and gang-affected youth. Characterized by a 
de-emphasis on singling out specific individuals as being in need of treatment, 
radical non-intervention advocates radical socio-cultural change, voluntary 
treatment, and a narrow scope of juvenile court involvement. 
Youthful misconduct, Schur argues, is common. Those involved in it are 
adolescents who, for a variety of reasons, drift into disapproved forms of behavior 
and are caught and processed. Much of the labeling of"offenders" is unnecessary 
and counterproductive. Policies should be adopted, therefore, which accept a 
greater diversity in youth behavior. Special laws regarding misbehavior in youth 
should be narrow in scope or abolished completely, along with efforts to single out 
specific individuals and programs employing compulsory treatment. Serious 
offenses, which cannot be ignored, should be criminalized with uniformly applied 
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punishment, not disguised as treatment; and increased formalization of juvenile 
court procedures should remain in order to limit sanctioning to cases where actual 
antisocial acts have been committed. 
46 
The primary target for delinquency policy should be the delinquency-defining 
process itself, says Schur. Traditional policy has required control of youthful 
behavior well beyond what is required to maintain a smooth-running society or to 
protect others from adolescent depredations. It does not mean that all behavior is 
socially acceptable. Public policy should, however, be enjoined to "leave youth 
alone wherever possible." Mechanisms should be established to divert youth away 
from court and to oppose various kinds of intervention by diverse social control and 
. socializing agencies. Policies would favor collective action programs instead of 
ones aimed at the individual, and should be voluntary, rather than compulsory 
treatment programs. The approach is radical in that it asserts that major and 
intentional socio-cultural change will help reduce gang and delinquency problems. 
Piecemeal reform will contain no great efficacy. 
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CHAPTER III 
PHILADELPHIA HOUSE OF UMOJA 
This chapter describes the first House of Umoja located in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania. It details the history of how it originated out of the desire of a 
gangster's mother to save her son from prison or death. It explains the importance 
of using a culturally-sensitive perspective to instill an Afrocentric value system in 
African American youth. While the program has maintained its underlying 
philosophy for three decades, it has also evolved with changing needs of the 
community. The chapter also explains the direction of its evolution and reasons for 
its longevity in a time when many programs last only from one administration to 
another. 
Overview 
The Philadelphia House ofUmoja (Umoja) is a community-based residential 
program providing a positive living environment to young men who have an 
insufficient family support structure. The program serves boys between fifteen and 
eighteen years of age and offers services designed to facilitate the acquisition of life 
skills leading to adult self-sufficiency. The youth receive individual and group 
counseling; educational support; cultural activities and experience; recreational, 
religious, and life skill activities; as well as parenting and family planning skills. In 
addition, the House ofUmoja provides direct social work services to and on behalf 
of members of the natural family ofthe youth in placement. The program is geared 
primarily toward independent living after a residence period of six months to one 
year (Annual Program Description 1990-91). 
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Umoja practices culturally-sensitive programming and recognizes the 
importance of understanding the traditional cultural nom1s of the African American 
community. It strives to imbue its clients with positive images of African and 
African American people and culture. The goal of the House ofUmoja is to 
provide residential services in a culturally-sensitive environment conducive to 
instilling in African American youths the psychological am1ament and skills 
necessary to resist media images and propaganda which encourage the adoption of 
self-destructive lifestyles and behaviors (Ibid.). 
Umoja's programs promote physical, cognitive, emotional, moral, social and 
sexual growth and development in teenagers through the concept of extended 
family, as defined by an Afrocentric cultural approach. Youth living at Umoja are 
family members, in a holistic sense, though involvement of the family of origin in 
treatment is also critical to the process. An eclectic, multi-disciplinary team 
approach is used to create a structured, therapeutic environment in which to 
capitalize on life skill strengths and mitigate effects of a youth's previous 
disadvantages (Ibid.). 
The program is designed with a progressive track system with a youth usually 
entering at the most intensive treatment schedule consisting of highly structured use 
of time and a strong therapeutic community emphasis. Importance is also placed 
on preparing for job placement, schooling, training and related discharge plans. 
Examples of activities include African history/culture sessions, sex education and 
family planning sessions, budgeting and money management training, decision-
making and self reliance training, assertiveness training, and alcohol and drug 
education. Community resources (e.g., consultants and field trips) are utilized in 
some instances to supplement staff resources (Ibid.). 
• 
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History 
Woodson (1986) states that the Philadelphia House ofUmoja was conceived 
in 1968 by Sister Falaka Fattah and David Fattah. Sister Fattah was then a 
journalist who was nationally known as Frances (Frankee) Brown Davenport. She 
was a widow and mother of six sons. She had a history of involvement in 
grassroots organizing for issues of concern to African Americans and was the 
winner of the 1966 Civil Rights Award for her work on housing rights issues. 
Davenport was self-employed in public relations. She married a Temple University 
student-activist. During the inception of their residential home for gang-affected 
youth, the couple took the family name, "Fattah," which means "revealer," and 
Davenport took the first name of"Falaka," meaning "a new day." 
David and Falaka Fattah both worked on the Black Power magazine, Umoja. 
This is a magazine created in response solely to the needs of black people. It is 
published quarterly by The House ofUmoja Information Center, which is a division 
ofUmoja Boystown businesses. It is financially supported by donations, 
advertisements, subscriptions and fundraising affairs. It evolved out of the Third 
Conference of Black Power which convened at the Church of the Advocate in 
Philadelphia in September, 1968. 
Sister Fattah had long been concerned about youth in gangs and the violence 
they wreaked on one another and communities. One of the first issues that came to 
the attention of the Umoja magazine was the toll gang warfare was taking on Black 
youth. Sister Fattah was shocked to learn that one of her sons was gang-involved. 
In order to save her son, she invited the entire gang to live at her home and become 
a part of her family, with a promise to keep them alive and out of jail. Fifteen 
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young men accepted the offer and joined Falaka, David, and her six sons in their 
two-bedroom, one bathroom, row house. 
In 1969, Falaka and David Fattah developed a comprehensive residential 
youth program which focused on the traditional extended family concept, and the 
House ofUmoja was created. The family-run agency was based upon Afrocentric 
principles and had as its two-fold purpose: 
To communicate a positive message of African-American heritage to Black 
youth and the community at large; 
To provide viable youth development activities to youth and families in 
distress. 
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According to Sister Fattah (personal communication October 20, 1995) in 
1970, the House ofUmoja was incorporated as a non-profit, civic organization. 
Between 1969 and 1971, over 200 gang members received sanctuary and pledged 
to stop gang warfare. 
The F attahs received no public assistance for the first few years of operation. 
Fiscal support was generated only through what the Fattahs, themselves, could 
generate. Most of the funding consisted of private donations. In 1972, the City of 
Philadelphia's Department of Human Services approached the Fattahs to accept a 
grant to continue their program. The House ofUmoja was recognized as a 
successful residential program. It seemed more pragmatic for the city to fund a 
successfully working program than endure the trials of building one anew. Though 
additional monies are raised for special projects, the House ofUmoja has retained 
its core funding grant from the city for over twenty years. 
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In 1973, the Youth Development Center contracted with the House ofUmoja 
for rehabilitation and services for gang youth who came to the home from 
throughout the city. In 1974, an intensive effort to end gang warfare commenced 
with a twelve hour "Imani (faith) Conference" where thirty-two gangs pledged 
peace and the end to gang warfare. 
Budget and Funding Resources 
The Philadelphia House of Umoja's annual budget hovers around $500,000 
with approximately half slated for the residential component. Other monies are 
~llocated for various outreach programs which will be described later in this 
chapter. 
In 1995, a State of Pennsylvania grant was awarded to the House ofUmoja 
and included a line item for $2.2 million to complete the renovation of their 
buildings (they were 70% completed as of Spring, 1996). 
The House ofUmoja has been the recipient of various grants over the years. 
Some have been for special projects such as the renovation of buildings, and others 
have targeted immediate needs of the community, such as emergency food 
distribution (Ibid.). 
Afrocentrism 
The House ofUmoja philosophy is based on African cultural rites of passage. 
It emphasizes an approach to living which incorporates valu~s of the Nguzo Saba 
(see APPENDIX D which describes Nguzo Saba). The tenets of Nguzo Saba are 1) 
Umoja (unity); 2) Kujichagulia (self determination); 3) Ujima (collective work and 
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responsibility; 4) Ujamaa (cooperative economics); 5) Nia (purpose); 6) Kuumba 
(creativity); and 7) Imani (spirituality) (Kunjufu, 1990, p. 63). 
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The Afrocentric (see APPENDIX E for a description) approach is not only a 
philosophy, but a strategy to dispel negative self images and stereotypes held by 
African Americans. The approach attempts to correct miseducation of African 
American youth about their culture and heritage. Culturally-sensitive programming 
recognizes the importance of understanding the traditional cultural norms of the 
African American community, and the European culture's impact on those cultural 
norms as it affects the development of African American youth (Annual Program 
Description, 1990-1991 ). 
Umoja, the Swahili term for unity, has served as a central organizing concept 
for the organization's approach to serving at-risk youth. It is based on the premise 
of a family collective which stipulates that every man. and woman should be a 
father and mother to all children. A communal living facility, it replicates the 
design of the ancient African city of Jenne (see APPENDIX F for a description of 
Jenne), and offers a community-based living experience for young men who lack 
sufficient family support structure (Organizational Information, 1995). 
Before the Umoja staff present a new African concept to the youth, its 
authenticity is verified by a professor from the University of Pennsylvania who 
resides in Africa. African-based curricula have been developed and are conveyed 
via an Afrocentric approach to daily life and specific classroom instruction. Umoja 
youth partake of on-site and off-campus activities designed to enhance and solidify 
Afrocentrism and self esteem (F. Fattah, personal communication, October 20, 
1995). 
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A significant part of the African centered approach is the tribal council 
meeting, the Adelia. Held on Friday evenings, the Adella is the time when family 
problems, including rule violations, are discussed. A structured sanctions list, 
ranging from extra duties to discharge from the program, can be utilized, but each 
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youth has input in the process and rule violators are encouraged to defend 
themselves. Extenuating circumstances can be considered mitigating factors when 
dealing with problems (Woodson, 1986). 
Umoja Today 
Twenty-seven years, 3, 000 residents, and an untold number of outreach youth 
later, the Philadelphia House ofUmoja is still on Frazier Street between Masters 
and Media streets in West Philadelphia. It is now a complex of twenty-three houses 
(including the original residence), comprising most of the homes on both sides of 
the street. The House has a paid staff of five, four paid consultants, and volunteers 
ranging in number from ten to seventy, depending on programmatic concerns (F. 
Fattah, personal communication, October 20, 1995). 
Twelve to fifteen youth live, family style, in two houses in the complex on 
Frazier Street. Each dwelling is overseen by a live-in house parent who approaches 
the job from the standpoint of love and family unity. House parents are 
traditionally family members: either one ofFalaka's biological sons or a former 
Umoja resident. She states that they have never recruited from outside the 
organization. Each staff member views the youth in residence as a parent would 
view offspring. 
This is a close family. When residents come in the door they're going to 
receive love. "Do you want anything to eat? Are you hungry?" Right. 
You come and get their sheets, take linen and all that, and all the boys take 
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them around (J. Darden, personal communication, October 12, 1995). 
The daily routine is highly structured. Youth participate in household, 
educational, treatment, community service, religious, and family unity activities. 
Sister Fattah states that many of the youth have strong emotional feelings about 
whether or not there is an adequate food supply, so that seeing food in the house, 
even if they have no desire to eat at the moment, is comforting. 
We serve five meals a day. And they still will ask for seconds ... , they do. 
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The 5:30 in the morning meal, then they have lunch at school. When they return 
after school, we have food ready for them. Because there's somebody in the 
kitchen, they're going to eat. Then we have dinner, and then at 10 o'clock they 
are put to bed after a snack. And this satisfies them, to eat ... a lot. (F. Fattah, 
personal communication, October 12, 1995). 
Familial love is the message at the House ofUmoja, but behavioral 
expectations are clear. Sanctions for misbehavior are meted out according to a 
predefined system. The sanction is not final, however, until the Adelia (African 
tribal meeting described in Afrocentric Approach) where the infraction is discussed 
and other courses of action are suggested. Sanctions rarige in severity from extra 
household chores to removal from the program. According to Sister Fattah; the 
practice is in accordance with the African tribal system of dealing with those who 
do not live within the behavioral expectations of the community. The worst 
punishment that can be inflicted on a person is banishment from the society - "You 
cannot be here with us." (Ibid.). 
Change in Focus for the Nineties 
The Umoja message and method of delivery has remained the same, but the 
profile of the youth served has changed over the years. Umoja still receives all its 
referrals through the Philadelphia Department of Human Services, Children and 
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Youth Division. Where Umoja focused originally on gang-affected and delinquent 
youth, it now serves only adolescents with dependency issues (neglect, abuse, 
homelessness, parents in prison, or abusing substances). "Because, a kid that has 
dependency issues, nine time~ out often, ifhe keeps traveling, he's on the road to 
negative behavior" (Ibid.). 
The change in focus occurred through the staffs ongoing self-evaluation of 
the program and its productivity. They determined that the need had changed 
since the height of the gang war campaigns in the early and mid-seventies. The 
crisis period had passed. Fewer youth now needed to be removed from the street. 
The labor intensive approach required to supervise adjudicated youth and monitor 
their access to the community was taken into consideration. The Fattahs believed 
they could more effectively impact the community if they concentrated their 
attention and resources on youth with other needs. 
Youth with dependency considerations could be provided with the family 
environment espoused by Umoja, while at the same time given the community 
freedom not permitted for adjudicated youth. Reduced direct supervision of 
residential charges (because they had not committed crimes) freed Umoja staff to 
effectuate more with the same amount of money through outreach programs. 
In addition to a change in the type of youth served, the House ofUmoja 
modified parts of the Afrocentric program to better meet current exigencies. 
Though the stated goal is for each child to reunite with his family, the reality is that 
80 percent ofUmoja residents do not return to their homes of origin. A child is 
usually removed from a home due to neglect, physical or sexual abuse, or addiction 
issues within the household. In many of the aforementioned situations, living 
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conditions will not have ameliorated during the youth's period of residence at 
Umoja and family reunification will not be appropriate. 
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Youth who do not return to their family of origin are slated for independent 
living situations upon reaching 18 years of age. The young adult is still expected 
to go to school (regular high school or an alternative school), but a large part of the 
training concentration nonetheless, is on building skills in preparation for 
independent living. Through partnership agreements with agencies throughout the 
city, students gearing for independent living can access budgeting and fmance, 
nutrition, parenting, vocational training and apprenticeship programs and learn to 
access the community for services and leisure activities (Ibid.). 
Outreach Projects 
In addition to services to dependent youth, the Philadelphia House ofUmoja 
has expanded its outreach to meet more needs in the general community. It has 
started a food distribution program, an anti-drug campaign, a public garden, and a 
program of enrichment for youth who are not Umoja residents, but who have 
dependency issues. 
"Fattah's Food for Thought" is a food distribution program is headed by 
Nasser Fattah (a son). The effort initially began as the numbers of Philadelphians 
seeking food referrals from Umoja exceeded the capacity to process them 
effectively. House ofUmoja had been acting as a food distribution center, but was 
finding recipients did not so much need emergency food, as a subsidy program. 
Fattah connected with the Philadelphia Food Bank and a state emergency food 
program, Share, to become a distribution site, "Fattah's Food for Thought: 
Providing a Hand Up, Not a Hand Out" (Ibid.). 
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The Food for Thought program is directed toward low income and fixed 
income families. Its aim is to help the families develop self sufficiency through 
education, adult literacy, job readiness, basic economic life skills, and urban 
gardening. It asks participants to volunteer three hours a week at a church or other 
organization in order to acclimate people to having to give something back to the 
community. It utilizes networks, workshops, and coalitions to fortify emergency 
cupboards, soup kitchens, and other programs providing the community with 
sustenance, empowerment, education and the advocacy necessary to combat the 
causes of hunger. Staff seek to increase the awareness and raise the consciousness 
of local political and business communities to the plight of low and fixed income 
families (House ofUmoja [Philadelphia], 1995a). 
"Super Cupboards", another outreach program, is related to Food for Thought. 
Targeting people who are unemployed, it is a way to deliver self-sufficiency by 
teaching wise food preparation and shopping practices to stretch food purchasing 
dollars. The program is conducted through the Pennsylvania State University 
Cooperative Extension Program, Expanded Food and Nutrition Component. It has 
been changed from a one day per week program i.o Mondays, Wednesdays, and 
Fridays in an effort to get people used to getting up and going out in the morning. 
It is now combined with targeted job searches, job development and Adult Basic 
Education/GED programs (N. Fattah, personal communication, October 12, 1995). 
The House ofUmoja can provide a living situation for, at the most, fifteen 
youth at a time. There are many more youths in need, however, and many who can 
be influenced by the Umoja message through outreach efforts. The "Friends and 
Neighbors" program attempts to reach as many as 50 youth with dependency issues 
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by involving them in Afrocentric educational programs, field trips, and other 
enriching experiences. 
Friends and Neighbors is a six-year demonstration program targeting 
dependent youth who are in the 10-12 year age range. Research through Temple 
University will deterriline whether such interventions can prevent delinquency by 
ages 16-18. Sister Fattah hopes that, if successful, the program can be replicated 
throughout the United States (F. Fattah and N. Fattah, personal communication, 
October 12, 1995). 
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The House ofUmoja has been recognized in the United States and beyond as 
an outstanding residential program for youth. Sister Fattah has· received over 
seventy national and local awards for community service and journalism. She has 
received the approbation of two presidents: Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan 
(Woodson, 1986). The Fattahs estimate that 100 residential programs for youth 
throughout the United States draw from methods practiced at House ofUmoja. 
The House ofUmoja in Portland, Oregon is one such program. In 1989, after 
a gang-related shooting death shocked the Portland community, the Fattahs were 
asked to serve as consultants in developing an Umoja-style residential facility to 
work with gang-affected youth. They were instrumental in replicating their 
program geared to the needs of Portland while adhering to Afrocentric principles in 
a residential setting. The Portland House ofUmoja is an important link in the 
continuum of services for youth at-risk. 
The Umoja approach strongly reflects the integration of opportunity, 
differential social organization, social bond, and social disorganization theories. 
The theories are demonstrated in Umoja's attempt to strengthen family and 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
59 
community ties by recreating a family atmosphere and the "African village" where 
adults are responsible for all children and children have a responsibility to behave 
in a fashion which does not jeopardize their position in the community. The 
Afrocentric approach rejects values of the dominant culture and emphasizes an 
alternate code of behavior and purpose which is based on the quality ofhurnan 
interactions and interconnectedness. 
• 
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CHAPTER IV 
CREATION OF THE PORTLAND HOUSE OF UMOJA 
The following chapter reconstructs events which led street level service 
providers, citizen activist groups, then city officials to recognize Portland's gang 
problem and to implement measures effectively to manage the illegal behavior. 
Though reluctant to acknowledge a problem existed~ when forced, decision makers 
assisted in more ways than expected. Policy-makers in city, state and county 
offices leveraged funds and other resources into areas where it was believed their 
efforts would most greatly impact neighborhoods. They made long term 
commitments to support programs to combat gangs. 
This chapter pursues the two themes mentioned in Chapter I. The first theme 
addresses the forces driving Portland's various responses to gang activity and how 
choices made by individuals helped to shape the process. The second theme 
addresses considerations involved in selecting a program for gang-affecte~ youth. 
Theme one is represented by the overall story of the city's response to the 
gang problem. It begins with street level providers who noticed a change in the 
types of youth they were serving and the way they changed servic;e delivery to meet 
the needs of the youth .. Agencies providing direct services to communities 
managed the problem within existing resources, but needed much more to address 
effectively the multi-dimensional needs of youth and their families. City and other 
governmental officials were unresponsive until a drive-by shooting forced action. 
After the gang style shooting death, an urgent quality surrounded efforts to put 
programs, including the House ofUmoja, in place. 
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The second theme addresses crime causation theories which governed 
prevention model selection. It plays a limited role in the first section of the chapter, 
but will be more fully developed in the second section when efforts to initiate 
intervention strategies are discussed. Selection of a community-based, residential, 
culturally..:specific facility was influenced by the Philadelphia House ofUmoja and 
guided by theories of Shaw and McKay, Hirschi, Cohen, and Cloward and Ohlin, 
described in Chapter II. 
Emergence of Gangs in Portland 
During the mid-1980s, gang members began moving to Portland from Los 
Angeles. According to the manager of the Gang Resource Intervention Team 
(GRIT), the Juvenile Justice Division (JJD), the "romanticized" version of the 
migration was that youth who were gang-affected moved to Oregon from California 
to take over the drug trade. Portland's law enforcement and suppression techniques 
were less organized and more relaxed than in Los Angeles, making the city more 
"livable" for drug dealers. The source speculates that more realistic reasons for the 
influx, however, include wearying of being a target of a rival's shooting, and fleeing 
to avoid prosecution by the California legal system. Once in Portland and seeing 
that police suppression methods were not being directed at drug dealing to the same 
extent as in Los Angeles, gangsters decided to stay (J. Brown, personal 
communication, December 19, 1994). 
Early on, gang activity appeared to be a move by the California gang 
members to reorganize the city's drug business from individual entrepreneurs to a 
large operation with international connections, which fueled the underground 
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economy with new resources. As the Neighborhood Crime Prevention manager for 
the City of Portland remarked, "The people that were selling it on the street had no 
capital to put up for that amount of drug" (S. McCormack, personal 
communication, February 24, 1995). The gangsters who moved to Portland 
recruited many local youths as low-level drug dealers. Promises of large sums of 
money, notoriety, and a group identity were attractive to youth for whom few 
opportunities for a better life and "being somebody" existed. 
By the winter of 1986 the numbers of drug houses in Northeast Portland had 
increased dramatically. Youth were talking about "these guys from Los Angeles 
that were having these parties, called 'recruiting' parties and 'Crip' parties" (J. 
Brown, GRIT manager, personal communication, June 20, 1995). Where 
previously only a few dozen "after hours places" (i.e., drug houses) existed, within 
months in 1986, three to four hundred such operations were in business. 
Confined chiefly to North and Northeast neighborhoods, gangsters and signs 
of their activity continued to be virtually invisible to most of the city's residents. 
Some Portlanders would not believe a "gang problem" existed. Many more did not 
yet appreciate its severity and the degree to which some citizens' lives were 
affected. Only those who witnessed daily drug sales on the streets or who worked 
with youths in their communities (outreach workers, law enforcement personnel, 
juvenile court personnel) had any intimation that such activities were taking place. 
Indeed, the very mention that such a thing was a possibi.lity was just short of 
blasphemous in some circles. 
While there was the natural concern about crime, the notion that Portland was 
experiencing a gang phenomenon was not widely embraced by the general public, 
nor encouraged by city politicians and others interested in maintaining the image of 
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Portland as a livable city. In fact, according to a Multnomah County publication 
(Monroe, 1989) in January of 1987, the Gang Intelligence Unit of the Portland 
Police Bureau listed only 69 local youths as Crips and Bloods. 
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During the ensuing year, however, gangsters were no longer content to lurk in 
the background. Clear signs of gang entrenchment in the Portland drug trade could 
not be ignored. Highly stylized, easily recognizable graffiti appeared everywhere. 
Drugs were dealt openly. Drug houses which numbered in the hundreds in a small 
section of the city began flagrant operations. Young men and women were fighting 
viciously, even to the death, over such things as the color ofhandkerchiefs or shoe 
laces. 
Elizabeth Waters, previously with the Black United Fund of Oregon, was 
quoted by The Oregonian (in Bondarowicz, 1991, p. L12) as saying, "We see kids 
from 13 to 20 in gangs, and 11-year-olds with the gang ranks. We see "wannabes" 
at 8 or 9. And ifl'm a gang girl and my baby's four years old, he knows gang signs, 
and I dress him in gang regalia." 
Portland, a Livable City 
Portland is located in the northwestern corner of Oregon at the confluence of 
the Columbia and Willamette rivers. The climate is mild, with temperatures 
ranging from the mid-40s in the winter to the high 70s in the summer. The 
metropolitan area offers many year round outdoor recreational opportunities. It 
boast 3 7,000 acres of parks. 
In 1991 the Portland five-county metropolitan area ranked 27th in population 
among the nation's 50 largest metropolitan areas. It is the 8th largest metropolitan 
area in the eleven western states, while the State of Oregon, lOth largest in land 
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area in the nation, ranked 30th in population. Portland has a healthy, diverse 
economy with a broad base of manufacturing, distribution, wholesale and retail 
trade, regional government and business services. Its diversity helps create a stable 
business environment with access to a plentiful and well-educated work force 
which has encouraged new companies to locate in the Portland area. Studies 
conducted in the mid-1980s showed Portland's work force in the high-tech industry 
to be one of the most stable in the nation. Portland's institutions of higher 
education serve a wide range of needs and include eight four-year institutions and a 
community college system (Portland Public Schools, 1995). 
Portland residents exhibit a rare degree of pride in their city with its pristine 
beauty and healthful lifestyle. The~ want the economy to remain healthy but not at 
the expense of population and industry growth at a high rate. In 1988, the U.S. 
Conference of Mayors presented the mayor with their city livability award for 
"Outstanding Mayoral Leadership in the Arts" (Friedman, 1993). Receiving a 
livability award has enhanced the city's attractiveness and has been employed to 
that end. 
Official Silence 
For city officials, news of gang infiltration could not have arrived at a less 
propitious time. Two multi-million dollar projects were underway in Northeast 
Portland, the area most affected by gangs. The Convention Center was being 
constructed and Lloyd Center Mall was undergoing an expensive remodeling 
project. The city could hardly encourage business and economic development in a 
neighborhood overrun by lawless teenagers (J. Brown, personal communication, 
. . 
December 19,1994). 
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Gang activity was, at the time, defined as a non-.problem. With economic and 
business concerns in the balance, it is understandable that public and political 
figures were reticent to acknowledge a gang predicament existed. Violent incidents 
in Northeast Portland involving young people were minimized. Citizens were 
assured that gangs were an "L.A. phenomenon." This was Portland and it just 
could not happen in a city like this. City officials were careful to avoid projecting a 
picture of marauding bands ofyouth commandeering business areas and 
jeopardizing the revenue likely to be generated there. Politicians and police 
officials contended that the acts of violence were isolated events; that people were 
only emulating what they were seeing on television. 
I think I referred to it as the 'Jaws Syndrome'. If you remember the original 
movie, Jaws, when the shark started eating people, the mayor didn't want the 
news to get out. He was trying to tell everybody it was something else. It wasn't 
a shark. It was a boat accident, or something. And it seemed like something was 
going on. I'm not much into conspiracy theories, but I think people really didn't 
want to believe it. And it may be because they had these big projects coming on, 
but I think they really didn't want to believe it and some people who, I think had 
a great deal of sentiment or love for this city, just didn't want to believe it could 
happen here. It was a real struggle. I remember going into a meeting with 
[the mayor], with several of our people, and as we were going into the meeting, 
the police chief, at the time, and several of his deputy chiefs came out and we 
passed them in the hall. They said hello. They were decked out in their dress 
uniforms. And we went in there and started talking to [the mayor] and his staff 
about the gang problem and - I don't blame him at all - but he just, "What are you 
talking about?! The chief and his deputies just came out of here- just assured 
me that we didn't have a gang problem in Portland!" And that's the way it was 
(E. Blackburn, personal communication, February 24, 1995). 
Organizing by Citizens' Groups and Street Level Service Providers 
JJD's management had confidence that staff reports of a grave situation 
involving gangs were credible. They supported efforts to implement specialized 
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techniques for managing the new type of juvenile offender, but did so without City 
Hall's recognition that an unusual situation was developing. 
More precise boundaries began to define the problem and it was delineated 
along racial lines. According to one staff member (J. Brown, personal 
communication, February 19, 1995), JJD's rationale for the lower profile centered 
on their assumption that African American children, predominantly male, were 
likely to be impacted negatively in the juvenile justice system which was racist and 
which impacted African American children to a disproportionate degree. 
At the time, it was determined that about 140 youth commit a large proportion 
of all crimes committed by juveniles in the city, and that 42 percent of the youth 
were Black males. They were concerned about the disproportionate number of 
Black youths being incarcerated before being remanded to community treatment 
methods. Statistics showed that 67 percent of Black youths were referred to 
community-based programs before commitment to the state training school for 
boys, compared to 88 percent of other youths. While Black youths succeeded in 
community placement 35 percent of the time, other youths experienced a 56 percent 
success rate. JJD staff were concerned that unless some intervention would occur 
soon, over half the Black youths in Multnomah County could be incarcerated 
(Durbin, 1988). 
Creating what would be interpreted as more racist, more negative sanctions 
against children would not be a wise decision, politically. JJD had recently 
developed a campaign focusing on increasing diversity and multi-cultural 
awareness within their organization. Suggesting, suddenly, that specialized 
programs be developed which would certainly impact youth of color (and African 
American youth, especially) would serve only to undermine the effort to bridge the 
• 
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racial/cultural gap within the ranks ofthe organization. In similar fashion, city 
officials were reluctant to take measures which could be perceived as racist when 
they believed that relationships with the African American community were 
strained enough. Instead, they delayed action, stating that appropriate criteria to 
determine gang membership were not yet available (J. Brown, personal 
communication, December 19, 1994). 
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While city officials procrastinated, street level bureaucrats and citizen 
coalitions responded to the crisis. Direct service providers were not certain, early 
on, that the object of their concern was drug-dealing gangsters. They could, 
however, characterize their problem as a shift in the special needs and concerns for 
youth. Where previously youth had confined much of their criminal activity to 
property crimes, the numbers of person to person, assaultive, and drug crimes 
began, noticeably, to rise. They knew they had to do something fast, even if it was 
not officially recognized or publicly sanctioned (J. Brown, personal 
communication, December 19, 1994). 
Expecting little financial or moral support from government sources, public 
agency personnel who had daily contact with the youth, unofficially assumed the 
responsibility for alleviating the problem. They scrambled to adjust their programs 
to meet the challenge and to find resources to make the changes. Programs were 
assembled to supervise youth, prevent disorder, and restore a sense of control and 
safety within neighborhoods. 
Inundated by a drastically increased number of referrals, JJD staff were 
experiencing considerable pressure. Prior to the onset of gang activity, the average 
number of law violations referred to the Multnomah County's Juvenile Department 
had involved approximately 30 .individuals per month. New numbers showed 400 
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youth for the same length of time. Active drug sales of crack cocaine and the 
escalation toward physical violence were not observed before 1987 ... "and that 
doesn't mean, necessarily, that that's all those folks were doing, but there seemed to 
be a break between kids who were just doing property kinds of crimes, some person 
to person crimes- and then drug crime" (Ibid.). 
It was imperative that an effective response to the more specialized needs of 
youth adjudicated for gang crimes be developed and that it be beyond a corrections 
and law enforcement approach. Because of their particular type of criminal activity 
(i.e., more person to person crimes), the gang-involved youth needed to be 
supervised in a more intensive fashion. JJD formed an informal committee to make 
decisions regarding the type of case management system under which to operate. 
They wrestled with resource questions: Whether to inject funds into programs for 
actively involved youth or in intervention techniques, focusing on youth who were 
less involved? Should they provide intensive services to less seriously involved 
youth, thereby slowing their move into the system? Or should the resources be 
directed toward individuals in the middle who were not too "bad", but who also 
were likely to commit other crimes? JJD staff began to work with other community 
agencies to determine which programs would be effective and to write for grants to 
implement them (Ibid.). 
While still not acknowledging a iiiDi problem, pressure was growing from 
within the governmental structure as well as from the public for decisions to be 
made on strategies to reduce crimes committed by youth. JJD made a critical 
choice which shaped Portland's approach to managing gangsters. An intensive 
probation model, in connection with community organizations, was implemented as 
an alternative to incarceration. The Gang Resource Intervention Team (GRIT), was 
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created to administer intermediate sanctions and intensive services for gang-
involved youth and their families. GRIT "counselors" worked with small 
caseloads, developing one-on-one relaticnships focusing on building skills for 
anger control, conflict resolution, esteem building, and educational issues, as well 
as traditional probation management services. The unit was also involved at the 
community level with street law, violence prevention, and restitution programs. 
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In 1987, GRIT was a three-person unit working with adolescent males who 
represented the greatest risk of commitment to MacLaren, the state training school. 
They worked primarily with African-American youth because they were the 
population which seemed most actively involved in gang activity. Soon after, 
however, significant numbers of Asian and white youth began appearing as 
gangsters. 
Portland Police Bureau (PPB) formed the Gang Enforcement Team (GET), a 
specialized unit for gathering infonnation on gangs and gangsters. They were 
effective in identifying gang members, communicating with residents and getting to 
know, personally, many of the youth who were involved in illegal activity. 
Portland Public Schools (PPS) was brought onto the team. 'It rallied to 
organize alternative education programs. The school district became involved 
partly to provide a place to learn for a student no one wanted, and partly to maintain 
some control over srudents who could potentially disrupt otherwise well-
functioning, middle and high school classrooms. They wanted to impact the group 
of students coming back to "civilian" life from the state training school who had not 
yet obtained GEDs. They were still minors in need of education, but the school 
district believed their presence in potentially explosive high schools would tip the 
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gangs. 
The solution was to establish alternative schools in affected neighborhoods. 
70 
Frontier I School's curricula focused on OED preparation for students who had not 
been in traditional schools. It also focused on concerns around anger management 
and other behavior problems manifesting in a child's early school years and 
becoming serious during middle and high schools years. In addition, the school 
district established two alternative schools with programs focusing on African-
American youth. Albina Youth Opportunity School (A YOS) and Portland 
Opportunities Industrialization Center (POIC) concentrated on employment training 
programs (J. Brown, personal communication, December 19, 1994; S. 
Hollingsworth, PPS police, April 3, 1996). 
Neighborhood groups in areas most intensely affected recognized gang 
activity as unique fonn of juvenile crime and as a force which could quickly gain 
the advantage if unchecked. Members of the North and Northeast Neighborhood 
Coalitions lost little time in organizing neighborhood patrols and Crime Watch 
programs to counteract the vulnerability of citizens and to stave off the growing 
sense of powerlessness and fear. They also fonned the Youth Gangs Outreach 
Program, comprised of volunteers who engaged in youth advocacy, identification 
of youths' needs, and referrals to appropriate agencies. 
The Youth Gang Task Force, a citizen-based action group with no fonnal 
charter, budget, or fiscal control of programs, was fonned from the city's Crime 
Prevention Program. Comprised of citizens of North and Northeast Portland 
neighborhoods and staff representing several agencies, its purpose was to lobby and 
• 
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advocate at several governmental levels to obtain public funding for services to deal 
with gang related issues (J. Brown, personal communication, December 19, 1994 ). 
Also in 1987, the Neighborhood Crime Prevention program arranged to host a 
seminar focusing on gangs. Dr. Lynn Curtis of the Eisenhower Foundation, a 
Washington, D.C.-based think tank which analyzes concerns involving youth, was 
the keynote speaker. Part of the foundation's work involves research on programs 
that work for youth. The work of the Philadelphia House of Umoja was discussed 
at the conference and found to have merit. 
Later that year, some of the Neighborhood Crime Prevention staff attended 
the National Urban Crime conference in Washington, D.C. Presenters advised 
conference attendees that if they were beginning to hear that regular drug activity 
was being affected by gangsters, they should organize now; that no one would 
believe there was a problem, but they should begin documenting activity and 
developing a continuum of responses (S. McCormack, personal communication, 
April4, 1995). The Philadelphia House ofUmoja was again promoted as a 
successful program. A residential treatment facility for gang-involved males was 
an interesting concept, but persuading the right people to recognize the existence of 
a problem was more pressing. A "House ofUmoja" concept for Portland was 
relegated to a secondary agenda. 
In August of that year, a contingent including law enforcement personnel, 
community activists, and legal, probation, and education professionals attended a 
conference on gangs in Los Angeles. Conference attendees returned with more 
sophisticated methods of identifying gang activity than they had previously used. 
They had a better notion of what a gang-impacted community looks like, the 
meaning of a particular piece of graffito, hand sign, or clothing style, and in which 
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observed police suppression methods used in Los Angeles. They returned 
convinced that Portland would require specialized police, a specialized juvenile 
court and prosecutory team, and an outreach team to identify specific needs of 
youth (Ibid.). They were determined to make convincing arguments to the city 
council. 
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As a result of newly found information, renewed enthusiasm was given to the 
task. Managing a gang situation had many dimensions. Networking was 
orchestrated, dialogues begun, work committees were organized, and efforts to 
prevent, intervene, interdict, adjudicate, incarcerate and educate were launched. 
Effort was directed toward preventing youngsters from succumbing to the influence 
of gang involvem~nt while intervening in and adjudicating their criminal activity. 
The forces of community organizations were marshaled to support citizens and 
reduce vulnerability to crime. All the while citizens in gang-affected areas were 
lobbying to be heard by those with power and the resources to influence policy. 
JJD was proud that it did not practice "traditional" juvenile justice. It referred 
to its probation officers as "counselors". It was proactive in the community. A 
continuum of sanctions was perceived to be most likely to meet the needs of youth, 
and the effort would have to involve the communities most impacted by the 
violence. A residential facility, located in, and involving neighborhood residents 
was an intervention congruent with JJD's philosophy of holistic treatment (L. Poe, 
personal communication, March 15, 1995). 
Of major concern was the question ofhow to handle youth who had been put 
on probation in the community by JJD (I. Bell, personal communication, January 
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Portland, the Oregon Children's Services Division (CSD) had closed its Northeast 
office. There was not even a case manager or a case worker in the community. 
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One of the results of the absence of a children's advocate presence was that 
adolescents in that area who were in trouble with the law (mostly African American 
youth) were simply shipped out of the area. Often, difficulties due to social and 
cultural differences ensued. Sometimes youth were removed to remote areas of the 
state where differences were yet more pronounced. They were no longer exposed 
to an African American perspective and even had difficulty with the availability of 
simple hygiene needs, such as hair products. Parents were concerned and asking 
why disciplinary sanctions needed to include shipping their children away. That 
was before the advent of gangs. 
When gang activity appeared, the obvious (and desirable) solution to many, 
was sending gang youth out of the city. Now JJD was sending them back to their 
neighborhood. Many community residents were terrorized by the new type of 
juvenile delinquent. They only wanted them to disappear from their lives and did 
not give thought to where the child should be sent or what would happen upon his 
or her return. Others advocated for management of the youth in the neighborhood 
while the community helped mold more appropriate behavior (Ibid.). 
Neighborhood residents were involved in much of the decision making 
process regarding the management of gangs. Community meetings were held 
throughout the North, Northeast, and Southeast neighborhoods. A Neighborhood 
Associations Crime prevention staff person stated that some meetings were 
community forums drawing 300 people. She estimates that as many as 100 block 
level meetings were held (S. McCormack, personal communication, April4, 1995). 
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Meetings focused on concerns of neighborhood residents and what they wanted to 
have happen with their children. Some continued to advocate removing the youth 
from the area. Others, however, argued that while facilities around the state might 
be able to force appropriate behavior, such as anger management, in that particular 
controlled setting, upon return to familiar territory, the application of newly-
acquired behavioral skills would not occur. Convincing justifications were made 
for a community, residential facility to focus on teaching coping skills from a 
culturally-specific perspective. A youth could practice his skills on real problems 
and be supported in an environment where individuals cared about his future (I. 
Bell, personal communication, January II, I995). Ideas for an Umoja-style facility 
were being nurtured. 
Drive-by Shooting Forces Acknowledgment 
Ray (Ray-Ray) Winston, a local 17-year old Crip affiliate residing in 
Columbia Villa, a housing project in North Portland, was shot to death at 12:30 
A.M. on the morning of August 17, 1988 as he and about a dozen friends lounged 
around picnic tables in University Park, a public area within the project. The event 
is significant in terms of its forcing recognition of gangsterism in Portland on city 
officials and a larger element of the population than those working and residing in 
the North and Northeast neighborhoods. 
Ray-Ray was just one of a group of teenagers who had received some gang 
notoriety, though he was not well known to law enforcement personnel prior to his 
death. He was outgoing. He had leadership potential. He was actively involved in 
school. He did not present himself as the typical urban gangster (T. Hopson, 
personal communication, April 18, 1995). 
-·---··-------------------------
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Incidents oftypically threatening gang behaviors (driving around and flashing 
signs) had occurred in the neighborhood a few days prior to the night of the 
shooting. According to trial testimony, several local youth, members of the 
Westside Piru set of the Bloods, decided to go over to the Columbia Villa and 
"disrespect" the youth congregating in the park. An excessive amount of alcohol 
was involved. Many of the youth were very intoxicated by the time they got in the 
cars and drove the short distance to the housing project. The Pirus did not plan to 
kill Ray-Ray Winston, or any person. They desired only to make some visible 
distinction between the two sets by firing a few rounds within the perimeter of the 
housing project, then quickly retreat to their own turf. The car cruised through 
Columbia Villa. When it passed the park, it slowed a fraction in front of the group. 
Several people in the car fired shots. The car sped away. Two teenage girls were 
hit, one in the back, one in the buttocks. Some were hysterical. All were stunned. 
Ray-Ray Winston was dead at the scene from a bullet through the cerebral cortex 
( J. Brown, personal communication, December 19, 1995; Hallman, 1988). 
Drive-by shootings had occurred previously, but none had come to the 
attention of and been sensationalized by the media. One just didn't do "drive-bys" 
in this city. "To drive in a car and shoot out a window into a crowd ... I mean, it 
was unheard of' (J. Brown, personal communication, June 20, 1995). The incident 
became known as the first drive-by shooting in Portland. 
Although unaffected citizens and city officials might not have been aware of 
the possibility of gang shootings, the Columbia Villa residents themselves knew of 
the danger that existed. Those who lived near the playground where the shooting 
took place had had windows shot out, and had taught their children to "hit the deck" 
when they heard gunfire. They stayed inside after dark (Woodward, 1988). 
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Official Recognition 
Winston's death was the catalytic event that made the unmistakable statement 
that Portland was a theater for gang activity. The media ran stories for several 
weeks following the shooting. Several community leaders were calling for more 
counselors at the street level to help ease tensions. Gladys McCoy, then 
Chairwoman of the County Board of Commissioners, stated that a request to hire 
counselors was turned down because the Board was concerned about a piecemeal 
approach to gang problems. She was quoted in The Oregonian as saying, "This 
gang thing just hit us so hard, so fast, that we weren't prepared to respond" (p. E-4). 
She stated that unless someone could show there was a real emergency, the request 
would not be considered until a quarterly budget review meeting which was 
scheduled for the following month (Rollins, 1988). 
Though gang activity was viewed as an African American issue, the Northeast 
area was touted as more than just a place where African Americans lived. Families 
living in the Alameda, Irvington, and Sabin neighborhoods were demanding 
protection and services. Since there were middle class whites living in the areas, 
they were likely to receive a response (J. Brown, personal communication, June 20, 
1995). 
That someone was killed was not a surprise to law enforcement personnel and 
social service providers. The fact that it was Ray-Ray Winston was unexpected. 
Field workers believed it ironic that someone had to die before serious attention 
could be given to the problem. "We had TOLD the mayor and we had TOLD the 
county people that there was gang stuff going on and nobody wanted to believe it" 
(Ibid.). 
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Winston's funeral was further evidence that gangs had taken root in Portland. 
A JJD worker described the gathering where Winston's friends ceremoniously 
placed blue carnations and their "do- rags" (handkerchiefs) on the casket (which 
was also blue). It was the first time Portlanders had seen behavior of that kind. It 
was clearly what would be considered appropriate gang behavior toward someone 
who had died from a particular set. "So, that continues. That was the first, and I 
don't think I've seen a single funeral occur with a gang involved young person 
where that hasn't happened. It's almost like it becomes a social event" (J. Brown, 
personal communication, January 13, 1995). 
In actuality, Winston's murder was the third gang style death in Portland. The 
first gang-related murder took place at Delta Park in March 1988. Killed was a 
young woman who was involved with a gang member. She had knowledge of his 
drug deals, and he thought she was planning to inform authorities when she tried to 
move away. He shot her in the head. Law enforcement personnel believe she was 
executed and left in the park to illustrate to others the consequences of providing 
police with incriminating information regarding gang operations. Investigation into 
the Delta Park homicide lasted about a year before the identity of the murderer was 
determined and traced back to gangs and drugs. By that time, Ray-Ray was famous 
in Portland as the first gang-involved homicide victim (Ibid.). 
The second gang-related murder occurred in April 1988 at Grant High School. 
Though primarily an argument between two youths, the cause of the disagreement 
(the color of a baseball cap), in reality, stemmed from escalating issues between 
Crips and Bloods. The youth who committed the murder was a Crip from Long 
Beach, California who had moved to Portland with his family, precisely to escape 
the influence of the gang lifestyle. The other youth was a local Portlander who 
• 
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leaned toward affiliation with the Bloods. Both boys had had problems with school 
and law enforcement officials. The result was that one young man was killed on 
the Grant High School campus and the other served four years at the state training 
school for boys (Ibid.). 
By the time the Delta Park and Grant High School deaths were linked to 
Crips and Bloods, Portlanders had recovered from their shock over Winston's death 
and were demanding action from law enforcement agencies and policy makers. 
With the shooting and finally with parents, their children, police officers, outreach 
workers and probation people saying they had been trying for a long time to be 
heard, government agencies became officially involved. 
II 
So up until the time that Ray-Ray was shot, you know, people were kind 
of like, "We really don't have an issue. This isn't L.A. This isn't Philly. This 
isn't Chicago. This isn't New York." Then when Ray got shot, then they 
started waking up saying, "Well, maybe we do have a problem." So, I thought 
that because of the fear and the outrage that folks felt from, "God, we're really 
not safe, you know. People are out here with guns and they're shooting people." 
That made it move very, very fast. Because now you had everyone on the same 
page saying that we need to do something. And whatever anyone came up with, 
as a collective, was going to get funded.· Just was no question at that point (T. 
Hopson, personal communication, April 18, 1995). 
Mobilization of Resources 
Ray-Ray Winston's death was catalytic for policy-makers. The first official 
recognition of gang activity in Portland was at the state level. Then Governor, Neil 
Goldschmidt believed that the problem might be greater and more complex than 
Portland could manage by itself. Once the governor had officially recognized 
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gangs had invaded some areas of Oregon, county and city policy makers were free 
to draw that conclusion, also. 
Early in 1989, Goldschmidt organized the Youth Gang Strike Force (YGSF), 
to handle interdictive efforts: prosecution, suppression, and intelligence. YGSF 
was comprised of officers from the Oregon State Police, Clark County 
(Washington) Sheriffs Office, Portland, Tigard, Beaverton, and some smaller 
police jurisdictions in and around Multnomah and Washington Counties. Tri-Met, 
the public transportation agency, and Portland Public Schools were also involved. 
The officers were allowed to cross jurisdictional lines in pursuit of suspects. Their 
mission focused primarily on identifying and dealing with drug traffickers (J. 
Brown, personal communication, June 20, 1995). 
YGSF's efforts took a number of high-profile gang-involved drug 
entrepreneurs out of the community and put them into the Federal Penal System. 
Since it dealt only with the drug gang issue, it did not address the continuing and 
growing numbers of youth who claimed gang affiliation, committed violent acts, 
but were not drng-connected. The interest only in drug-related crime became a 
concern. As major players were adjudicated and incarcerated for significant 
periods of time, they were not succeeded by equally influential replacements. 
YGSF became a question of cost efficiency. Millions of dollars were spent on 
interdiction, but soon, it had no more powerful drug lords to arrest. After the first 
two years, the YGSF became less active. It is no longer a formal, multi-: 
jurisdictional body with millions of dollars to spend, though members still meet to 
share intelligence. YGSF became the Oregon State Police (OSP) Gang Unit and 
uses its resources state-wide to gather intelligence on gang-involved youth. It is 
similar in function to PPB's GET which also gathers intelligence (Ibid.). 
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In Portland the problem was now perceived as serious. Within a month of the 
Winston shooting, the Chair ofMultnomah County's Board of County 
Commissioners, the Mayor of the City of Portland, the Administrator of the 
Housing Authority, the Directors ofthe County Departments of Human Services 
and Justice Services met with City, County, and State officials for the purpose of 
structuring a process which would address youth gang violence and its underlying 
causes. The group, composed mainly of social service personnel, indicated a 
predisposition toward social bond/social disorganization explanations of crime 
causation. 
By October of 1988, an aggressive interdisciplinary service delivery team was 
in the process of locating field offices within the boundaries of the Columbia Villa 
housing project. Team goals were to improve quality of life for residents, reduce 
crime, and reduce fear of crime. The team (eventually 44 agencies plus a residents' 
group) was intended to provide a full complement of services to residents of the 
housing project. Programs offering a wide array of life-enhancing services 
directed funding and other resources toward Columbia Villa. Summer youth 
activities were sponsored by the United Way, the City of Portland Parks and 
Recreation Bureau, Delauney Institute's North Portland Youth Service Center, the 
Private Industry Council (PIC), the State Employment Division, the Housing 
Authority of Portland (HAP), the Departments of Justice Services and Human 
Services from Multnomah County, and Portland Public Schools. A drug and 
alcohol program, including counseling, was made up of representatives from 
Oregon's Departments of Vocational Rehabilitation, Adult and Family Services, 
Employment Division, and the state-funded Mainstream drug and alcohol 
counseling program for youth and family. 
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Original service providers mainly represented public agencies traditionally 
offering relief to the poor. County agencies included Health Service Field Nurse. 
Adult Probation Services, Juvenile Probation Services, Aging Services, North 
Portland Youth Service Center, and Multnomah County/State of Oregon Extension 
Services. The State of Oregon provided assistance from Adult and Family 
Services, Children's Services Division, Vocational Rehabilitation Office, and 
Employment Division. The City of Portland offered the services of the Office of 
Neighborhood Associations, Neighborhood Crime Prevention Services, North 
Portland Police Bureau, and City Parks and Recreation (Monroe, 1989). 
By far, however, the largest presence on the team and in the housing project 
was the Safety Action Team (SAT). SAT consisted of three, masters-degreed, 
specially- selected, bicycle-riding, community-policing deputies and two civilian 
investigative officers. They provided full-time law enforcement services to the 77 
acre project, home to a mere 1600 people, and were extraordinarily effective in 
reducing crime on the Columbia Villa reservation. SAT received most of the press 
coverage and all of the .accolades for their community .policing efforts. It was a 
testament to the argument that reducing a youth's involvement in gang behavior did 
not lie solely in suppressive law enforcement tactics. 
Hope for Youth Conference 
Citizens in other parts ofNorth and Northeast Portland continued to express 
safety concerns. City officials continued to enact measures intended to reassure the 
public that the situation was controllable and that responsible action would be taken 
to stop gang activity from escalating. Ed Blackburn, then manager of the Portland 
Neighborhood Crime Prevention Office, was asked by City officials to coordinate a 
• 
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city-wide conference on youth. Community groups, Southeast Uplift and the 
Northeast Coalition ofNeighborhoods, chaired by community leader, Ron 
Herndon, were asked to participate. Blackburn agreed on the condition that the 
conference concentrate on youth crime issues, especially on prevention. One of the 
tasks would be to design a residential program. They believed it had to be Umoja-
like (i.e., small, family setting, culturally-specific, and located in the community) 
(J. Brown, personal communication, December 19, 1995). 
Blackburn and Herndon decided the conference would feature community 
based programs and several were discussed. Both men were aware of the 
Philadelphia House ofUmoja and its respectable reputation. Herndon knew Sister 
Falaka and David Fattah, personally. It was decided that the Fattahs, founders of 
the Philadelphia House ofUmoja, should be invited to make a presentation at the 
conference. 
The "Hope for Youth Conference: Community Based Programs for Youth at 
Risk" was held on January 28, 1989. Blackburn declared in the conference 
brochure: "Growing numbers of our children are becoming involved in Black 
Gangs, Asian Gangs, and Neo-Nazi Skinhead Groups. We must dare to be 
innovative in searching for solutions. The real' Hope for Youth' lies in community 
involvement." 
The goals of the conference were to showcase programs which had a history 
of recognized accomplishments, to join youth service providers and neighborhood 
leaders in an effort to identify areas of need for youth at risk in the community, and 
to develop Portland's own program model which would "reflect the principles of 
extended family, neighborhood revitalization and jobs, self esteem and community 
involvement" (Blackburn, 1989). 
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The seminar was organized to include a combination of neighborhood 
activists. field workers, and as many people from the city's bureaucracy as would 
attend, so both sides could hear the others' concerns. According to Blackburn, 
those who could help each other and move issues into the policy phase regarding 
gang-involved youth were not meeting with each other. A conscious effort was 
made to involve people who could control potential funding sources, so that no 
entity could later say the entire scenario was not delineated for them. Bureaucratic 
attendees included representatives of Juvenile Court, Portland Police Bureau, and a 
few city politicians. Most City representatives were at a level to control funds for 
their agency (E. Blackburn, personal communication, February 24, 1995). 
Conference attendees reviewed program models with development potential 
in Portland. David and Falaka Fattah's presentation was well-received. The 
Philadelphia House ofUmoja was one of the most successful urban program 
models in the United States. The Fattahs attributed their success to the program's 
replacing gang values with family values (Buell, 1989). 
The Fattahs also conducted a small group process whereby program leaders 
and citizens analyzed what was happening with the youth in neighborhoods and 
outlined programs to resolve the problems. Time and time again, the small group 
participants designed a model resembling the House ofUmoja. The Fattahs' 
presentation certainly influenced the group's thinking process, but most agreed that 
the answer was simple: In order to become pro-social adults, youth need shelter, 
stability, love and support, value guidance, encouragement to succeed and someone 
to build their self esteem (E. Blackburn, personal communication, February 24, 
1995). While the answer seemed simple, the implementation would be difficult. 
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We can come up with some stop-gap, immediate response kinds of things, 
but I think all of us recognized that, the fertile ground for gangs to develop here, 
really was a whole social system thing, and that we were going to need to do 
things in terms of something that's an alternative living situation. And so, it was 
no surprise that House ofUmoja was set up as a way to look at creating some 
different kind of family for kids where they really could have some stability (S. 
McCormack, personal communication, April 4, 1996). 
Leaders Emerge, Groups Coalesce 
By the time the Hope for Youth conference occurred, Blackburn was 
emerging as a leader in the race to position strategie~ to manage gang-involved 
youth. Something, however, was wrong with the picture. The problem of gangs 
was viewed as an issue mainly affecting African Americans. Blackburn is white, 
promoting an Umoja-like program to mostly white business and political 
communities. Leaders from the African American community were also needed to 
endorse the concept. Lolenzo Poe, resource development manager with JJD and 
respected community activist, was then recruited to complete three tasks: To 
capture support from the African American community, to help set the structure for 
the newly envisioned residential facility, and to entice the broader community to 
contribute financial support to the project. Poe's presence brought in Multnomah 
County Chair Gladys McCoy, the Coalition of Black Men, and the Urban League of 
Portland (L. Poe, personal communication, March 1, 1995). 
I recognize that I am able - which is always my sacred trust with the 
community, Northeast Portland- because I was born there, raised there; 
and lived there, knew one thing: That with Lolenzo, the interest of the 
children in this community is going to be first and foremost, not the 
systemic or institutional issues. So, when I said that this is what we were 
going to do and this is how we were going to do it, I had a community 
that would go with that. So, when you took that kind of impact to the 
council, and they said, "Well, does that area support it?", and then you 
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wanted to see that, when we had group meetings, people turned out (Ibid.). 
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Though both would argue that the House ofUmoja exists because of 
community effort, Blackburn and Poe were clearly the leaders. Blackburn lent 
vision. political savvy, and indefatigable dedication to the project. "If it was not for 
Ed Blackburn", stated Poe, "and I think, in the Umoja story, it was Ed's UN-
YIELD-ING belief that this was the best thing for this city, it would have never 
happened" (Ibid.). Poe was the credible link to the African American community 
who brought knowledge of the JJD and other local political systems. 
In March of 1989, Blackburn and Poe organized a press conference with the 
mayor, city commissioners, and agencies serving youth, in particular: Alfred Yaun 
Home, A YOS, POIC, and Minority Youth Concerns Action Program (MYCAP). 
There, the most visible leadership in the Black community publicly sanctioned the 
Umoja-style facility concept, stating that they (and the Black community) believed 
it had the best opportunity to impact the gang problem in Northeast Portland. 
With the endorsement of the Black community, momentum for a residential 
facility mounted throughout the city. The Rainbow Coalition, the Black United 
Front, Northeast Portland Head Start, the American Friends Service Committee, 
and JJD's management, with the power to change policy for that agency, intensified 
their involvement. Representatives from the aforementioned entities formed the 
first House ofUmoja advisory board. Representatives from MYCAP, Alfred Yaun 
Home, Albina Ministerial Alliance (AMA), Self Enhancement, Inc. (SEI), the State 
Alcohol and Drug Division, PPS, and PPB were also invited to be present. Oregon 
Children's Services Division (CSD), the NAACP, and the Urban League acted as 
consultants. The movement not only had momentum, it had credibility (Ibid.). 
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As gangs began to be acknowledged, federal grant monies were becoming. 
available for efforts to thwart their activity. Agencies began to think in tenns of a 
financial boon in funding for gang programs. The proposed residential facility was 
to be one program amongst many that would be a contender for a portion of the 
money. Some staff within existing agencies believed that the city did not need 
another program to serve youth and compete for funding and other resources. They 
believed the program's high profile and ability to garner large corporate donations 
was unfair. They believed it more unfair that the new program should also qualify 
for the newly released state and federal funds. Many organizations suddenly 
claimed a right to the money, stating that they worked with youth who were gang-
involved. An effort was launched to detennine which were capable of working 
with gang youth and which were not. 
I don't care how many Umojas you build, it will not cure the problem, 
because Umoja is into rehabilitation. They're dealing with kids who've 
already gone through the system. So, unless·someone gets on the front end 
to stop the bleeding, we'll always be bleeding, always be putting Band-Aids 
on this. If we're looking for a real answer, then the only place you can look 
is at prevention. It has to be in prevention (T. Hopson, personal communication, 
April 18, 1995). 
At the outset of the effort to manage gangs, youth were assigned evenly 
among agencies claiming the ability to accommodate them. Many programs did 
not have extensive experience with gang-involved youth, but were working with 
them, nonetheless. "People were just following the money. It's the nature of 
community based organizations to readjust and readapt as they hear where the 
dollars are going to come from" (I. Bell, personal communication, January 25, 
1995). 
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Agencies were readjusting and readapting, however, when they did not 
adequately understand the level of dysfunctionality of the youngsters with whom 
they worked. They were trying to implement recreational programs for delinquent 
youth who were telling them they were willing to die for their set. Counselors were 
not trained to contend with such declarations, yet they were receiving funding to do 
that and it was dissipating the effort to deal with the population (Ibid.). 
In answer to the problem, the Northeast Rescue Plan Action Committee 
(NERP A C) was formed. Its charter was to delineate the expertise of each agency, 
and to help avoid turf issues and the counterproductivity of fragmentation by 
fostering relationships between agencies. NERPAC consisted ofyouth-serving 
organizations operating in the Northeast neighborhoods. PPS, CSD, SEI, MYCAP, 
PIC, AMA, Yaun, and others were involved. The committee also concentrated on 
issues concerning Northeast Portland youth and their families by identifying needs 
and coordinating services with the organizations which could meet them. Gang 
activity, employment, educational, housing and leisure concerns were addressed. 
The Committee presented a unified effort when working with potential funding 
sources which might be looking to give financial assistance, but did not know to 
which organization funds should be awarded. Traditional, more visible, but less 
committed groups could be receiving funds which should be distributed to agencies 
with gang expertise (Ibid.). 
Leery of the suddenly civic-minded community programs, NERP AC 
developed a grid system. Agencies were required to provide a three-page outline 
detailing their services and identifying the target group served. A chart was 
developed to delineate the type of client and type of services offered by each 
agency. The grid approach meant that agencies not specifically addressing needs of 
--· ·-·--------
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gang- involved youth should refrain from requesting "gang designated dollars" 
unless a bonafide program existed. "But, if you don't do gangs, don't do gangs. 
And it was real clear" (Ibid.). 
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It was eventually determined that MYCAP would work with youth who were 
or had been incarcerated at MacLaren, the state training school. The House of 
Umoja would receive the bulk of the gang-allocated funding. It would be 
developed as an intervention program; an alternative to incarceration for 
adjudicated youth who were gang involved. 
Community Process 
Decision-making processes do not typically follow a prescribed path. 
Interpersonal relationships were important, but so was the community consensus 
process. The House ofUmoja was formed from a broad base of individuals who 
were influential in the decision-making process. Collaboration with the community 
was emphasized. Resident opinions were heavily solicited. Poe and Blackburn 
honored the process and brought the residents' wishes to the attention of city 
officials. Those who experienced it say the group decision-making process, though 
difficult, was healthy and served to strengthen the emerging program. 
It was also a process which moved with a strong sense of urgency. With each 
gang shooting the need for decisiveness became more compelling. Citizens, 
community leaders, and city officials began to conduct business with the 
knowledge that while there might be differences of opinion, prolonged arguments 
could not occur. Extended debate would mean that responsibility for the next youth 
to die would rest on the shoulders of those who did not act (L. Poe, personal 
communication, March 1, 1995). 
• 
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Infusion of Energy 
Excitement over the Fattah charisma and the Umoja mystique was not long-
lived, once the Fattahs returned to Philadelphia. Though the project enjoyed an 
auspicious beginning in January, by June of 1989, no concrete commitments for 
funding or other resources had been made by City or State policy-makers. Forward 
movement became a quagmire of in-fighting between the County and the State over 
whose responsibility it was to fund the House ofUmoja. Poe had officially 
assumed the role of public spokesman for the project. Poe and Blackburn brought 
the Fattahs back to Portland, hoping their presence would infuse decision-makers 
with some of the energy and excitement which pervaded the March visit. The 
strategy worked. David and Falaka Fattah were followed closely by the media. 
We had all this support. They couldn't go anywhere in Portland that people 
didn't know where they were. I mean, media coverage was so heavy. I'd take 
them out to lunch or something and inevitably, somebody, two or three times 
during lunch, would come over and say, 'I saw you on the news and I love you,' 
you know and, 'Hope it all works out,' type of thing. So, there was a lot of 
support. They probably could've run for city council or an election, at that 
time (E. Blackburn, personal communication, February 24, 1995). 
The Fattahs met with the Citizens' Crime Commission, business groups, and 
politicians to build awareness of, and support for the Portland House ofUmoja 
effort. Poe and Blackburn hoped the attention given the Fattahs would focus 
citizens toward strategies concentrating on prevention and intervention, and away 
from enforcement perspectives, which were crude, without expertise, and 
counterproductive (Ibid.). 
Bringing Falaka and David Fattah back to Portland proved an astute strategy. 
The charismatic Fattahs, their entourage, and the media sat in on the City Council 
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meeting. Television cameras recorded the voting to commit funds for the House of 
Umoja. It was no surprise that the vote was unanimous to apply $75,000 toward 
the Portland House ofUmoja. 
Once the City Council committed the first $75,000, other members of the city 
family felt free to release funds. Almost immediately, the State Alcohol and Drug 
Department added $8,000. Three days later Nike, Inc., a Portland-based 
international sportswear manufacturer, committed $100,000. A local accounting 
firm and a legal firm offered their services, pro bono. Other private sector 
businesses and individual citizens contributed additional money and services (E. 
Blackburn, personal communication February 24, 1995; I. Bell, personal 
communication, January 25, 1995). 
Commitment of real dollars meant that finally serious planning could take 
place. A committee, consisting of representatives from CSD, the State Office of 
Alcohol and Drug, Yaun Home, JJD, Multnomah County, other youth provider 
organizations, with the Fattahs as consultants, met to formulate an Umoja-type 
program in Portland. Dollars in the bank also me~t that someone could be 
engaged to deal with the legal and business aspects of starting the program. Iris 
Bell was hired under a contract with the Neighborhood Association. She brought 
organizational skills, an ability to manage many tasks simultaneously, and a 
capacity for seeing the broader picture to the project. Bell assumed the tasks of 
developing a 501(c)(3) private non-profit document, articles of incorporation, board 
development, site development, initial start-up of the program, and myriad other 
details requiring attention in order for the Portland House ofUmoja to come into 
being (1. Bell, personal communication, January 11, 1995). 
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Before much forward movement could take place, The House ofUmoja 
needed to become legally a private non-profit organization. It became a pressing 
issue in the fall of 1989 because the president ofNike, Inc. was offering $100,000 
in start -up money, but wanted to make the contribution in 1989 to receive a. tax 
credit. Nike, Inc.'s potential contribution was being held off by the fact that the 
50l(c)(3) document was not finalized and not likely to be so, if allowed to traverse 
the normal application process. State Congressional representatives, Ron Wyden 
and Les AuCoin, both assisted in the process. The application was accompanied by 
a letter from Les AuCoin requesting that the document be expedited given the fact 
that a $100,000 contribution was pending (Ibid.). 
It is interesting that after years of officially ignoring gang activity, suddenly 
many entities were willing, in fact, stampeding to become involved. Les AuCoin's 
office "edged out" Ron Wyden's office to be the facilitator of the 501(c)(3) 
document. They both remained involved, asking what the next task would be and 
how they could help. The effort made by so many agencies and private citizens 
astonished those who were working closely at bringing the program to a point 
where the doors could be opened and youth could be served. It was a broad-based 
community effort with civic, corporate, neighborhood and community people 
working on an issue they believed to be significant. It had the broad appeal of 
"child saving", and the perception that it might restore the image of Portland as a 
livable city. No one wanted Portland to be viewed as a gang capital and no one 
wanted conditions surrounding gang activities to worsen (Ibid.). 
With private, non-profit status (before the end of 1989), Nike, Inc.'s $100,000 
in the bank, fiscal and legal consultants on line, and a board of directors in place, 
formal board meetings began. Individuals who had been on the advisory committee 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
92 
helping with legal and incorporating aspects of the project dropped out of active 
involvement. People with different areas of expertise moved on to the board of 
directors, in an advisory capacity, to deal with issues related to fashioning programs 
and operating residential facilities. The first board of directors consisted of then 
Director of JJD, Harold Ogburn, Opal Chancellor-Moore, a PPS employee, Rodney 
Cook, Director of Yaun Home, A vel Gordly, then Director of American Friends 
Service Committee, now a state representative, Iris Bell, Lolenzo Poe, and a few 
business and civic leaders (Ibid.). 
. By the spring of 1990, Juvenile Court was ready to make funding available to 
purchase a specified number of beds to which it could remand youth in lieu of 
incarceration. Once the private non-profit status had been granted, the House of 
Umoja was supposed to begin operating. They needed to start an interim program, 
but there was no place from which to operate such a program. A site had yet to be 
identified and decisions made as to whether a new structure would be built or an 
existing one remodeled. 
Bell, meanwhile, believed her contractual obligations had been concluded as 
the 50l(c)(3) was completed, a board with an advisory committee was in place, and 
a program outline was in progress. She thought it propitious to bow out of her 
involvement to date and serve only on the board of directors. Low level 
participation did not last long. She was called to act as interim executive director 
with the goals of locating a site, raising money to renovate the site, and organizing 
the development of a program. A temporary building was located on 30th and 
Northeast Broadway, and the Umoja group began an outreach program (Ibid.). 
For nearly a year the interim outreach program operated out of a house with a 
kitchen, den, and employment and counseling areas, but no beds. The House of 
• 
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Umoja was not yet equipped to be a 24-hour residential facility. Supervision could 
only be provided from 8:00A.M. to midnight, with calls after that to make sure 
participants were still at home once they were dropped off there by staff. Night 
basketball and other innovative programs were developed to assist in monitoring 
the activities of the youth for longer periods of the day (Ibid.). Nonetheless, it was 
clear that the need to find a permanent residential site was growing critical. 
Finding an Acceptable Location 
The problem of finding a suitable residential facility in the community was 
important in terms of being able to manage and treat clients, but the issue also had a 
political aspect. Residents and business owners objected to proposed locations, 
citing safety issues surrounding a group of convicted juvenile felons being "turned 
loose" in their neighborhoods. Poe and Blackburn were cognizant that the 
community would not support a facility in a location they believed had been foisted 
upon them. While no site would be ideal, they continued to work with residents to 
find a building all would accept. 
In 1989, according to Blackburn, a local banking firm had donated two houses 
as possible sites. Of the two houses, the most promising as a residential site was 
located on the comer of Northeast 7th and Alberta near King Elementary School. 
Anticipating they would encounter opposition by citizen~ and never be allowed to 
locate next to the school, Blackburn, Poe, and Bell searched for an alternative 
building. A building was located at 17th and Alberta (ten blocks east of the first 
choice) during the summer of 1989. The Black Educational Center owned the 
building. Bell was a former member of their board of directors. She orchestrated 
negotiations with them immediately, and brokered an agreement to acquire the 
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Blackburn had taken tactical lead in this part of the project. His strategy, 
during a series of community meetings to agree on a site, was to gain resident 
consensus to support any site which was a reasonable distance from the elementary 
school. In need of community support and advocacy, Blackburn invited the Fattahs 
to return, believing they could be influential in quelling residents' fears and in 
encouraging the reintegrative, Afrocentric approach. The Fattahs were present at a 
decidedly tumultuous meeting where commitment was grudgingly made. Residents 
agreed to allow the House ofUmoja to be located at the 17th and Alberta site (its 
present location). A hotly contested hurdle had been crossed. 
Program Development 
While the site issue was being fought, a treatment program was being 
developed. Psychologist Mary DuPain was contracted, with the Fattahs as 
consultants, to develop a day by day application of the Afrocentric rites of passage. 
The concept is based on a series of levels designed to have a dramatic, direct and 
forceful impact on youth (see APPENDIX D for a discussion of Afrocentrism). 
DuPain developed the curriculum and trained staff in the underlying conceptual 
model and its implementation. The model is considered to encompass the 
fundamental guiding principles African men need to apply to all aspects of their 
lives. 
The rites of passage components include African and African American 
history, economics, politics, family responsibility, career development, spirituality, 
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community involvement and organizing, physical fitness, and the Nguzo Saba value 
system, taught from an Afrocentric perspective. The seven guiding values of the 
Nguzo Saba system are: Umoja (unity), Kujichagulia (self determination), Ujima 
(collective work and responsibility), Ujamaa (cooperative economics), Nia 
(purpose), Kuumba (creativity), lmani (faith). The objective ofthe Umoja approach 
is to have the youth master certain criteria in each area through a teaching style 
utilizing creative as well as logical learning mechanisms. Symbols are significant 
(as they are within gangs) and t-shirts, sweatshirts, jackets and caps are used to 
reinforce culture and to create group solidarity (Kunjufu, 1990). 
In addition to Afrocentric programming, the Portland House ofUmoja was to 
comprise clinical, educational, and employment components, with extensive 
outreach, family, and transitional programs. Before youth could be served, each 
component needed to be developed and staff hired and trained. Though it was 
widely acknowledged that tailoring of the programs needed to occur to fit them to 
the Portland situation, the approach developed by the Fattahs in Philadelphia 
heavily influenced the development of the Portland facility. 
Financial and Community Support 
With the seed money largely spent, the project needed community support 
and financial assistance from private sources in order to remain afloat. A staff 
person was recruited to raise funds from corporate and individual donors. Key to 
fund raising was the establishment of a board of directors who were both influential 
and affluential. Prestigious board members were recruited. They helped by 
networking with other corporate executives, championing the cause ofUmoja, and 
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ensuring community based representation (E. Waters, personal communication, 
January 18. 1996). 
Corporate and business entities contributed in an effort that appealed from 
both altruistic and pragmatic perspectives. They contributed to a worthy cause and 
sought to engender good will and possibly dissuade potential thefts, vandalism or 
other losses of revenue by helping youth choose activity alternatives. They would 
also be investing in the future by helping to create responsible citizens, prospective 
employees, and consumers. The House ofUmoja concept had broad appeal and 
was embraced by a large segment of the population. Community response was 
more encouraging than expected. 
As we started talking and started raising funds, we started getting notes and 
letters from Gladstone, from Hillsboro, from West Linn, from all throughout the 
metropolitan area. Ten dollars here; five dollars here. 'I hope this will help.' I 
mean, just the most dearest letters from people (I. Bell, personal communication, 
January 11, 1995). 
A major problem with this broad acceptance was that the House ofUmoja 
concept was misunderstood. Residents of the larger community believed that the 
House ofUmoja would be a "quick fix;" that gang activity would disappear and the 
blighted area would be cured forever. Few people recognized the broader social 
issues surrounding gang activity: poverty, lack of opportunity for material gain, 
social disenfranchisement. The public was only aware that adolescents with little 
parental guidance or education, and who had been kicked out of school were roving 
the streets, creating problems and shooting people. Bell and Blackburn, quick to 
recognize this, took measures to educate the public that the House ofUmoja was 
part of a continuum of services, and that like any other social program, would be an 
on-going process. It would be years before the gang influence would be eradicated. 
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"There was a real desire to get it fixed, but not a lot of understanding of what it was 
going to take to fix it" (Ibid.). 
If they can touch fifty kids a year in any significant way, I think that's good. 
But, that's cuz I'm looking at other kinds of programs, too, and knowing that 
when you've got, what amounts to a caseload, and you've got to do follow up 
and you look at all the needs that child brings into the living situation ... they 
have sisters and brothers, the mom and dad, whoever's the family construct, 
drug and alcohol issues, education issues, anger management and violence 
stuff that they've still got to deal with ... to think that Umoja can have that much 
impact on hundreds of kids, is crazy. But, it's what people think (S. McCormack, 
personal communication, April 4, 1995). 
The House ofUmoja helped the community by serving as a reminder that the 
North and Northeast neighborhoods should not be neglected. CSD had closed its 
neighborhood office some years prior to the advent ofUmoja. As a result, no social 
workers actually canvassed the neighborhood to find families in need of assistance. 
When the Umoja staff increased its outreach effort, they became aware of specific 
cases of people in need of various public services. They began to comprehend the 
level of dysfunctionality in some families and the magnitude of the need to have 
other kinds of services available to families, not just the young person remanded to 
Umoja. CSD was asked to return to the neighborhood, reopening its Northeast 
Portland office in 1990 (I. Bell, personal communication, January 11, 1995). 
We're dealing with kids whose normal response to anything is to shoot. We 
deal with the 'throwaway' kids, who have been in and out of other programs. 
They're pretty hard core. For all practical purposes, they've grown up as street 
kids. But when they're given a home environment and a structure, they respond 
to it. They respond to nurturance. It's something they've always dreamed about 
(E. Waters, quoted in The Oregonian, Bondarowicz, 1991, p. 112). 
Umoja was able to begin to raise concerns about broader issues of community 
need and resources outside of just the immediate fifteen youth within the House of 
Umoja. For example, homeless children were abundant in Northeast Portland, 
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though they would not identify themselves as that as long as there was a relative, a 
couch, or a basement floor they could occasionally claim. They struggled with the 
same issues as youth living on the streets in the central business district. Umoja's 
influence was able to raise the issue of the dispersal of homeless dollars. A whole 
network of youths who were homeless lived in Northeast Portland, but dollars 
allocated for the homeless were not going into that community (I. Bell, personal 
communication, January 11, 1995). 
In another instance, outreach workers discovered a young boy, believed to be 
staying with his grandmother, a woman who clearly would qualify and benefit from 
public services. During the course of developing an assistance plan for the family, 
it was learned that she was not his grandmother, but his great-grandmother. She 
was trying to provide for the 16 year old boy and two younger siblings, but not 
utilizing any public services except her social security check. She was able to 
ensure the children had a shelter and food, but little else. 
Yet another case involved a young man who refused to enter the House of 
Umoja. He told his caseworker that he was choosing to remain in his abusive home 
because his younger brother was still there. He was in a gang, stealing and 
involving himself in other illegal activities in order to ensure that his brother went 
to school everyday. He acted as the protection for his brother, sleeping on the 
couch to prevent further abuse. He was candid about why he would not stop being 
involved in a gang though he was clearly benefiting from exposure to the Umoja 
program. "Came every day. Like clockwork. On time. Participated. Did 
everything. But knew that he had to make a choice, there. And it was just unfair to 
watch him have to make that kind of choice with his life, being all of sixteen, 
himself' (Ibid.). 
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Opening the Broadway Site 
Bell was juggling many projects: raising funds, monitoring the development 
of a treatment model, hiring staff, and educating the community. S4e was still 
under pressure to begin serving the youth remanded to the program. Not ready to 
open even the temporary site on Broadway, Bell, Blackburn, and Poe arranged to 
send six of the young men to the House of Umoja in Philadelphia. The idea was to 
have them work with the Fattahs, to learn, first-hand, about Afrocentric concepts, 
and to return as "junior counselors", and examples to others. They were to spend 
four months in Philadelphia while the Portland Umoja team hired and trained staff, 
found a permanent facility, and started the outreach component. An emergency 
situation involving the death of a staff member occurred in Philadelphia. The 
youths returned early, forcing the process to begin ahead of schedule. On February 
19, 1991, the Portland House ofUmoja residential facility for gang involved males, 
ages 1 0-15, opened its doors for business. 
We have youth in a program, no place to put them, we better hurry up and 
do something. So, we had to speed the process along. That helped though, 
to some degree, because the program went a lot faster. But then, to some 
degree, the employees suffered from not having the training and some of the 
things that needed to happen in place before that (1. Bell, personal 
communication, January 11, 1995). 
Criticism of the Operation 
By the time the facility had been open one year, a local weekly newspaper 
featured an article which was critical ofUmoja's general philosophy, and 
questioned its record in helping youth disengage from the gang lifestyle. The 
article also expressed concern over Umoja's high public profile and comparatively 
sizable budget which caused resentment among other youth-serving agencies. 
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The criticism is accepted as being legitimate, even by many who worked on 
bringing the House ofUmoja to Portland. Other agencies had been in operation for 
years, working with youth with many different needs. Almost overnight, Umoja 
was set up, receiving hundreds of thousands of dollars, community support, and 
media publicity, while other youth-serving agencies struggled to maintain an 
existence ( J. Schrag, 1992). 
The news item also called into question the fact that Lolenzo Poe, then 
chairman of the House ofUmoja board of directors, also worked for JJD. It 
allowed that Poe was not directly responsible for overseeing the contract, but 
worked with employees who did control it. Poe contended that Umoja receives no 
special regard because of his connection, but others continued to wonder about the 
politics of the decision-making process (Ibid.). 
The article questioned the county's accountability in cases where a conflict of 
interest might be present. As a result, the county enacted a rule stating that it was 
unlawful for a county employee to sit on a board of directors of an organization · 
where the county had an involvement in funding the organization (I. Bell, personal 
communication, January 25, 1995). 
The fact that Umoja continues to flourish at the Alberta Street site indicates 
its degree of acceptance by the community. During the past five years, the Portland 
House ofUmoja has provided residential services to approximately 130 youth and 
touched 3,000 more through outreach efforts (J. Gage, M. Branch, personal 
communication May 2, 1996). The program continues to be an attractive 
alternative to incarceration for youth who are ready to extricate themselves from the 
gang life-style. 
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DISCUSSION 
Chapter V discusses responses to the problem of a gang presence in Portland. 
Efforts of law enforcement personnel, social service providers and members of 
citizens groups to manage the situation are examined first. The behavior of law 
makers and city officials throughout the process are addressed second, followed by 
a discussion of the role of community leaders in shaping the process. The chapter 
concludes with recommendations for other programs. 
Street Level Service Providers and Citizens' Groups 
Both the Juvenile Justice Department (JJD) and Portland Police Bureau (PPB) 
practiced a version of law enforcement which embraced views described earlier in 
the works of Shaw and McKay, Cohen, Cloward and Ohlin, and Hirschi. Whether 
consciously or not, the organizational cultures of both agencies viewed the issue of 
lower class crime from perspectives described by those theorists. PPB officers and 
JJD parole and probation officers avoided suppressive tactics and approached their 
jobs from a human services perspective. When faced with a problem they 
perceived as serious (Cobb and Elder, 1984), (increased juvenile referrals, more 
violent offenders, more seriously dysfunctional families), the response was to 
involve social service agencies and the community in affecting the lives of the 
youths. 
JJD worked closely with Children's Services Division (CSD) on youth issues 
of abuse, neglect, and homelessness. To the extent possible, families were included 
in rehabilitation efforts. Anger management, alcohol and drug, and criminal 
thinking programs for youth increased in size and intensity during the mid-1980s. 
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As the community policing model emerged and was celebrated as an effective law 
enforcement technique, PPB became involved. JJD also capitalized on the 
popularity of community policing and inserted its Gang Enforcement Team (GET) 
into neighborhoods. GET members became acquainted with both law-abiding and 
law-breaking citizens. 
North and Northeast Portland neighborhood associations had a history of 
being well-organized, active and sophisticated in their relationship with law 
enforcement and city agencies. Citizens traditionally looked to the community 
process as a way to accomplish a task. Individuals active in city politics had 
maintained a practical perspective on the youth who were committing crimes and 
were instrumental in educating residents on strategies to defend against it. 
A balance was struck between acknowledging the fear of residents and 
acknowledging youthful offenders as a part of the community. Neighborhood 
associations helped residents define the problem as one belonging to the 
community (Nelson, 1986, Stone, 1989). Rather than rerp.oving them, community 
groups (with help from street level service providers) sought to create a situation 
where offending adolescents could be taught to behave appropriately in their 
current setting. 
The idea was promulgated, in almost slogan-like terms, that all youth who 
were gang-involved were the community's children and these children were killing 
each other. Defined in such a way, the issue was first viewed as non-controversial. 
No one could be against preventing children from killing one another, preventing 
youth from becoming involved in gangs and preventing drugs from being sold to 
children. Controversy occurred when the community and the city began to 
determine a specific strategy for handling the problem. The issue became 
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complicated as it was learned how much effective programs would cost. 
Incremental change might be acceptable, but sweeping changes within the social 
structure would not be tolerated by citizens or law-makers. · 
Law-Makers and City Officials 
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Early denial of gang activity by Portland city officials was due in part, to the 
fact that Portland was enjoying prestige as a livable city, having been nationally 
recognized for several years and having won an award. The notion that Portland 
might be encountering gang problems similar to Los Angeles or Chicago threatened 
the image that Portlanders liked to have and that city officials desired to project. 
In addition, the city was experiencing a period of economic growth. 
Government leaders were concerned about two projects underway precisely in the 
location of reported gang activity, inner Northeast Portland. City officials did not 
want to do anything to jeopardize the growth or cause businesses to move out of the 
area or discourage new businesses or industries from relocation. 
Still not sure if a gang problem existed, the situation was still being defined as 
controllable. City officials thought that if law enforcement agencies were not yet 
requesting support, nothing out of the ordinary was occurring. For a period, JJD 
and PPB maintained the position that though they were seeing more extremes in 
crimes and levels of dysfunctionality among youth, as experienced and resourceful 
professionals, their skills had not yet been exhausted. The city was willing to 
accept that, knowing that if law enforcement agencies needed assistance, it could 
not be given without allocating more dollars from a stretched budget. 
In addition, not just city officials, but school and business leaders wanted to 
be cautious in making statements which would cause citizens to panic. No one 
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wanted to be the first to say publicly, "We have gangs in Portland," only to be 
unsupported in the claim. Such statements could invite ridicule, and be considered 
irresponsible for unduly panicking the community. Many saw the Grant High 
School shooting in the spring of 1988, as an incident of gang activity, but were 
reluctant to make statements which would cause alarm. Fear-invoking rhetoric 
could cause the stable mix of racially integrated, working class and lower middle 
class homeowners to move from the area, send their children to other schools, or 
not send them to school at all. 
Crisis Event 
As stated in Chapter IV, the drive by shooting death of Ray Winston was not 
the first gang related death in Portland. It was also not the first drive by shooting, 
but only the first to attract attention because a death was involved. The drive by 
shooting death in August 1988 was the first incident recognized and described by 
the media as gang related. 
The shooting was a crisis event (Kingdon, 1984, Stone, 1989, Nelson, 1986) 
which shocked residents and city officials with undeniable evidence of gang 
presence. The incident gave distinct form and definition to the activity observed on 
the streets. Prior to the incident, the public could believe that drugs are dealt on 
street comers by drug dealers, but not necessarily by gangsters. Youth might kill 
each other at school over incidental disagreements which are not gang-related. 
Young women are shot in the head in parks by people other than gangsters. Only 
gangsters, however, shoot wildly from moving vehicles. City officials were forced 
to acknowledge that a serious situation existed (Cobb and Elder, 1984) and that the 
problem would have to receive attention. 
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Official City Response 
The city government's response seemed frenetic compared with the casual 
attitude of the recent past. Gangs had been allowed to become well-integrated in 
some neighborhoods and would be difficult to dislodge. City officials needed to 
assure citizens that they were still in control and that no sections of the city had 
been captured by gang members. 
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After the shooting incident, county and state officials became interested in 
stopping escalation and discouraging gang activity. They called on those who had 
been active for a long time in managing gang activity: Staff from JJD, PPB, and 
human services agencies. At the advice of community activist and JJD employ~e 
Lolenzo Poe, neighborhood coalitions were asked to participate in the process to 
find solutions for managing gangsters. 
The first project implemented after the shooting incident was the Columbia 
Villa Community Service Project. It was instituted to provide an array of services 
to the housing project where the murder had occurred. An interagency, multi-
disciplinary team was formed to integrate law enforcement and social services to 
holistically impact the lives of the housing project residents. 
In theory, anyone requesting services of any of the agencies would receive 
assistance, but the project's location made it clear that the focus was on Columbia 
Villa residents. Gangsters oper~ted over a wider area. Sending them across the 
street or a mile away was not a long term solution to a gang problem. It is, 
however, a definable area, with an easily controllable perimeter. It is also an area 
for which concentrated services could easily be provided. If officials found that 
this level of intervention was necessary to control gangs, similar programs would 
be implemented in incremental stages throughout specific areas of the city. 
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Gang activity occurred in a larger part of the city than just the housing 
project. If not curbed, the problem could spread to encompass an even greater 
portion of Portland. Armed with that knowledge, city officials organized meetings 
between community groups, law enforcement and social services workers to 
discuss a continuum of sanctions for youth who had been convicted of gang-related 
crimes. Again, the problem was defined as one with social causation, one which 
would not disappear just because a few gangsters were arrested, and one which 
would require long term prevention and intervention measures. With a tradition of 
community involvement and sociological beliefs regarding crime causation, ideas 
for a community based, residential facility began to take form. 
Influence of Leaders 
Poe and Blackburn emerged as leaders in bringing the House ofUmoja into 
reality. Blackburn, then manager of the Neighborhood Crime Prevention program, 
was a skillful strategist with vision. Poe, a JJD employee, had credibility and · 
connections with both the Black community and the city's administrative offices. 
Blackburn realized that as a white man, he was at a disadvantage in 
convincing whites or Blacks which sanctions to impose for a situation involving 
youth who were predominantly Black. He contacted representatives of the Black 
community and was advised that if he could convince Poe to endorse the project, he 
would have their support. Sanctioning ofUmoja by the Black community would 
ensure a united stance which Blackburn believed was necessary to induce other 
residents, city decision-makers, and corporate entities to spend money to back the 
project. 
• 
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Bringing the Fattahs in as consultants was another successful tactic on the part 
of Blackburn. The Fattahs, whose legend had preceded them, were "experts" who 
had been successful in their field for twenty years. They could advise the Portland 
novices on setting up the facility, avoiding problems, and applying the Afrocentric 
approach. In addition, charismatic Falaka Fattah's African name and clothing 
intrigued many Portlanders who saw a charming contradiction in the grandmotherly 
figure who fearlessly embraced tough gangsters. 
Blackburn maintained a continuing dialogue with citizens' groups throughout 
the process. Countless neighborhood meetings were held. The decision-making 
body, of which Blackburn and Poe were a part, honored the wishes expressed by 
citizens in meetings as the program developed. The respect they demonstrated for 
residents' concerns was repaid in good will. Citizens were willing to attend 
meeting after meeting to work out solutions to a difficult problem and to accept and 
support the House ofUmoja, once it opened. 
Poe had credibility and connections with influential Black groups, and city 
officials. He was trusted by Portland's Black community and served as their 
spokesman in matters connected with the City of Portland. He was a life-long 
Portland resident and had grown up in the Northeast neighborhood. As a respected 
JJD professional and the trusted emissary for the population most affected, Poe was 
a credible witness when promoting the House ofUmoja to residents or city 
officials. When he supported opening a residential facility for gangsters next door 
to his wife's parents' home, the community believed the idea would work. 
Poe was also skilled at leveraging funds. The Black Men's Coalition, the 
Black United Front, and the Urban League of Portland agreed to support whatever 
programs Poe would endorse. He had the acumen to hire a professional fund raiser 
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who was able to attract the interest of 22 businesses. Corporate leaders, such as the 
president ofNike, Inc., were able to induce other businesses to financially assist the 
House ofUmoja. Once the weight of the business community and the influential 
Black organizations were behind him, smaller businesses, private citizens and 
foundations offered support, as well. 
Options Not Selected 
Law enforcement agencies in Portland could have chosen to impose harsher 
punishments with the expectation that incapacitation through a long prison 
sentence, or threats of such a sentence, would deter violent crime. As Currie (1993) 
contends, such a deterrence strategy is unworkable because there are too many 
gangsters to realistically believe they could all be locked up. In addition, fear of 
incarceration does not effectively prevent illegal behavior. Many who engage in 
criminal activity are too desperately enmeshed in life difficulties to have rational 
thoughts regarding the possibility of prison sentences. They may also consider 
prison simply as a part of life's expectations. 
Poe, Blackburn, and the street level professionals were aware, however, of the 
disproportionate number of Black youth who were incarcerated, and did not want to 
further practice racist adjudication and disposition. They believed that since they 
were creating a gang response program, they could utilize research and advice 
available to build a program which had a chance to work. They did not want to 
repeat mistakes of other cities. They wanted a program which approached the 
underlying causes of gang activity. Incarceration would not address those issues. 
Another course of action could have been to remove youth from the area, 
thereby destroying alliances and power structures within gang groups based on 
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numbers and reputations. It would also have removed a difficult youngster from 
the community and given residents respite from his or her terrorization. 
For those designing the city's continuum of responses, removal was 
considered similar to incarceration. It might have an immediate impact for 
residents, but not one which would endure. It would not help the youth learn to 
become a law-abiding citizen in the community where he would be tested on a 
daily basis. It would not help the youth gain the ability to develop a repertoire of 
appropriate responses to temptations to engage in illegal activity and have the 
opportunity to practice them. 
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In Oregon, where the only significant Black population resides in Portland, 
removal would be perceived as another racist tactic. It could be viewed as an 
attempt to destroy the Black culture and further denigrate Black males. Framers of 
programs to deal with gangs were interested, rather, in having an adolescent benefit 
from a more benevolent response to unlawful behavior: that the community, 
though abhorring the behavior, continues to acknowledge the youth as part of the 
larger family and wants the individual to remain among the group. The community 
is willing to include the youth in all the advantages available to those who conform: 
protection, support, inclusion. 
Another response might have been to remand equal percentages of white 
and minority youth to integrated residential facilities. Early in the effort, it was 
thought integration would be a non-racist way to manage the problem and Poe 
endorsed such an endeavor (Durbin, 1988). Through the course of dialogue, 
however, an integrated facility came to be viewed as inadequate to meet the needs 
of all youth. Smaller programs, tailored to certain types of youth, were believed to 
better meet the needs of those youth and could more effectively reach their families. 
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Hindsight 
Poe states that in looking back over the process, the initial phases were not 
broad-reaching enough. He believes the school district and the community were 
not included early enough. He adds that the program's designers did well in their 
discussions about the long-term goals, but that some policies were made with short-
sightedness. Poe states that the designers should have asked for more money to 
extend their outreach program. For him, outreach is~ important part of the 
Umoja vision to impact gang involvement. 
From a broader sense, the experience that it took the community through, 
I believe, is continuing to have long term impacts. It is the way we do most 
business now. You bring community policy people around the table, talking 
about analyzing, you continue to have a forum, with programs and interviews 
that are involved in the issues of gangs (L. Poe, personal communication, March 
15, 1995). 
These days, according to Poe, community and program representatives 
meet on a weekly basis. They strategize how, as a system of services, the 
community can improve service delivery. They maximize their potential by 
collaboratively seeking grants, where in the past they competed with each other. 
The purpose is to present a unified front for the kind of solutions that are needed. 
So, to get a model that now says that we're all going to sit down and talk 
about this before we move, I mean, it is the model that I use in this division to 
move forward those processes and programs that we spend a hundred million 
dollars on. You talk about a different mindset of really empowering community 
by allowing them access to participate in those processes that govern their lives. 
That's what we did. And to watch that. To watch it continue on tells me that 
just for the process of reaching decisions, it was working (Ibid.) . 
• 
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Impact 
The House ofUmoja, as an attempt to stabilize disruption and disorganization 
in a Northeast Portland neighborhood, has been a successful means of social control 
in that it has channeled some of the discontent into traditional power structures. It 
is limited by its size and funding base, however, in effecting social change on more 
than that area of the city. 
What is different about the House ofUmoja is that it is not a practice of what 
Helfgot (1981 ), Marris and Rein (1982), and Trattner (1994) describe as attributing 
the problems of the needy to personal shortcomings and providing counseling or 
advise to promote participation in the labor force. Umoja holds the community 
responsible for its problems and enlists the assistance of residents in working 
toward a better neighborhood. 
According to several individuals who collaborated on the project, Umoja's 
contribution has been in fostering the notion of hope and unity. It has brought 
together agencies which had previously competed with each other. The contribution 
of the youth who occupy the Umoja home has been to demonstrate the Afrocentric 
model to the community. Removing fifteen young men from the street for a year 
does not significantly impact Portland's gang activity. Fifteen young men, 
however, re-entering the community and demonstrating the values of collective 
unification and commitment to the principle of family and community is a 
beginning. When they are able to touch other lives they are impacting the 
community. Development through outreach and the ability to broaden the message 
of unity and collectivism is limited only by the few numbers that can go through a 
residential facility (Ibid.). 
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Poe believes the House ofUmoja could have greater impact on building a 
sense of family and community if its funding source changed. The program is 
currently 70 per cent government funded and 30 per cent privately funded. Public 
funding carries rigid mandates including the requirement to provide law 
enforcement staff access to resident youth upon demand. He believes the authority 
to demand access to youth violates the sanctity of the family, depriving Umoja of a 
proper opportunity to offer the protection of a home. 
Poe wants Umoja to be able to move to a permanent percentage of funding 
which does not come from a government agency. Faced with that issue a few years 
ago, Sister Fattah maneuvered the Philadelphia House ofUmoja away from much 
of its public funding and toward a greater percentage of private donations. She is 
now able to accept only youth who have dependency issues (abuse, neglect), and is 
not required to report them to authorities for minor rule violations which can be 
handled informally within the family. The more like a home either House of 
Umoja can become, the more successful they will be in instilling community and 
family values in youth. 
When I grew up, we never sat down and had a case management 
session. My mother never did an initial assessment. At least not formally. 
Those are informal things that happen in natural being of a family ... That's 
the business you want these young men to walk away with. Family is 
community. You have certain expectations of behavior about doing what's 
in the best interests of the community. And that's what you have to develop · 
(Ibid.). 
Community-Based, Residential Facility 
From a theoretical perspective, youth become involved in gangs for reasons 
related to the complex social environment in which a child lives. Poverty (amid 
relative wealth), isolation, family disruption and instability are usually cited as 
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factors associated with gang involvement. Currie (1993) contends that when faced 
with few opportunities to feel capable and strong, belonging to a gang satisfies the 
need for challenge and esteem. 
The notion is sometimes reduced to a "lack of family values" or "broken 
homes". Oversimplification may have been a factor driving the decision to initiate 
a residential facility. Making a place for youth to stay and locating it in their 
neighborhood was an attempt to make a surrogate home. Operating costs, risks to 
the community, and efficacy were concepts not considered in the beginning. The 
non-controversial nature of the idea of a home for children who did not have good 
homes took precedence over practical issues. For the House ofUmoja, Portland's 
strong tradition of community involvement made the decision for a local facility a 
natural choice. Portland citizens were comfortable with having more control over 
the program, offering advice on techniques, and committing to some of the 
responsibility for its success. 
The community, at large, had some unrealistic expectations about what the 
House ofUinoja was supposed to be able to accomplish. Most citizens who were 
involved in the community organization phases, however, were aware that ridding 
the city of gangsters would be a long and difficult process. It could not be done 
without long term commitment from both public and private funding sources, direct 
service providers, and the citizens, themselves. 
Support of the family by the community and in general by all levels of social 
programs could help to reduce violence in the home. JJD was interested in 
implementing proactive services as well as community sanctions for people after 
they had broken the law. Part of a proactive model would be deliver; of the basic 
services offenders and their families need (health, housing, counseling, education, 
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(not lengthy incarcerations). JJD wanted to ensure that youth left the hands of 
juvenile justice authorities in a better state than when they entered the system. 
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From a practical standpoint, community involvement meant that part of the 
responsibility for rehabilitation of the youth would rest on citizens. According to 
Porche-Burke and Fulton (1992), community involvement communicates to gang 
members that gang and substance abuse problems are being recognized and that 
people have concern and dedication to amelioratio.n of problems associated with 
gang violence and· substance abuse. In addition, a community-based facility can 
utilize neighborhood services. Youth could continue to go to public schools, and 
be employed in the community, while working in tandem with their families to 
address issues contributing to their criminal behavior. 
Cultural Specificity 
Part of the reason for choosing a culturally specific program in Portland was, 
again, the belief that the breakdown in the youths' behavior was symptomatic of a 
regression in the solidarity of the community. Managing youth was only part of the 
problem. An effective gang policy would require attention to a larger segment of 
the city. Portland's gang problem was originally believed to involve mainly 
African American youth. With that assumption, a holistic program would have to 
address the African American experience. 
The Afrocentric approach is intertwined with the emphasis on family and 
community. One interviewee stated that Afrocentrism is nothing mythical or 
magical. A similar attitude toward one's responsibility to, and for all children can 
be observed in some neighborhoods. Afrocentrism, as applied to community, is 
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misbehave, to share food, bandage a toe, or provide refuge. 
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In observance of the African proverb, "It takes a whole village to raise a 
child," the Umoja model attempts to recreate the African village where children 
have an enduring sense of purpose, connectedness, and heritage. Family 
attachments ensure a security and responsibility which control behavior. Within 
the village concept, a child receives the message that people care what happens to 
him on a daily basis and over the course of his life. He or she understands that 
one's behaviors also reflect on the community. 
The Afrocentric approach is valuable, states Kunjufu (1990), for its emphasis 
on Rites of Passage, dramatizing and ritualizing the passage to manhood and of 
transforming that passage into a community event. Structured initiation rites guide 
youths through the difficult developmental period of adolescence. When 
fonnalized, the transitional process can translate complex problems of identity 
formation into concrete and straightforward tasks. 
When gang presence was new in Portland, the most visible activity was that 
associated with Black gangsters. JJD recognized cultural diversity among its staff 
and its clients, and social services staff became aware that some ethnic groups 
might better relate to the message if taught from their cultural perspective. 
The Philadelphia House ofUmoja was practicing a culturally-specific 
program with African American youth. Project leaders and city officials believed 
much of the Umoja program could be borrowed for developing a program in 
Portland. A program based on a value system which would enrich the personal and 
communitarian connectedness of youth involved in gangs made practical sense. 
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Recommendations for Portland 
Invitations for more research and effective programming in Portland are 
similar to national calls for measures to reduce crime. As mentinned in Chapter II, 
Currie (1989) proposes a "social-environmental" or "human-ecological" approach 
to reduce crime. The approach includes interventions at the level of individuals and 
families at-risk, but also moves to exert social control over larger forces which are 
increasingly undermining communities and placing families at risk in the first 
place. He suggests that strategies address individuals, families, community 
stability, and political economy. They should include ap early education, expanded 
health and mental health services, commitment to family support systems (such as 
pro-family economic policy at the national level, and attention to interventions at 
the family level), a commitment to the importance of doing something constructive 
with people after they have broken the law, and to accessible, non-punitive drug 
abuse treatment. 
Reform, contends Currie, should not invest in the old system because it does 
not work. It should ensure the delivery of intensive, high quality treatment 
programs, outreach to hard~to-reach abusers, aftercare which provides supports 
after leaving treatment and advocacy in the community for broader needs like 
housing, health care, and employment. 
Kunjufu (1990) calls for adults to show African American male youth that 
they can resolve problems via means other than physical aggression, through the 
devices of role-playing and exposure to Martin Luther King's theories of non-
violence. Needed, he states, are programs and men who can teach the distinction 
between a battle and a war. He contends that Black boys need to know when it is 
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appropriate to lose a battle so that they will be available for the war in the liberation 
of Black people. 
Churches, schools, and community groups, Kunjufu continues, need to 
establish better relationships with the police and with gang-involved youth. He 
argues that the improved communication would assist in preventing males from 
being seized by gangs, dealers, the media, police and penal institutions. 
Kunjufu suggests implementing a community "safety net" when home and 
school do not provide enough structure for an adolescent. He calls for businesses, 
churches, community organizations, and concerned African American men to 
identify adolescent male youth and provide them with a safety net which includes 
direction, high expectations, employment opportunities, and educational 
advancement. He states that the weakest factor in African American communities 
is the lack of overall desire to respond to youth who are not biologically related, but 
who belong to the African village. It is obvious that a single parent and two parents 
will not be as successful as a village in raising children. 
Kunjufu asserts that Rites of Passage organizations are needed in every city, 
neighborhood and block. Minimal standards should include exposure to African 
and African American history, economics, p~litics, family responsibility, career 
development, spirituality, community involvement and organizing, physical fitness, 
and the Nguzo Saba value system, taught from an Afrocentric perspective. 
Portland, like any other city, is limited in what it can do to prevent gang-
involvement by youth who are now in middle and high school. Prevention 
programs do need to be of high quality and directed at children who are in 
preschool and elementary school. In neighborhoods with a high concentration of 
students belonging to particular ethnic groups, a culturally-specific curriculum 
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residents about the program and enlist their support in forging a stronger bond 
between the youth, the schools, and the community. 
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More House of Umoja and other cultura!ly-specific programs should be set 
in motion to benefit more youth living dysfunctional lives. Like the Philadelphia 
House ofUmoja, effort should be made to rely as little as possible on public 
funding. Though expensive to operate, if predominantly privately funded, the 
residential facilities could provide family-like, protected surroundings. 
The reality in Portland, and in Oregon overall, is that time has changed the 
circumstances now facing citizens. The trend in Oregon has moved away from 
proactive intervention and has gone the way of vindictive and punitive 
incapacitation for adolescent offenders. For example, Oregon voters recently 
passed a law known as Measure 11. The law requires stiff prison sentences, 
without the possibility of earning a sentence reduction, for anyone 15 years old or 
older who is convicted of any of 21 specific crimes. 
The effort to place a response to the gang issue was an exhausting 
experience and people may no longer feel the sense of urgency to rescue 
neighborhoods and young people from gangs. There may be complacency among 
citizens about what it means to live in a gang-affected neighborhood. Gang 
activity, itself, may now be in a less active phase ofits cyclic behavior. The 
leadership which emerged for that brief period of time has moved on to other 
endeavors. Corporate business leaders and public funding sources may believe they 
have allocated more than enough money iri the direction of programs for wayward 
youth. The push to bring the House ofUmoja into existence may not be able to be 
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recreated. The community process to propel ideas into a reality, however, should 
be practiced often. 
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APPENDIX A 
METHODOLOGY 
The research was designed as a case study to examine the response of 
residents, professionals in social services and law enforcement and government 
officials to the problem of gang activity in Portland. The study followed two 
themes. The first theme focused on forces driving responses to gang activity and 
how choices made by key individuals helped to shape the process. The second 
theme addressed issues related to the choosing of a community based, culturally 
specific, residential facility for gang involved male adolescents. The study focused 
on events, the social context in which the program developed and on key 
informants' recollections of the general mood and context of discussions of the 
issues surrounding the effort to open a residential facility for youth. 
Rationale for a Case Study Approach 
As defined by Yin (1989), "A case study is an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context; when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which 
multiple sources of evidence are used" (p.23). He believes the strength of a case 
study is that it is able to deal with a full variety of evidence (documents, artifacts, 
interviews and observations). He recommends it be used when dealing with "how" 
and "why" questions about contemporary events, but when relevant behaviors 
cannot be manipulated. In style, the research overlapped with an historical study 
(no control over behavioral events), but added direct observation and systematic 
interviewing. 
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The case of the micro and macro social and political climate in which the 
Portland House ofUmoja was brought into being possesses the requirements of the 
definition. It was a situation occurring in the recent past and in the present. It 
could not be studied in a laboratory. Events relevant to the research in question 
were spontaneous. A shooting death could not have been set up in a laboratory to 
determine how citizens would react or who would emerge as a prominent and 
influential personality. Quantitative methods would not capture the milieu of 
community meetings, the urgency felt in dialogues, the dedication of residents, or 
public attitude. 
The rationale for choosing qualitative methodology was based on the nature 
of the research. It was an attempt to understand the meanings of complex sets of 
circumstances and decisions through an understanding of the actors, their motives, 
and the social and political in Portland in the late 1980's and early 1990's. Feagin, 
et al. (1991) state that social scientists "believe decisions tell much about the 
character of power and influence" (p.l 0). Only qualitative data would have been 
able to capture the essence ofthe combination of personalities, charisma, 
reputations, sophistication, timing, strategy, and a certain amount of good fortune 
which shaped the course of events for Umoja. 
Rationale for Holistic Study 
The case was examined holistically, as no logical subunits were identified and 
the underlying theory, itself, was of a holistic nature. Community based programs 
are a judicious and rational intervention (and prevention) for an individual who is 
gang involved. A community-based endeavor would be heavily influenced by the 
social and political climate and the community of discourse surrounding the effort. 
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As Yin (1989) points out, a potential problem of the global approach is that 
the researcher is restricted by his or her data from examining any specific 
phenomenon in operational detail. When using a holistic design, it may be that the 
entire case study can be conducted at an abstract level, lacking any clear measures 
or data. The entire nature of the study may shift and the initial questions may have 
reflected one orientation, but as the case study proceeds, a different orientation may 
emerge, and the evidence begins to address different questions. The largest 
criticism of case studies is this type of shift (when the original research design is no 
longer appropriate for the research questions being asked). 
Construct Validity 
According to Yin, the criticism regarding the ability to ensure construct 
validity in a case study is that subjective judgments are used to collect data. He 
recommends selecting types of areas to be studied, then demonstrating that the 
selected measures of these changes do, indeed, reflect the specific types of areas 
that have been selected. He suggests that tactics to increase construct validity 
include: Using multiple sources of evidence encouraging convergent lines of 
inquiry, having drafts reviewed by key informants, and establishing a chain of 
evidence. 
The research was conducted employing multiple sources of evidence. In 
particular, there were interviews from a wide range of players, each holding a 
unique perspective on events as they unfolded. Documents, brochures, and 
newspaper items were added to support information furnished in interviews. The 
researcher also arranged with several influential players to review drafts of the 
research report for accuracy. 
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External Validity 
The goal was to ensure that the study would be generalizable beyond the 
immediate case. The main criticism of a case study is that it is a poor basis for 
generalizing. But, case studies rely on analytical (not statistical) generalization. In 
analytical generalization, the investigator is striving to generalize a particular set of 
results to some broader theory. That broader theory is the same one that will help 
identify the other cases to which the results are generalizable (Ibid.). 
An attempt was made to generalize the notion that a combination of forces is 
necessary to bring an issue to the attention of people with the power to make 
decisions. Once policy makers have become interested in a project, another 
combination of forces are needed to propel action on the issue. In the case of a 
human needs issue, the community most affected, and its leaders play a large role 
in shaping the course of the process. 
Research Protocol 
Research was conducted mainly through the interview process. Rapport was 
established, first with the staff who currently work at the House ofUmoja. There 
was initial confusion as to the purpose of the research. Quantitative research 
projects regarding the usefulness and successfulness of the House ofUmoja were in 
process. Concern and dismay that quantitative research did not capture the essence 
of"what Umoja's all about" were frequently expressed by House ofUmoja staff. 
An understanding of the types of inquiries to be made and the assurance that none 
of the youth or their records were sought, placed the case study project in a 
favorable light. The Umoja staff assisted with introductions to board members and 
leads to others who might lend additional insight. 
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APPENDICES Band C). The informed consent form follows the standard 
procedure for a taped interview recommended by the Human Subjects Research 
Review Committee. It has been approved by the Committee. 
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The questionnaire was devised in two parts: The first part was administered 
· to persons in Portland who were instrumental in decisions to bring the House of 
Umoja to Portland. The second part was to be asked of David and Falaka Fattah, 
originators of the Philadelphia House ofUmoja. The interview with the Fattahs 
followed a different course, however, and many questions wete not asked. It also 
became clear that the Fattahs were heavily involved in crafting policy to form the 
House ofUmoja in Portland. 
In an effort to understand more about the mission of the House ofUmoja, 
semi-formal interviews were conducted with its executive director. He was not a 
part of the group setting the project in motion, but he was employed by the House 
ofUmoja while it was in its formulation stages. He was initially hired to supervise 
youth who were tearing down the interior of the building which eventually became 
the House ofUmoja. He moved to the position of house parent, then acting 
executive director, and executive director. 
Interviews covered topics from recent events or on-going events involving 
drop-in, outreach, or resident youth, the content and context of meetings with city 
or state government officials, or visions for the House ofUmoja. After six such 
sessions, the researcher believed an interview priority plan was taking form. 
It was reasoned that the "snowball" approach would find interviewees in 
the most complete and efficient manner. Staff at the House ofUmoja provided the 
names of some potential interviewees; in some cases provided the introductions and 
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in others, offered assistance in making connections. Those interviewees provided 
other names. As the list of persons interviewed grew, the names of potential 
interviewees began to repeat. The researcher came to have a degree of confidence 
that the list of interviewees, or those who had been interviewed, constituted a 
reasonably complete list of those important in the process and who could provide 
the most information and insight. There also came to be a degree of certainty that 
some persons had offered peripheral support for only certain aspects of the process, 
that they could offer information, but that ~eir knowledge of the overall process 
would be superficial. 
At times, up to three persons were in various stages of interview completion. 
Scheduling was arranged at a time and location convenient to the interviewee. 
Most interview sessions were held at the interviewee's place of employment, but 
one person preferred her three sessions to take place at a restaurant. No interview 
lasted longer than three 90-minute sessions. Most interviews lasted about one hour. 
Interviews were precipitated by a presentation of the "Informed Consent" 
form and an additional verbal request to tape record the session. In two instances, 
an interviewee requested the recorder be turned off while additional information 
was provided, then allowed it to be reactivated. With one exception, all 
interviewees agreed to be tape recorded. The exception was an individual who was 
willing to be interviewed and even recorded, but took umbrage with verbiage on the 
consent form. She was interviewed, but not recorded. The interviewer took notes 
and sought clarification and approval of the notes from the interviewee. 
Interviews were transcribed in a fashion which sought to capture the emotion 
(sometimes ardent) of the interviewee with appropriate punctuation. Pauses, 
shouts, breath exputsions, and table slams were included in the transcription. 
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Battery failure was of great concern and four spares were carried at all 
times. The problem did not occur. On one occasion, however, it was discovered 
that the tape had malfunctioned. The interviewee was contacted and he graciously 
agreed to be reinterviewed. 
Problems with the Methodology 
The design of the current study posed some problems. The timing of the 
study, parts of the interview process, and the research questions were troublesome 
to some degree. 
When interviewing the Fattahs, it was clear that they had an agenda of items 
to cover, and the interviewer, as their guest, would accept the information they 
chose to provide. While the audience with the Fattahs was an invaluable 
experience, and as a cooperative visitor, the interviewer was guided on an 
interesting tour of the facility, additional information needed to be obtained later, 
via telephone with Sister Fattah. 
The study was begun a full three years after the House ofUmoja opened its 
doors. Memories fade with the passage of time. Most interviewees' recollections 
were what the interviewer perceived to be somewhat romanticized and 
reconstructed versions of a "truly magical time" when everyone collaborated to 
move the program forward. It might have been more interesting and informative to 
have uncovered feelings of disgust and frustration with the process. 
Not all of the key players were available to be interviewed. City and state 
government administrations had changed personnel. One person had died. Others 
did not return phone calls requesting an interview. Former city and state officials 
who had since retired to private practices ignored requests for interviews. 
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Most interviews were completed in an hour-long session. Three interviewees 
were interviewed in three 90-minute sessions. One hour is rarely enough time to 
establish trust and rapport. The interviewer believed that information provided by 
interv'iewees was selective and guarded. Though the process was portrayed a 
community effort in a cause everyone could believe in, more candid recounts of the 
process might have revealed more about the disjointed and contentious experience. 
Early in the interviewing process, it became clear that some of the questions 
were not appropriately written. Several questions were combined and others were 
altered to the extent that they enabled the interview to run more smoothly, but not 
in such a fashion as to change the intent of the inquiry. 
In particular, under section II, questions 1 and 2 read, respectively: "How 
many discussions were held in the course of formulating a policy?" "Who attended 
discussions and what agencies did they represent?" During actual interviews, the 
two questions were cumbersome and redundant. It was learned that the interviewee 
would naturally answer both questions in response to one query. The questions 
were combined, then, to read: "How many discussions were held in the course of 
formulating policy and who attended them?" 
Also, under section II, questions 3 and 4 were combined, as they were clumsy 
when asked individually. They read: "Were all decisions handled in formal 
meetings?" "Who made decisions? How? Developed beforehand, at the table, 
bargaining and compromise?" They were subsequently changed to: "How was the 
decision making process handled?" A follow up clarification would need to be 
made, on occasion, but if the interviewee did not ask for a prompt, the interviewer 
would avoid leading the conversation in a particular direction. 
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Under section IV, questions 1 and 2 were combined, partly because question 
two would be answered in question one, and partly because, in the opinion of the 
interviewer (the author of the questionnaire), the "what went wrong" phrase was 
offensive. They had read: "What went right and what went wrong?" "What would 
you like to have seen handled differently?" As combined, the question read: "What 
went right and what would you like to have seen handled differently?" 
In question 6, section II, the word "experience" was deleted, as it did not seem 
to fit with the type of question being asked. "Experience", in the context used, is in 
a category separate from "position", "money", and "charisma", in its ability to 
influence the decision-making process. 
Another deletion occurred in section III, question 1. The second phrase of the 
second question, "or were people just relieved that there was an attempt to do 
something about the problem?" was omitted, as it seemed argumentative. 
In section Ill, question 2, the word, "violence" was changed to "involvement" 
and the word, "problem" was omitted. The original word evoked more emotion 
than was intended and threw a negative bias on program participants. The 
alternative tenn, "involvement", was chosen for its relative neutrality and political 
correctness. 
----------------






Personal (Telephone) interview with. ____________ , 
(Position) (Address) (Phone) 
INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN BRINGING UMOJA TO PORTLAND: 
I. Chro~ology of events leading to the creation of the House of Umoja 
1. How did gang activity in Portland affect your agency? 
2. How did your agency come to be involved in the decision making process to 
bring the House ofUmoja to Portland? 
3. Was there a specific event or series of events causing your agency to alter the 
way it did business? 
II. Group dynamics of decision makers 
1. How many discussions were held in the course of formulating a policy? 
2. Who attended discussions and what agencies did they represent? 
3. Were all decisions handled in formal meetings? 
4. Who made decisions? How? Developed beforehand, at the table, bargaining and 
compromise? 
5. Was there an appointed leader or someone who seemed to assume a le~dership 
role? 
·-·-·· ··--·---------------------------
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6. How, if at all, did position, money, charisma, or experience, play a part in how 
decisions were made? 
7. Are you aware of people who were influential to, but not actually a part of, the 
decision making process? How and why were they influential? 
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8. How would you characterize the context and climate of the meetings comprising 
the decision making process? 
Ill. Goals of decision making body 
1. Do you believe that some individuals came with an agenda and that there was to 
be no discussion? Were there· alternatives, or were people just relieved that there 
was an attempt to do something about the problem? 
2. How far do you think the House ofUmoja is expected to go toward resolving 
the gang violence problem in Portland? What are Umoja's contributions? 
IV. The decision making experience 
I. What went right and what went wrong? 
2. What would you like to have seen handled differently? 
3. Given what can realistically be accomplished, do you believe the House of 
Umoja has been a wise policy choice, so far? 
4. Is the current state of the House ofUmoja what you believe to have been the 
original intent? Explain. 
INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN ORGANIZING UMOJA IN PHILADELPHIA: 
I. Chronology of events ieading to the development of the House of Umoja 
1. Describe the events leading to the beginnings ofthe House ofUmoja. 
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2. What were you hoping to accomplish when you started? Is it the same today? 
3. Where did you learn about the principles of the Afrocentric concept and how did 
you come to the belief they might work with gang affected youth? 
·II. Organizational dynamics 
1. Under what type of governing body do you currently operate? Has this changed? 
How and why? 
2. If your origins had been different, what would be different about how you 
operate today? 
3. What are your funding sources and how do they affect the kind of service you 
provide? 
III. Goals of Philadelphia House of Umoja 
I. As your organization has aged, how have your goals evolved? 
2. Do you see the organization becoming separated from your original intent? 
IV. House ofUmoja, so far ... 
I. What went right and what went wrong? 
2. What would you like to have handled differently? 
3. What will the House ofUmoja be like five years from now? 
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INFORMED CONSENT 
I, , agree to take part in this 
research project on the social, economic, and political contexts which give rise to 
community based approaches in response to urban problems. 
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I understand that because of this study I run the risk of attributing beliefs or 
attitudes to an individual or group which may not be accurate or may not be those 
the individual or group intends to project, thereby producing strained relationships. 
I also understand that there is the possibility I may be identified through the 
content of the statements I make. · 
Debra Lindberg has told me that the purpose of the study is to learn more 
about how .and why relationships between those who make decisions and the 
contextual features of the decision-making process affect policy. 
I may not receive any direct benefit from taking part in thi:;; study. But the 
study may help to increase knowledge that may help others in the future. 
Debra Lindberg has offered to answer any questions I have about the study 
and what I arn expected to do. 
She has promised that all information I give will be kept confidential to the 
extent permitted by law, and that the names of all people in the study will be kept 
confidential. 
I understand that I do not have to take part in this study and that I may 
withdraw at any time without jeopardizing my relationship ·with my agency or with 
Portland State University. 
I further understand that should I agree to participate in the study that I may 
stop the tape recorder at any time. 
I have read and understand the above information and agree to take part in this 
study. 
Date: _______ Signature:. ______________ _ 
If you have concerns or questions about this study, please contact the Chair ofthe 
Human Subjects Review Committee, Office of Research and Sponsored Projects, 
105 Neuberger Hall, Portland State University, (503) 725-3417. 
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APPENDIXD 
NGUZOSABA 
As stated in Chapter III, Sister Fattah was influenced by the Black Power 
Movement and incorporated the Nguzo Saba (seven guiding principles) into the 
House ofUmoja approach to the rearing of children. The following section 
explains the Nguzo Saba, its philosophy and origins in the African American 
holiday, Kwanzaa. Information contained, herein, relies solely on the work of 
Maul ana Karenga, who created Kwanzaa in 1966. 
Karenga first began to conceive and develop Kwanzaa out of Continental 
Africa First Fruits celebrations, but completed it in the context of the African 
American life and struggle. He believed an African American holiday was 
necessary to reaffirm and restore African heritage and culture for Africar: American 
people. The holiday, a direct product of the 1960s Black liberation movement, is 
an expression of recovery and reconstruction of African culture. Origins and 
functions of ~wanzaa, with its emphasis on family, community, and culture, will 
be outlined first. The rationale and meaning of each of the Nguzo Saba and their 
associated duties, as assigned by Karenga (1988), will be explained last. 
Origins of Kwanzaa 
The seven day, African American holiday, Kwanzaa, is celebrated from 
December 26 to January 1. Its origins are in a selection of the best of what is 
African: It is a synthesis of African cultural elements, with attention to cultural 
authenticity and values for a meaningful, principled, productive life. Its African 
components are a combination of the cultural values and practices of several 
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African peoples from all parts of the continent. It is based, both in conception and 
commitment, on tradition and reason. Kawaida, the philosophy of which Kwanzaa 
was created, teaches, "All we think and do should be based on tradition and reason 
which are, in tum, rooted in practice" (p. 15). Tradition, maintains Karenga, is 
grounding and cultural authenticity for anything done or thought as African people. 
Reason, he states, is necessary critical thought about tradition which enables one to 
select, preserve, and build on the best of what has been achieved. 
Kwanzaa's continental African origins are in the agricultural celebrations, the 
"first fruits". The ·name Kwanzaa is from the Swahili phrase, "matunda ya kwanza" 
(matunda - fruits; ya kwanza - first). First Fruits celebrations were held, even in 
ancient times, in Egypt and other classical African societies: Nubia, Ashantiland, 
Yorubaland, Zulu, Swaziland, Matabele, Thonga, and Lovedu. Karenga critically 
selected values and practices, associated with First Fruits, which were similar in 
each culture's tradition. Five common values and practices emerged: in-gathering, 
reverence, commemoration, recommitment, and celebration. 
In-gathering of people is the bringing together of the most valuable product of 
the nation: people. It serves the purpose of allowing people to renew and 
strengthen bonds. It promotes rituals of communion and sharin:g which strengthens 
mutual concern and commitment. The gathering reaffirms and reinforces bonds 
through collective work and responsibility for the harvest and for collective rituals 
which are also reverential, commemorative, committing, and celebratory. 
Reverence for Creator and creation is the central focus of the in-gathering of 
people. It is an expression of African spirituality (intense emotional and rational 
appreciation for the highest ideals and values of humankind). During the time of 
reverence, participants give thanks to the Creator for a good harvest and a good life. 
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They demonstrate respect for creation by praying for harmony with nature and the 
universe. The agricultural focus is due to the harvest being the focal point, though 
symbolic of divine, natural, and social forces merging into an interrelated and 
harmonious whole. Emphasis is on restoration: renew, refresh, rejuvenate, and 
reinforce the fertility of the earth. It is also on the life and strength of the people, 
the leader, and the creative energy of the cosmos within the context of spirituality. 
Another component is a collective thrust toward renewal and reinforcement of 
social relations through spiritual healing of the people: casting off old, committing 
to new; forgiving and forgetting past offenses; projecting and stressing the highest 
values of the community (love, brotherhood, sisterhood, truth, justice, harmony, 
reciprocity, and peace). 
Commemoration of the past emphasizes ancestors. African people hold a 
profound respect for ancestors, though it is a misnomer to call the practice, 
"ancestor worship." Africans, notes Karenga, worship only God, the Creator, in 
his many manifestations. Respect for ancestors does, however, have a spiritual 
dimension which is more like veneration. Ancestors are venerated because they are 
a source and symbol of lineage, are models of an ethical life, service, and social 
achievement, and serve as spiritual intercessors between humans and the Creator. 
Honoring ancestors is honoring roots, heritage, and lineage. It reminds celebrants 
of bonds of kinship and association; commemorates struggles and deeds; and 
honors struggle to shape the world in their image and interest. He contends that 
one is morally compelled to remember the struggle and achievement of ancestors. 
They left a legacy of tradition which, as stated earlier, grounds people, provides 
cultural authority and measures the cultural authenticity of all that is thought and 
done. 
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Recommitment to cultural ideals refers to the highest cultural values of the 
community, in both thought and practice. Recommitment in culture requires 
reassessment of ones total life pattern involving spiritual, historical, social, 
economic, political, creative, and psychological aspects. Recommitment to the way 
of the Creator is by the way of the ancestors to what is "good." It is a cultural and 
spiritual good which benefits humans and satisfies the Creator through cooperation, 
peace, truth, justice, righteousness, brotherhood and sisterhood, hr_"'Ilony, 
reciprocity, creativity, collective work and responsibility, sharing, mutual care and 
confidence, self determination, and cultural integrity of a people. Its purpose is to 
se1 ve as grounding and social glue for the community. 
Celebration ofthe "Good", both solemn and joyful, is a celebration of the 
Creator and creation, of life, of people, their history and culture, a good harvest and 
good next year. It is a celebration of all that is good, thanksgiving, jubilation and 
communion. Families, communions, and culture are preserved, reaffirmed, and 
renewed. For this reason, first fruits celebrations with the in-gathering, reverence, 
commemoration, recommitment and celebration are considered a celebration of 
family, community and culture. It was in the context of this understanding that 
Kwanzaa has been given its form and content. 
Functions of Kwanzaa 
As stated previously, Kar~nga first conceived of Kwanzaa in terms of African 
agricultural or "First Fruits" celebrations, but completed it within the context of 
African American struggles. It was created to serve several functions for African 
American people: 
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Reaffirming and restoring African heritage and culture was the first function. 
The celebration is an expression of the recovery and reconstruction of African 
culture. Karenga developed Kwanzaa in 1966 in the general context ofthe Black 
liberation movement, and within the specific context of "Us" organization. 
The 1960's Black liberation movement was defined by its thrust to "return to 
the source." The Movement str~ssed reconstruction of African history and culture, 
a redefinition of the individual, a restructuring of goals and pillPose of struggle for 
liberation and a higher level of human life based on an Afrocentric model. 
Us, under the leadership ofKarcnga, was a part of the Movement. It was, and 
remains a leading organization in the process of cultural restoration. It is dedicated 
to the creation, recreation, and circulation of Black culture, maintaining that the key 
to improvement and enrichment of African life is in the rescue and reconstruction 
of their culture. 
The second function of Kwanzaa was to introduce and reaffirm the Nguzo 
Saba (Seven Principles), Karenga's contribution to the Black liberation movement 
call for an African (and African American) value system. The communitarian 
character of the principles is viewed as especially important because of their 
collective emphasis, positive composition and their rootedness and prevalence in 
African culture. The Nguzo Saba are a moral minimum set of values that African 
Americans need to rebuild and strengthen family, community, and culture and 
become a social force in the struggle to control their destiny and daily life. 
Kwanzaa's third purpose was to address the absence of non-heroic holidays in 
the National African American community. Aside from African American history 
month, no national holiday to celebrate a communal event of great historic and 
cultural significance existed before the creation of Kwanzaa. 
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The celebration's next function was to serve as a regular communal 
celebration reaffirming and reinforcing the bonds between African Americans, as a 
people. The in-gathering strengthens the community and reaffirms a common 
identity, national purpose and common direction. 
The final function of Kwanzaa was to strve as an act of cultural self 
determination, a self conscious statement of cultural truth as African people. 
Karenga believes it to be an important expression of being African in a context 
dominated by European thinking. 
Value system 
Kwanzaa's core focus and foundation are rooted in concern with values, an 
inheritance from Kawaida, the African philosophical framework in which it was 
created. Kawaida holds that values are the hinge on which human possibilities 
tum. Emphasis is on the prioritization of values as they produce and sustain 
thought and practice, which either diminish or enhance human possibilities. Values 
are also considered a core component of a culture. They reciprocally interact with 
human practice in creating and sustaining the substance of a culture. Kawaida 
philosophy stresses development of character through instruction in and practice of 
ethics, and places great value on virtue and character. 
Kawaida, and therefore, Kwanzaa also stress communitarianism. In African 
philosophy, the human is never isolated or unattached, but always a person-in-
community. The community defines the person. Karenga quotes Mbiti: "I am 
because we are; and since we are, therefore I am", (p. 39). Personhood is 
considered a process of becoming rather than a state of being. It is achieved by 
successive stages of integration into the community through rites of passage. In 
- ·---· -·----------------------------
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addition to the ritual itself, the struggle to grow, change and develop in the moral 
and social context of the community is the means to becoming a fully, realized 
person. 
The relationship between a community and person, or between individuals is 
one of reciprocity, mutual care, concern and respect. It is empathy and an 
investment in the happiness, well-being, and development of the community. 
Whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole group; whatever happens 
to the group, happens to the individual. Communalism, contends Karenga, is also 
"a recognition of the limited character of the possibilities of the 'individual' alone, 
isolated and outside an adequate support system to aid him/her in his/her quest for 
well-being and self realization" (p. 41 ). It is characterized by values such as social 
well being, solidarity, cooperation, interdependence, and reciprocal obligation. 
Emphasis on communalism has important implications for the social practice 
of the African philosophy. Community, not the individual, is the focal point of 
departure for understanding and organizing community and relations. An 
individual's reality is understood within community. Communal social order 
evolves, advocates, and practices an ethics of care and responsibility within the 
intricate web of social relationships. The process of becoming a full member of 
one's community is a perpetual process of becoming, and full of creative challenge 
for ever higher levels of human life. It ensures an individual's worth and affords 
the opportunity to make a meaningful life through contributions to the general 
welfare. 
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NguzoSaba 
Nguzo Saba is a minimum set of values. Karenga believes that African 
Americans need to build and sustain an Afrocentric family, community and culture. 
As African Americans are a community in struggle, their values must reflect and 
lend support to the struggle. The values are: Umoja (unity); Kujichagulia (self 
determination); Ujima (collective work and responsibility); Ujamaa (cooperative 
economics); Nia (purpose); Kuumba (creativity); Imani (faith). They were chosen 
for four reasons: 
1) their prevalence and recurrence in communitarian African societies; 
2) their perceived relevance to the liberational project of the African 
American struggle for freedom, rebuilding community, and contributing to a 
new history of humankind; 
3) the cultural and spiritual significance of "7" in African culture; 
4) the manageability of the number, "7", in terms ofteaching, memorizing, 
learning and core emphasis. 
Karenga developed the Nguzo Saba and offered it as an Afrocentric value 
system which would enrich personal and ~ommunity interrelations and establish 
standards, commitments, and priorities to enhance human possibilities. It was also 
expected to aid in the recovery and reconstruction of African Americans' lost 
historical memory and cultural legacy. It would serve as a contribution to a core 
system of ethical values for the moral guidance and instruction of the community. 
It would contribute to a set of Afrocentric, communitarian values aiding in the 
development of a person who participates in the ethical project of starting a new 
history of the African people and humankind. 
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Definitions of Guiding Principles 
JJ.mgj_g (unity) means, "to strive for a principled and harmonious togetherness 
in the family, community, nation, and world African community." Karenga states 
that it is the first and foundational principle. All others suffer without it. He 
enjoins African Americans to practice togetherness in all things good and of mutual 
benefit. A moral life includes principled and harmonious togetherness. 
In practice, Umoja is defined by positive interaction and active solidarity, 
which is born, based, and sustained in action. Expressions of Umoja can be seen as 
building, struggling, maintaining, and acting together in mutual benefit. 
Unity, understood as "oneness" implies a similarity and sameness giving 
African Americans an identity as a people. It is imperative to self consciously unite 
to define, defend, and develop interests of African Americans. Within the family, 
Karenga's charge is to engage in harmonious living, sharing and acting in unison, 
avoiding conflict, exercising willing, principled resolution, with yielding and 
gentleness of exchange. The family must reject harshness and practice gentleness, 
stress cooperation, and attend to matters causing division or differences negative to 
togetherness. The family must be the focal point with united parents and multiple 
generations. Elders must be included and respected. They are useful and active in 
the community as judges and reconcilers. The young benefit, as well, by exposure 
to the process of aging, seasoned knowledge and experience. 
Umoja is also practiced in the community. The strengths or weaknesses of 
the family are those of the community. Unity is extended from the family to 
organizational affiliation and unity of organizations. It was for Malcolm X, 
morally irresponsible and self-destructive not to unite around common interests and 
instead glory in differences. Malcolm X contended that African Americans needed 
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supports Malcolm X's contentions. 
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Umoja responsibilities also extend to the national community: Those of 
African race and the world African community. Pan-Africanism is the struggle to 
unite all Africans around common interests and make African cultural and political 
presence on the world, both powerful and permanent. It requires African 
Americans to see themselves, and to behave in history, as an African people, 
belonging to a world community of African peoples. It obligates behavior 
honoring, preserving and expanding the history in the struggle for liberation and 
ever higher levels of human life. 
Kzqichagulia (self determination) means to defme oneself, name oneself, 
create for oneself, and speak for oneself instead of being defined, named, created 
for and spoken for by others. Karenga directs African people to define, defend, and 
develop themselves instead of allowing others to do that. It requires recovery, 
restoration and reconstruction of lost memory in order to, once again, shape the 
world in their own interests and image. He considers it a call for African 
Americans to speak their own special truth to the world. 
Practicing Kujichagulia involves asking oneself, "Who am I?"; "Am I really 
who I am?"; and, "Am I all I ought to be?" Personal identity, history, culture, and 
collective identity are embraced. 
In both the principle and practice of self determination there is the assumption 
of right and responsibility to exist as a people and to make unique contributions to 
human history. African people created and introduced the basic disciplines of 
knowledge: Science, technology, geometry, math, medicine, ethics, and advanced 
architecture. Karenga asserts," ... as fathers and mothers of humanity and human 
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civilization in the Nile Valley, we have no business playing the cultural children of 
the world" (p. 53). He states that open exchange of ideas must occur, but urges 
African people not to accept another's version of their history and cultural identity. 
Self determination supports the principle and practice of "Afrocentricity" and 
is supportive of the right of African people to share with other humans, freedom 
from want, toil, and domination, and freedom to fully realize themselves. The 
Afrocentric view affirms, rescues and reconstructs its own people after enslavement 
and European oppression. It is ongoing reconstruction of lost and missing parts of 
historical self information as a people. It poses African experience as an instructive 
and useful example for human liberation. 
J.l.jjmg. (collective work and responsibility) means to build and maintain the 
African American community together and make one's sisters' and brothers' 
problems one's own. It is, according to Karenga, commitment to active and 
informed accord on matters of common interest and recognition and respect of the 
fact that progress and liberation are impossible without collective work and 
struggle. It supports the notion that "African" is not just an identity, but a destiny 
and a duty. It is an obligation to collectively shape the future. 
As a principle and in practice Ujima is an acceptance of responsibility for 
failures as well as accomplishments. African freedom is indivisible. As long as an 
African anywhere is oppressed, exploited, enslaved or wounded, so are all African 
people. The notion of the desirability of individual freedom is rejected. This poses 
the need to create a context in which all can be free. It supports commitment to and 
concern for human beings within the spirit of cooperaton. Actions benefiting 
others, also benefit the self. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
149 
Ujamaa (cooperative economics) means to build one's own businesses, 
control the economics of one's own community and share in all its work and 
wealth. It is commitment to the practice of shared social wealth and the work 
necessary to achieve it. It is Karenga's contention that social wealth belongs to the 
masses of people who created it. Furthermore, no person should have such an 
unequal amount of wealth that it creates the ability to impose unequal, exploitative 
or oppressive relations on others. Sharing wealth is another form of communitarian 
exchange. 
Ujamaa is based on the assumption of human equality, on the belief 
domination of another is immoral, and on the knowledge that every person desires 
freedom and the ability to lead a decent life in conditions of peace. It is a human 
centered principle holding that happiness and development are best achieved in the 
context of shared social wealth. 
It stresses self reliance in building, strengthening and controlling the 
community's economics. It assumes a responsibility and respect for the dignity and 
value of work. It obliges generosity, especially to the poor and vulnerable. 
!jjg (purpose) means to make African Americans' collective vocation the 
building and developing of community in order to restore the people to their 
traditional greatness. It is commitment to collectively building, developing and 
defending the national community, its culture and history in order to regain 
historical initiative and greatness as African people. Personal and social purpose 
are not at odds. The highest form of personal purpose is social purpose, which 
involves and benefits the community. 
It is based on the assumption that African people's role, historically, has been 
and remains, key in the great legacy Africa has given the world. Not only having 
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introduced in the Nile Valley civilizations, the basic disciplines ofhuman 
knowledge, gives Nia overriding cultural purpose and suggests a direction. 
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As both heirs and custodians of the great legacy, African people must 
recognize and respect its importance. As custodians, they must guard, preserve, 
expand, and promote it. They must recognize and respect where it places African 
Americans in total picture of humankind's development: Not as ghetto dwellers, 
but as world historical people who have made and must continue to make a 
significant contribution to the forward flow of human history. 
Kuumba (creativity) means to do always as much as possible to leave the 
community more beautiful and beneficial than when it was inherited. It is 
commitment to being creative within the context of the national community 
vocation of restoring African people to their traditional greatness and leaving the 
community beneficial and beautiful. Kuumba has both a social and spiritual 
dimension and is deeply rooted in African societies' teachings. 
The responsibility to behave creatively is clearly expressed in writings of 
ancient Egypt. Whether an original act, imitation of the Creator, or restorative act, 
Kuumba is constantly revitalizing and restoring the natural, spiritual and cosmic 
energy of the world. The concepts of restoration and progressive perfection 
(restoration to something beautiful than before) are key in Kawaida philosophy. 
Kuumba is not creation from nothing, but creative restoration in the African 
spirit of cultural restoration and renewal. It assumes the ability and obligation to 
strive always to leave what one inherits more beautiful and beneficial than before. 
Emphasis is on generational responsibility: leaving a legacy building on and 
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society causing growth and ensuring life for eternity. 
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Imani (faith) means to believe with one's whole heart in the Creator, the 
people, parents, teachers, leaders and the righteousness· and victory ofthe African 
struggle. It assumes a profound belief in and commitment to all that is or'value to 
Africans: family, community, people and culture. It begins in belief in the Creator 
and in the positiveness of creation, and leads to a belief in the essential goodness 
and possibility of the human personality. 
All African spiritual traditions teach that humans are made in the image of the 
Creator. Thus, they are capable of ultimate righteousness and creativity through 
self-mastery and development within the context of positive support. An important 
aspect of Imani is faith in the self and faith in the capacity of humans to live 
righteously, to self correct, support, care for and be responsible for others and 
eventually create the just and good society. 
Karenga holds that faith is central to the progress of African people. He 
states that they must believe in the value and validity, the righteousness and 
significance of the struggle for liberation and higher level of human life. There 
must be a belief in the ability to carry out the assigned role: to set in. motion new 
history of humankind and in the company of other oppressed and the Third World 
peoples; to pose a new structure of human society and human relations. The role is 
not to imitate oppressors or be taught by them. It is to dare to struggle, to become 
free, politically and culturally, to raise images reflective of capacity for human 
progress and greatness. 
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APPENDIXE 
AFROCENTRISM 
This section provides information regarding the philosophical basis for the 
House ofUmoja program. It orients the reader to the meaning of the term, 
"Afrocentrism". 
Afrocentrism is a quality of thought and practice rooted in the cultural image 
and human interests of African people. It is African holism, rooted ·man African 
value system, especially in an historical and cultural sense. It is recovery and 
reconstruction of the classical model of an African worldview. It is also an 
ongoing restoration of lost parts of African American historical self-information. It 
is viewing the experience of all African people as an instructive and useful model 
for human liberation and a higher level of human life (Asante, 1990; Karenga, 
1988). 
Karenga ( 1988) holds Eurocentrism to be racist and practicing a structured 
denial of the history and humanity of Third World people. He states that one of the 
greatest problems in the world is the progressive Europeanization of human 
consciousness: the attempt by European people to impose their cultUre as the 
universal and only serious option for humanity and against the tendency of Third 
World people. Afrocentrism, conversely, seeks to affirm, rescue and reconstruct its 
own history and humanity after the "Holocaust of Enslavement" various other 
forms of European oppression. Afrocentrism, he states, does not attempt to deny or 
destroy others' humanity. 
Asante ( 1990) contends that Eurocentrism is a development to support a 
version of Africa which justified the subjugation of a people and the annihilation of 
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cultures. Afrocentrism is not "slave studies", and goes beyond a Western rendition 
of history to revalidate the African place in the interpretation of Africans. The 
notion of "slave studies" is rejected as it is a limitation which would disconnect 
Africans in America from thousands of years of history and tradition. It is difficult 
to determine when an African-centered viewpoint is imposed. Most Western 
thought interprets world history and present day interactions in terms of European 
values and perspectives. "African Studies" is often the study of Africa from a 
European frame of reference. 
African Ideals and Values 
As in any culture, the exact composition of African ideals and values is the 
subject of debate and perhaps impossible to determine. Basic to the ethical system, 
however, are the seven guiding principles of Nguzo Saba (Karenga, 1988). Each 
day a principle is designated for reflection, anticipation, planning, and enjoyment 
with hope for the future and reinforcement of mutual goals. The principles are 
described in detail in Appendix C. 
Umoja (unity)- to strive for and maintain unity in the family, community, 
nation and race, coming together and sharing. 
Kujichagulia (self determination) - to define, name, create and speak for 
oneself, instead of being defined, named, created for, and spoken for by others; 
freedom to define goals. 
Ujima (collective work and responsibility)- to build and maintain a 
community as a group; to own problems as a collective and to solve them as such; 
accepting responsibility for past and future, good or bad. 
------------------------------
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Ujamaa (cooperative economics)- to build and maintain stores, shops, other 
businesses and to profit from them together, believing people come before profit 
and that money is not the only measure of all things; considering the needs of all 
people. 
Nia (purpose) - to make the collective vocation, the building and developing 
of the community in order to restore Africans to their traditional greatness; working 
together as social beings in communities. 
· Kuumba (creativity)- to do always am much as possible in order to leave the 
community more beneficial than when inherited; enhancing the world. 
Imani (faith) - to believe in the African people, parents, teachers, leaders and 
the righteousness and victory of the struggle; believing in inner strengths; 
respecting and selectively honoring leaders. 
Afrocentric Worldview 
The remainder of the section describing Afrocentrism relies solely on the 
writings and opinions ofMolefKete Asante (1990). He states that Afrocentrism 
depends heavily on myth, symbol, motif, code and conversations as a valid frames 
of reference for decision-making. Principle questions of meaning, knowledge, 
values, and aesthetics are framed so they are distinctly Afrocentered in relation to 
external phenomena. African culture in myths, legends, literatures and oratures 
play a significant role and take into consideration the dynamics of race, culture, 
gender, and class. 
Race, Asante says, is an important factor to understand in structuring an 
African American perspective. It is a factor that remains prevalent in 
heterogeneous, but hegemonically Eurocentric societies. At the same time, 
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Afrocentrism recognizes class distinctions as a social reality and seeks to empower 
individuals to exercise their economic and political authority against them. Race 
and class are the most dominant aspect of intersocial relations in many Western 
societies. 
He continues by stating that the Afrocentric approach understands culture as 
shared perceptions, attitudes, and predispositions which allow people to organize 
experiences in certain ways. Afrocentrism encourages r~cognition of different 
cultures encourages identification of overlaps in social and cultural definitions. 
Explanations of how issues and people are joined or differentiated are sought. 
Afrocentrism encourages a response to social behaviors rather than to cultural 
behaviors. 
Nature of Knowledge 
A sante contends that the Afrocentric quest for truth will be found in language, 
myth, ancestral memory, dance-music-art, and science. Myth is "prebelief' based 
on the particularity of the African experience in the world. It is an expression of 
the depth of the culture intertwined with stories and legends. Dance, music, and art 
are central to interpretation of cultural and social reality. Dance is a way of life in 
traditional African life, not merely a leisure activity. "Dance and music must be 
interwoven with life" (p.ll ). The Afrocentric approach allows for opportunities to 
express much of life's daily experiences and special events through these artistic 
media. 
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Value System 
An ethical system is central to the quest for truth, states Asante. Ethical 
is~;ues are connected to, and are essentially, functional knowledge. In social 
analyses, "good" is judged by historical conditions and cultural developments of a 
particular society. Personal conduct, how one "walks among others" determines 
goodness. "Beauty" is judged by action, rather than physical attributes. 
Aesthetic Concept 
Creative expression of knowledge and right conduct are woven through all 
aspects of African life. Seven artistic senses are delineated. They are: polyrhythm, 
polycentrism, dimensional, repetition, curvilinearity, epic memory, holism. They 
exist as leading elements of Afrocentrism's response to art. 
Polyrhythm is the simultaneous recurrence of several major rhythms. 
Polycentrism is the presence of several colors in a painting or several 
movements in a dancers body occurring in the context of presentation of art. 
The dimensional element refers to spatial relationships and shows depth, 
energy, and awareness ofvital force. 
Recurrences are represented in African art. They are not necessarily the exact 
theme, but will contain the same concept. 
Curvilineature appears art, dance, music or poetry. 
Epic memory is the idea that art contains an historic memory which allows 
both the artist and audience to participate in the same celebration or pathos. 
Holism is the unity of the collective parts of the art work, despite the various 
unique aspects of the art. 
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Formal Acquisition of Knowledge 
Africalogy is Afrocentrism in a heuristic sense. Defined, it is the Afrocentric 
study of phenomena, events, ideas, and personalities related to Africa. A scholar 
generates research questions based on the centrality of Africa using the classical 
origins of civilization (the Nile River valley) as the beginning of knowledge. It is 
the study of Africans in the United States, Jamaica, or Brazil with appreciation for 
the historical and cultural significance of Africa. It maintains the precedence of 
classical African civilization. It begins analysis from the primacy of the classical 
African civilizations, Kemet (Egypt), Nubia, Axum, and Meroe. 
Africalogy recognizes seven general subject fields: social, communication, 
historical, cultural, political, economic, and psychological. It is study located in the 
social context of African people, libraries, archives, o.r laboratories. The purpose is 
to provide research which is ultimately verifiable in human experience, the final 
empirical authority. 
Africalogy studies more than just written word. Because written documents 
are often not found, does not mean that they did not exist. It may be that materials 
did not survive or a limited number of people could read and write. Also, alternate 
forms of communication, besides an alphabetic system of writing, can exist. Some 
of the alternate systems are more complex and hold several levels of subtle 
significance for the interpreter. 
The Western approach to knowledge is to study societies familiar and similar 
to the dominant European mind. A great amount of archeological data remains of 
the Vikings and Phoenicians, especially in terms of alphabetic-style writing (a 
communication method understood by Europeans). Both cultures have been 
heavily studied due to their accessibility through a system recognized and embraced 
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by Western researchers. In the course of scrutinization, a wider array of material 
culture has been attributed to them than is justified. African cultures, not as readily 
understood, have concomitantly been ignored and recognition of their contributions 
to world civilization diminished. 
In further abandonment of acknowledgment of African gifts, Western thought 
often classifies peoples by "race", using statements of value identified with race 
theory. Prior to the era of world exploration beginning in the fifteenth century, 
people of dark melanin were honored and revered. The diminution of the stature of 
the "African race" began as justification for geographical and human conquests and 
subjugation. 
Race is usually interpreted as the progeny of a fairly stable common gene 
pool which produces people with similar physical characteristics. Usually, oceans 
are the biggest barriers to gene pool overflow and provide fairly tight boundaries. 
People of the whole African continent comprise the African race. Included are all 
those whose ancestors originated there and who possess linguistic and cultural 
qualities and traits associated with the gene pool. In a biological sense, it could be 
said that all humans are African since all possess the mitochondrial DNA of an 
African woman who lived about 200,000 years ago. In the present historical epoch, 
though, "African" has come to mean one who has physical and cultural 
char!lcteristics similar to those presently found in some region of the continent. 
Society pertains to an interrelated set of habits created and maintained by 
humans by interacting. Culture, on the other hand, refers to a cognitive concept 
about how humans interact, create, maintain, and develop institutions in as much as 
culture exists in the brain as well as in the execution. 
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Centrism is the groundedness of observation and behavior in one's own 
historical experiences. It shapes the concepts, paradigms, theories, and methods of 
Africalogy. It is the life perspective which secures a place along side the other 
centric pluralisms without hierarchy and without seeking hegemony. It is sustained 
by a commitment to centering the study of phenomena and events in the particular 
cultural voice of the composite African people. It opens the door for interpretations 
of reality based in evidence and data secured by reference to the African world 
voice. 
Africalogical Methodology 
Western methods of scholarly study have philosophical roots in specific 
assumptions about phenomena, human inquiry, and knowledge. The usual 
Eurocentric frame of reference regarding African peoples flows from a 
conceptualization developed to support the Western version of Africa. 
Africalogy relies heavily on a descriptive mode for research, though critics 
contend that objectivity is compromised. The Afrocentrist does not accept the 
European concept of objectivity because it is invalid, operationally. What passes 
for objectivity is a collective European subjectivity based on racist Western 
perceptions of history. Afrocentricity identifies with research verifiable in the 
experience of human beings, the final empirical authority. Method~ ofproofare 
founded in principles of fairness and openness: acts proven to be fair in procedure 
and open in application. 
The Eurocentric approach allows individual research to be conducted, 
thinking objectivity can be ensured. The researcher is expected to make sense of 
discoveries made in a community about which nothing is known. When 
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conducting cross cultural or transracial study, Afrocentric research requires two 
researchers to collect and assess similar data. At least one researcher must be from 
the social or cultural context. 
Asante believes that experimental laboratory research with universal laws, 
favored by Westerners, is highly questionable .. People live in societies and operate 
within cultures, not controlled environments. The Africalogist has a different goal 
and a harmonizing mission: in depth knowledge of social-human context. Strength 
is found in cooperative and integrative functions of human experiences. All 
assumptions about reality are questioned. It is an interactive, holistic model rather 
than a distant, sterile, abstract, isolated, detached, disparate, reality. 
The approach also rejects separation of the investigator/subject relationship. 
Social context encourages a collective as opposed to an individual separation. The 
investigator must be immersed into the culture to be studied. He or she must have 
familiarity with the history, language, myths, and philosophy of the people under 
study. According to Asante, " ... reality is a process and ... the discussion of 
normative patterns cannot be made intelligently unless the researcher understands 
the social context" (p. 28). Furthermore, the researcher is required to examine 
himself or herself in the process of examining any subject. It involves intropection 
and retrospection. Introspection will ascertain personal obstacles. Retrospection 
calls for the researcher to self-question afterward for obstacles to fair interpretation. 
Methodology, holistic and integrative, participatory and committed to the 
advancement of knowledge, creates spaces for human understanding. It seeks to 
provide logical explanations of African peoples' experiences from the origin of 
civilization to the present. It works to develop a holistic approach to the role of 
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through interpretations and analyses derived from an Afrocentric perspective. 
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History is the key discipline in providing a knowledge base for Afrocentric 
research. Hegel, like other European and American writers, held an arrogantly 
Eurocentric view of history and demonstrated an overwhelming ignorance of 
ancient African civilizations. He viewed Greek culture as virgin while it was 
actually African-derived. He admitted, with reluctance, the Egyptians preceded the 
Greeks in civilization, but would not admit that Egypt was a high culture. 
In further dismissal of African contributions to world civilizations, Western 
thinking historians, and anthropologists have imposed a false division on the 
African continent. They claim it is composed of Asian Africa, European Africa and 
Africa proper. In their view, Africa proper is the area south of the Sahara; 
European Africa is north of the Sahara; and Egypt is connected to Asia. Scholars 
have tried to argue that the area north of the Sahara is qualitatively different from 
southern areas. The attitude displays extreme disregard for historical processes 
carried out by Africans in various cultural and social contexts for many millennia. 
Egypt, portrayed as belonging more to Asia than Africa, is ignoring the fact 
that the African civilization in Egypt flourished for 4,000 years prior Arab invasion. 
Continental definition of Africa, geographically, must acknowledge its cultural and 
historical unity. It is less likely that Egypt was inspired by Asian than by other 
African influences: Nubia, Punt, Libya, and Ethiopia, all of which flourished along 
the Nile, the principle origin of social, historical, civic and monumental life. 
Propinquity suggests Egypt more closely related to African societies than to more 
distant and inaccessible lands. 
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Africalogy does not deny rationalism its historical place, but neither does it 
deny other forms of human inquiry their places in the acquisition of knowledge. 
Humans can reason without lessons 1in logic and can learn without being instructed. 
To advance knowledge, the fundamental ingredients must be openness to all 
possibilities, freedom of thought, evaluation of all data received, and integration of 
all methods by human beings into the intellectual inquiry. Different sensibilities 
must be used to gain access to knowledge. Oral traditions, linguistics, material 
transformation, trade patterns, legends, my-ills, and rumors must be utilized. The 
researcher must move beyond the moment and grasp the dynamic and rhythmic 
processes by which all live in the world. The scholar must be engaged creatively as 
a person who lives in the world, encompassing the psychological, cultural, and 
mythical dimensions of human life. "Indeed, we make the future by virtue of 
realizing in our actions the predominant objective task for restructuring the present. 
The authentic empirical experience is living in the world with an appreciation of the 
individual as the motive force for social reconstructionism" (p. 38). 
African aesthetic sensibility seeks to merge facts with beauty which becomes 
the creative quest for an interpretation which "looks good" while it is explaining. 
The African-centered idea of holism is that everything is everything, and we are 
part of the one and the other is our own measure (Asante, 1990). 
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APPENDIXF 
JENNE, THE BEAUTIFUL CITY OF WEST AFRICA 
This section describes the Beautiful City of Jenne. Sister Fattah's goal is to 
replicate the city. The House ofUmoja in Philadelphia has begun renovation of 
their buildings based on the architecture of Jenne. Sister Fattah's goal is for Umoja 
to also become an Afri~an cultural and educational center like J~nne. The 
information contained in the description of the City of J~nne is borrowed from 
Robinson, Battle, and Robinson (1987), recommended by Sister Fattah. 
The city of Jenne was founded by the Sonikes during the 13th century, in the 
declining years of Ghana's Empire, on the backwaters ofthe Bani River, a tributary 
of the Niger. Jenne was known then as "the Beautiful City". It was considered to 
be the most beautiful city in the world by international travelers of the 15th and 
16th centuries. Part ofthe city's attraction was due to the beauty of its waterways, 
and it could only be reached through a narrow and twisting passage of canals and 
streams. 
Jenne was also a sophisticated, affluent city. Songhai had an enlightened 
system of banking and credit. The dress of many citizens was luxurious. Men and 
women wore jewels, much gold, and velvet flowing robes. Tree-lined avenues 
fronted multi-level homes of polished stone, a m~el of architecture and design. 
The city's park was known for its hanging gardens. Night clubs presented 
orchestras which performed on violins, harps, flutes, guitars, bugles and bagpipes. 
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The city was also an educational center. The great university of Jenne hosted 
scholars of all nationalities and races. Fourteen hundred faculty taught law, 
medicine, history, astronomy, languages, and higher mathematics. 
A wide commercial area housed foundries which manufactured iron swords 
and agricultural implements. Iron was first smelted in Africa, and different clans in 
the Songhai empire specialized in metallurgy. Armor was woven from steel 
through a smelting process that produced caparisoned products which were light, 
flexible, and almost impenetrable. The commercial centers of Jenne held a variety 
of shops displaying glass, copper, tin, silver, gold; ivory; and clothing 
In West Africa, during the same period called the Middle Ages in Europe, the 
art of phy~ical healing was performed through training schools and colleges of 
medicine operated under the authority of the emperors of the Songhai Empire. 
Disciplines of medicine included surgery, the transplanting of limbs, and the study 
of bacteria. Caring for the sick included prescriptions for hundreds of diseases 
including vaccinations against smallpox, as well as such sophisticated operations as 
the removal of cataracts. Physicians of Jenne were also taught the art of mental and 
emotional healing, and a wide and knowledgeable use of herbal medicine. 
The Songhai was an empire larger than Europe, located in West Africa. Jenne 
surrendered to Songhai warriors in 1473 after a seven year siege of the city. After 
the acquisition of Jenne, the Songhai Empire replaced Mali as the dominant power 
in the western Sudan. The city and Songhai empire declined in the 17th and 18th 
centuries. Scholars are unsure of the causes. 
0 What a beautiful city. 
0 What a beautiful city! 
Twelve gates to that city of 
Hallelujah! 
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This song was voiced in remembrance of Jenne on the plantations of 
America's old South. European explorers and traders sought to reach the Sud·an 
from the coastal regions, but were prevented by the rain forests and the strong 
Songhai armed forces. The Songhai people did not sell any of their citizens to the 
Europeans as suggested by some historians, and except for isolated instances of . 
kidnapping, were able to defend against the Europeans during the 15th and 16th 
centuries. 
A replica of the ancient city of Jenne was built by the noted sculptor Reginald 
E. Beauchamp. It was first displayed in the foyer of Philadelphia's Evening and 
Sunday Bulletin and soon after in the newly opened First Pennsylvania Bank in 
1974. The recreation of Jenne has now found a permanent home in the buildings of 
the House ofUmoja in West Philadelphia (Robinson, et al, 1987). 
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